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Abstract
Jones, Jeffery. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2018. “Benjamin O. Davis
Sr.: America’s First Black General: The Paradox of Racial Leadership and the Military
Profession” Major Professor: Dr. Aram Goudsouzian

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the life and military legacy of the Army’s
first African-American general. Using the life and military career of Benjamin O. Davis Sr. as a
lens into the military experience of black soldiers in general, I hope to capture his historical
impact upon the military and American society in general.
I would like to explore to what extent Davis accommodated, resisted, and or negotiated
the larger patterns of racism in the US military, and to what extent he shaped those patterns.
American attributes normally associated as positive traits that coincided with military
service, i.e., nationalism, military professionalism, and service to the nation, in many cases,
clashed against the black American experience of racism, segregation, and open prejudice. As
blacks entered the military of Davis’s era they were faced with an institution that was openly
hostile and dominated by white male figures who openly questioned their value and role within
the military.
Within this dissertation I will expand on the discussion about the life and service of Davis
started by Marvin Fletcher in 1989. This has been the only work written on Davis Sr. Most
black military historians or writers have largely overlooked the service and meaning of Davis’s
life and status as the Army’s first black general officer.
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Several key black authors mentioned within this study, Bernard Nalty, Gail Buckley,
David Kilroy, and Gerald Patton, only briefly touch on Davis in their studies of blacks who have
served in America’s military. I assert that Davis helped to shape conversations about what
military service meant to black soldiers and Americans and African Americans in general.
While he may have been a reluctant racial figure, Davis’s service and success within the military
helped to open portals towards understanding spatial, cultural, and social aspects of black’s
service within the army from the period that he served to present.
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Introduction

Benjamin Oliver Davis Sr. is remembered in American history as an iconic as well as
enigmatic figure. In 1943 he was the first African American military officer to break through the
glass ceiling of the Army Officer’s corps to enter the esteemed rank of general officer. This
achievement for a black soldier in a segregated army was quite literally unprecedented. His rise
from the lowest rank of private was the quintessential example of American achievement. It
took him more than forty years of regular active duty service for this transition to take place.
Davis did this within an organization in which all conceivable odds were placed against him.
While Davis served there had only been a select number of blacks that were even allowed the
revered status of an army commission. Between 1865 and 1940 there were never more than four
black officers who served as regular active duty officers at a given time. Davis carried the
distinction of being one of the four for thirty-nine of those years. Despite his stellar record
within the military, Davis is hardly noted within the black community as a race advocate. His
voice and notoriety for the majority of the American laity remains obscure.
Davis avoided many of the common pitfalls that resulted in very short careers for other
black officers. Too often, many black officers who were lucky enough to have passed the
rigorous tests and screening to obtain a regular army commission were met with stiff opposition
in their first assignment.
Placed under white senior officers, many faltered as they failed to convince their
commanding officers that they were worthy of the longevity of a career in the regular army.
Blacks were first allowed to enter West Point in 1870. Between 1870 and 1900 the academy
1

admitted 12 African American cadets of which, three would successfully navigate the premier
officer producing school. 1 Henry Ossian Flipper was the first to complete the academy in 1877.
He was followed by John Alexander in who completed the academy in1887 and Charles Young
who graduated in 1889. Young would be the last black to successfully negotiate the school for
decades. Following Young, three other African Americans were admitted into the academy, but
they failed to graduate. The academy unofficially halted admissions of black cadets until 1932,
when Benjamin Davis Jr. was admitted. This left direct commissioning as the only means for
blacks to enter the regular army officer corps for more than 30 years.
Black men who were appointed and then able to successfully complete West Point were
celebrated by the entire black community for their achievements and heralded as race leaders.
Unfortunately, their sudden dismissals from the service also brought notoriety, leaving these men
shamed for their failure. In most cases, this was due to flagrant racist actions taken against them
by white military commanders such as Colonel William R. Shafter, who dismissed Second
Lieutenant Henry Flipper in 1882. In 1881 Flipper was accused of embezzling funds and
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentlemen by Shafter.
He was acquitted of the embezzlement charge but was found guilty, by general court
martial, of conduct unbecoming an officer. On June 30, 1882, he was dismissed from the Army
as required by this conviction. 2
The common line of reasoning for most white senior army officers following the Civil
War and Indian Wars was that blacks lacked the capacity of sound reasoning that would have
The Racial History of the U.S. Military Academies, Susan D. Hansen: The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education,
No. 26 (Winter, 1999-2000), pp. 111-116.
2
The Colored Cadet at West Point: Autobiography of Lieut. Henry Ossian Flipper, U.S.A. (Homer Lee & Co; First
edition, 1878). Hansen, The Racial History of the U.S. Military Academies.
1

2

enabled them to be viable leaders. 3 The mindset of many senior white officers such as Shafter
was that ridding the service of such problematic figures was viewed as normal attrition that
allowed the best officers to rise to the top. 4 The legacy of such attitudes has prevailed even into
today’s military force as black officers, both male and female, are forced to navigate through
many of the same straits that were present during Davis’s early years in the Army.
Brigadier General Remo Butler in his 1995 study noted that the Army is primarily a
reflection of a white-male-dominated culture with which many young blacks have little or no
experience. And since many whites have little or no experience with black culture in America, it
is difficult for many white commanders to understand and acknowledge the difference with a
sense of neutrality or an unbiased perspective. 5
Those who were forced out under negative circumstances were left embittered and
shaken in their core values of what it meant to be an American, and they questioned whether
ascending to become a member of a professional elite was worthwhile. Accompanying the
demise of their military career was also the loss of stature in the black community, as their
attributes of masculinity and professional competence were left in question. Lastly, their status
as lesser American citizens was vividly laid bare.
Colonel Charles Young, a colleague and mentor of Davis who had helped him to acquire
a regular Army appointment, by all measures of his time in service, was a successful career

Brian G. Shellum, Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier Regiment: The Military Career of Charles Young, (Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press, 2010), pp.10-11; William A. Dobak, Thomas D. Phillips, The Black Regulars:18661898, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001) pp.68-69. Memorandum to Chief of Staff of the Army from
Lytle Brown, Brigadier General (ca. 1917), RG309, NARS.
4
Shellum, Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier Regiment, pp. 11-13.
5
Remo Butler, “Why Black Officers Fail,” Parameters 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 54,
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/99autumn/butler.htm
3
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officer. Nonetheless, he ended a thirty-plus year career, angry and sarcastic. He epitomized
these emotions in the advice he offered to a young man seeking counsel about a career in the
military. Young responded in a letter back to the prospective neophyte in bittertones, stating:
“My advice is, don’t think of it. If you put one-half of the time, patience, diligence and ‘pep’ in
any other profession or vocation, you will succeed and get rich but if you go thru the Military
Academy it means a dog’s life while you are there and for years after you graduate, a pittance of
a salary as a subaltern and in the end retirement on a mere competence, which does not pay if
you have a little girl in view that wishes to wear diamonds. I tell you this as a brother who has
been over the whole road. I wish I had taken my time and put in tropical agriculture and
supplemented it with the Spanish language and I would have been a rich man now instead of a
Colonel on the scrap heap of the U.S. Army.” 6
Young, after more than thirty years of devoted service, had grown reproachful with the
military. Throughout his career he had experienced systemic racial bias, segregation, and steady
messaging that black soldiers were not on par with their white contemporaries. Despite his harsh
experience, he remained in the Army as a career soldier because his lot as a soldier was still
better than most of his contemporaries who sought middle class careers.
Benjamin O. Davis Jr., in tribute to his father’s courage and endurance, also recounted
how his experiences with the military clashed with his loyalty to the military and nation.
Commenting on his own “trial by fire” between 1932 and 1936 at West Point, and his first years
as an active duty officer, Davis Jr. noted, “I was ashamed that the army would treat my wife and
me the way they did. I had a great deal of trouble reconciling those first six years with the “Duty,

David P. Kilroy, For Race and Country: The Life and Career of Colonel Charles Young, (Westport: Praeger
Publishers, 2003), pp.120-121. “Race Leaders in the Making,” Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 28, 1917.

6
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Honor, Country, I had been taught at West Point.” 7 Davis Jr. also observed how foreigners of
any race habitually enjoyed near equal treatment in the United States. He observed that while
native-born American blacks were routinely castigated, mocked, and scorned throughout the
army, their foreign-born contemporaries who were invited to the US for military schooling often
enjoyed both formal and informal acceptance by white soldiers and leaders. This included young
men of ethnic origin who were practically indistinguishable in physical appearance from
American blacks. Davis Jr. recalls that West Point cadets from Thailand and Nicaragua that
served with him during his tenure at the academy were treated much better.
He expressed that while at West Point, foreign cadets were considered practically equal
to whites and enjoyed American generosity, while he and subsequent black cadets that followed
him at West Point were subjected to such negative features as the silent treatment, mockery, and
ridicule throughout the span of their service at the academy. 8
The first black officers to serve in the army numbered only approximately 100 men who
had been commissioned during the American Civil War and Reconstruction era. These men had
been promoted to this rank under the Army Reorganization Act of 1866. 9 Concerned about
restiveness among the Plains Indians and the demands of policing Reconstruction, Congress
passed the Army Reorganization Act in 1866, authorizing the creation of ten new regiments of
cavalry, five new artillery regiments, and forty-five new infantry regiments. Within this force,
two of the cavalry regiments and four of the infantry regiments were to be made up of black

Marvin E. Fletcher, Taped Interview conducted with Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., by Marvin E. Fletcher and Edward
Coffman, Chicago Illinois, 2 June 1968, Davis Archives; Marvin Fletcher Collection, U.S. Military Institute,
Carlisle, Pa.
8
Marvin E. Fletcher, Taped Interview conducted with Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., by Marvin E. Fletcher and Edward
Coffman, Chicago Illinois, 2 June 1968; Davis Archives; Marvin Fletcher Collection, U.S. Military Institute,
Carlisle, Pa.
9
Ibid.
7
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soldiers. Although these six regiments were exclusively black, their commanders and line
officers were to be white. The only unique exceptions within the next several generations would
be the three black officers who completed West Point. These officers were limited to service
within the black regiments.
The black officers who had served during the Civil War were decorated war heroes and
were nominated for officer commissions by their white superiors. Although these men were
proven leaders tested by fire in battle and heartily endorsed by their white command structure,
their status as army officers was deemed unworthy for the regular army. None of them were
allowed to retain commissions as the Army restructured itself. Most white leaders within the
War Department for various reasons feared the prospect of these black officers leading white
enlisted soldiers or white subordinate officers. Their rank as lieutenants was only good within
the segregated units within which they served. 10 In 1869, the army reorganized and reduced the
four black infantry regiments to two, leaving the 24th Infantry (Colored) and the 25th Infantry
(Colored) regiments. The cavalry regiments, the famed 9th and 10th Cavalry (Colored)
regiments, remained intact. 11 Black officers who left or were reassigned from their segregated
units were to be relegated to whatever their previous rank had been before their promotion. As a
rule of thumb this was not permitted anyway, as the Army remained segregated. In the waning
years of the nineteenth century some white leaders questioned the need for blacks to serve at all.
None of this initial group of black officers was promoted above the rank of captain.

10
Marvin E. Fletcher. The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891-1917, (Missouri: University of
Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 52-57.
11
Ibid.
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Davis was preceded in the unique experience of black officership within the army by
such figures as James W. Smith of South Carolina, the first black to enter the West Point
Military Academy in 1870.
Despite Smith’s investment of four years of dedicated service, his time at the academy
was characterized by what became a standard practice against black cadets that included extreme
hazing and ostracism. Smith failed to complete West Point. Between 1870 and 1889 twentythree blacks were appointed and twelve who passed entrance examinations to the academy, but
only three of these graduated. 12
With the help of his father, Louis Davis, Benjamin applied for admission into West Point
in 1898. His father hoped to secure an appointment through friendly contacts within President
William McKinley’s administration but was rebuffed with the reply that appointing a black man
to the United States Military Academy was not feasible at that time. 13 With West Point out of
the question as a source for a commission, Davis sought a direct commission through testing in
1899. He hoped that he would be allowed to serve in one of several newly authorized volunteer
regiments that were bound for the Philippines during the Filipino Insurrection. He was again
turned down by the Army. Despite an excellent academic record, stellar fitness reports, and
recommendations from friends and supporters such as Senator Shelby Cullom of Illinois; Mrs.
John Logan, an influential family friend; and Colonel Elijah Huggins, a Volunteers Regimental
commander, Davis’s military career aspirations were put on hold. 14

Marvin Fletcher. The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891-1917. 72-73.
Marvin E. Fletcher, Taped Interview conducted with Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., by Marvin E. Fletcher and Edward
Coffman, Chicago Illinois, 2 June 1968, Davis Archives; Marvin Fletcher Collection, U.S. Military Institute,
Carlisle, Pa.
14
Ibid
12
13
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Davis persisted and with the direct help of Lieutenant Charles Young as a coach and
tutor, he achieved his dream of a commission into the regular army in 1901. Young not only
tutored Davis on every aspect of the coming officer’s examination and board, he also mentored
him. He provided Davis with wise and experienced counsel as a regular Army officer with more
than ten years active duty experience.
Davis and his fellow black officer contemporaries were the vanguard of African
American progress and American inclusiveness in the late nineteenth century. Through their
persistence and dogged determination to enter the officer corps, these men tested the limits to
which White America would go in granting equal access into one of its most elite institutions,
the regular army officer corps.
Although academy graduates were considered as the most elite within the officer corps, a
regular Army commission, even for non-academy men, was highly valued and sought out by
career-minded military men. As commissioned officers in the regular army, they were following
in the footsteps of such American icons and military academy graduates as Ulysses S. Grant,
Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis, Thomas Jackson, Thomas Longstreet, William T. Sherman, and
Philip Sheridan. These white iconic figures, through their service at West Point and the regular
army, had become embedded in the fabric of American folklore and popular military culture. To
allow blacks to share this heritage with such historic figures of American masculinity and
leadership was not accepted easily by the “military academy,” nor the common white American
public of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

8

Within both the black and white communities’ supporters and detractors monitored their
progress with great interest. By their mere service within the uniform as officers they were
considered race men.
Given this charge, it was no small incident when downturns of fortune occurred, such as
the court-martial and dismissal of Lieutenant Flipper in 1882, or the death of John Alexander
from apoplexy in 1894. 15 Alexander was only thirty years old at the time of his death. 16 This
left Charles Young, John Green, and Davis as the only black officers on active duty between
1899 and 1917. Other blacks were commissioned during the Army’s expansion leading up to
World War I. None of the black officers commissioned during World War I were permitted into
the regular army.
Considering his longevity in service, Davis should have been more pronounced as an
example of American achievement. Because he was the first black officer to have had the honor
of attaining a general officer appointment in the regular army, by comparable metrics in any
career field, Davis should be heralded as a “race leader.” His ability to navigate for decades
through a largely hostile military against blacks was no small triumph. Both he and his son
overcame innumerable obstacles in a society that had historically questioned whether blacks
should have been allowed to even serve in the military. This achievement should have secured
his place in American history.
Yet he has not been accorded such notability. The proscribed storyline about Benjamin
Davis Sr. is largely overshadowed by the almost myth-like credit assigned to his son, Benjamin

15
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Marvin Fletcher. The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891-1917. 88-91.
Ibid

9

Davis Jr. Davis Sr., by most media accounts of the 1940s through the 1960s, was relegated to a
background status as the father figure who was responsible for the success of his son. His own
achievements are left to secondary or filler print, past the headlines that usually spoke of Davis
Jr. and the Tuskegee Airmen of World War II. 17
Most historians and scholars overlook his accomplishments and will discuss him in terms
of his promotion to general officer was, more or less, part of a compromise between A.P.
Randolph and Franklin D. Roosevelt to preclude a 1942 March on Washington. Marvin
Fletcher’s biography of Davis is the only significant scholarly interpretation of Davis as a
military officer and man. Fletcher offers comparisons between Davis and other key figures of
his era such as Charles Young, Booker T. Washington, and William Hastie, but he does not
provide any in depth discussion about the relationships between Davis and these notable black
figures. Fletcher argues that through his accommodationist stance, Davis helped to erode
segregation in the army. Fletcher maintains that if Davis had been as radical as such figures as
A. P. Randolph, he would not have been as successful in his personal or larger career as the
nation’s first black general officer. He argues, instead, that Davis helped lay the foundation for
the desegregation of the military, in what he terms “the first major break in the wall of
segregated America.” 18 Other scholars such as George Lipsitz, Philip McGuire, and John
Marzalek have been critical of Fletcher’s rendition of Davis as a race leader who helped break
the barriers of segregation in the military. Each of these scholars assert that Davis’s recall from
retirement and promotion were the result of Roosevelt caving in to pressure exerted by A.P.

17

Bernard C. Nalty. Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military J. Todd Moye. Freedom
Flyers: The Tuskegee Airmen of World War II. (New York and other cities; Oxford University Press, 2010.
18
Marvin E. Fletcher, America’s First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis Sr.,1880-1970. (Kansas: University Press
of Kansas, 1989), pp. 23-25.
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Randolph. McGuire, in particular, views Davis’s promotion as a merely symbolic gesture
provided to an easily malleable figure. John Marzalek even argues that maybe the inverse was
true. He notes that because Davis was such a submissive figure for the government and
institutional racist practices, he and his legacy may have served as a bellwether to subsequent
generations of black soldiers regarding their limited space within the military. 19 In this vein,
Davis established a professional behavioral template that was adopted in many ways by
subsequent generations of black officers. This pattern of behavior was marked by conservative
values, full obedience and compliance within the military structure, downplaying or complete
disassociation from race and social matters, and heavy dependence upon white mentors. Generals
Roscoe Robinson, (1928-1993), Julius Becton, (1926--present), Leo Brooks Sr. (1932—present),
Colin Powell, (1937—present), William Ward, (1949—present) and Vincent Brooks, (1958present), in their biographies or messaging to black soldiers, offer many of the prosaic platitudes
espoused by Davis.
In the general framework surrounding discussions about African-American military
history, most scholars have portrayed black soldiers prior to the de-segregation of the armed forces
as victims of American racism, who overcame this challenge through their fortitude, patriotism,
and heroism in war. This narrative has transferred into the current trope used by the military as a
convenient anecdotal tale of “success through perseverance” for black soldiers in service today.
This narrative overlooks problematic trends that continue to plague the nation’s armed forces, such
as consistent shortages of black officers in combat arms, under-representation of blacks within
general officer ranks, and the lack of diversity that remains in various segments of military forces,

McGuire, Phillip, Review of America’s First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., 1880-1970. The Journal of
American History, Vol. 76, (Mar., 1990), 1282-1283.

19
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such as special operations. A 2015 USA Today story titled, “Army Commanders: White Men lead
a Diverse Force,” related the historic issue of under-representation of minority leaders in the army.
In 2014 there was one black commander or colonel in command out of 26 active duty army
brigades, which is the Army's main fighting unit of about 4,000 soldiers. 20 Also, out of 78 active
duty battalions or units that consist of 800 to 1,000 soldiers led by lieutenant colonels, only one
was scheduled to be commanded by a black officer in 2015. 21 This has a direct correlation to the
pool of officers who are competitive for consideration for general officer slots. The majority of
those in contention for such vacancies derive from combat arms branches of infantry, field artillery,
cavalry or armor, aviation, and special operations.
My own personal experiences within the military ring similar tones to the experiences of
Davis and Young, and the black officer experience beyond them. I saw the rarity of black
officers, especially in combat arms. I experienced being the only black officer within an infantry
battalion or at times I was the only black officer in a brigade for months or even a year within a
three-year assignment. At best, I was one of several black officers within a brigade structure that
held as many as 150 officer vacancies. During a two-year period in the late 1980s, I was only one
of two black officers within our brigade who were afforded the distinction of a company
command. As I endured this somewhat isolated experience, I was bombarded with a repeated
mantra from senior officers, black officers who were senior to me, and from the army’s public
affairs advertisements that the army was one of the most progressive institutions within
American culture, as it allowed minorities and all others to “be all that we could be.” The
messaging was positive and uplifting as senior leaders assured us that opportunities were there

20
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Brook, Tom V., “Whites Command a Diverse Force,” USA Today, Sept. 11, 2014.
Ibid.
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for each of us, regardless of our ethnicity and background, to go as far as we wanted.
Specifically, as evidence of its progressive spirit, military leaders would broach the sensitive
topic of race, through commemoration, celebration, and homage to past ethnic minority military
figures. During events typically held in February, i.e., Black History month or September for
Hispanic Heritage month, black leaders or senior officers would usually speak in positive
intonations to reflect about “how far” blacks had come in the army from the days of Jim Crow
and enforced segregation.
Figures such as both General Davis Sr. and Davis Jr., and more current black senior
officers, were promoted as stalwarts who suffered through the face of adversity during America’s
most regressive years, but still succeeded to advance their race, the nation, and military, one step
further in an ever-positive arc towards the ideals of the American republic. As these optimistic
narratives were thrown about and distilled within the ranks of black soldiers and officers, we
were confronted with a daily reality that stood in stark contrast to these missives. When given the
opportunity, we repeatedly asked: where are the black officers, and why were so few in combat
arms?
Chad Williams, in Torchbearers for Democracy, notes the dominant trends in the
production of African-American military history. He asserts that institutionalized racism was the
defining characteristic of the black military experience, along steadfast determination and
patriotism of African-American soldiers to overcome its negative impacts. 22 He reflects on
several key works that have attempted to capture this dichotomy including, Bernard Nalty’s
Strength for the Fight, Gail Buckley’s American Patriots, and William H. Leckie and Shirley A.
Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers for Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era, (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010)
22
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Leckie’s, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West. I agree with his
assessment that such scholarly examinations contribute to a broad historical accounting about the
black military experience, but rely too heavily upon the premise that government and military
policy evolved over time, in an ever-positive arc towards better equality and representation.
The fault of this analogy, Williams argues is that it loses sight of the actual experience of
black soldiers themselves, as well as their broader social and political impact. 23 I believe that
such shortcomings are also overlooked in past examinations of black military figures including
the Davises, Charles Young, and Colin Powell.
Using the life and military career of Benjamin Davis Sr. as a prism, I intend to probe the
nature of the black military experience through the eyes of our nation’s first black general
officer. This study will probe to what extent Davis accommodated, resisted, and or negotiated
the larger patterns of racism in the US military, and to what degree did he shape or change those
patterns. I will explore this through Davis’s interactions with white military and social figures
that shaped and influenced his entry and career in the military, black mentors and supporting
figures that directly impacted Davis’s life in the military, from the beginning of his career
through his seniority as a general officer, and family members who also influenced and shaped
his life and career within the military.
I take issue with the commonly offered trope about “blacks conquering adversity through
their solid determination, patriotism, and faith in the American cause” offered by today’s
military leaders. I argue that this narrative is countered largely through the life example of

23

Ibid. Intro p.5.
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Davis. His storied career included high and low points largely determined by his race, postmilitary semi-activism, and the disturbingly long period in which it took another twenty-five
years before another black officer was selected for general officer. Although scores of blacks
were commissioned through various sources such as the Reserve Officer Training Program or
ROTC, West Point, and the Officer Candidate School or OCS, another black officer did not
follow Davis for general officer selection until 1968.
This narrative unseats the model of positive army progression for black officers. Davis
made a positive impact in promoting black success in the military and army officer corps. His
career and success story has been used as a template to promote African American success
within the officer corps for generations beyond his tenure. This, I offer has both good and bad
attributes. Davis’s steadfast determination, hard work ethic, and mantra of hard study, is
commonly touted by senior officers to prospective neophytes as a roadmap for successful careers
in the military. However, his accommodationist stance has also carried forward as an anecdotal
posture needed to survive and progress within the officer ranks. Commonly heard phrases in
military ranks from lieutenant to senior field grades reflect the passive legacy left by officers
such as Davis as anecdotal advice for survival within officer ranks through such expressions as,
“don’t rock the boat,” cooperate and graduate, and “Learn to obey before you command.” 24 I
understand a counter to this argument could be that black Army officers were not created to
become social agents of change, because they are military leaders. Within this framework, their
first commitment is to the military. However, this study purposefully interrogates two

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600–65 Personnel—General: Leadership Statements and Quotes
Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC., 1 November 1985.
24

15

dimensions beyond military duty, this includes the legacy of racism, and how black officers such
as Davis responded to discrimination against blacks.
Generals Colin Powell, and Roscoe Robinson, reflected similar missives in their
biographies. Powell noted an exchange that he had with his ROTC commander at City College
of New York and New York University prior to his commissioning. The West Point graduate,
Colonel Brookhart, offered sage advice to the prospective black officer entering the Army in the
1960s, warning him as he traveled south for his first duty station at Fort Benning, Georgia, that
“he would have to learn to compromise, to accept a world that he had not made and that was
beyond his changing. 25 Brookhart further noted to Powell, reflectively mentioning Benjamin O.
Davis Jr. as problematic because “he had tried to buck the system.” Powell expressed that “the
colonel was telling me, in effect, not to rock the boat, to be a “good Negro.” Powell responded to
this advice stating that he was not upset, knowing that Colonel Brookhart meant well, and that he
thanked him and left. 26 Leon Haley, biographer for General Roscoe Robinson, the Army’s first
black four star-general officer, noted several instances when Robinson kept to himself his views
on military actions and civil rights demonstrations, and instead focused his attention on his duties
as a U.S. Army officer. Haley describes Robinson as a socially conservative African American
military officer who did not embrace “affirmative action” or view himself as a beneficiary of
policies designed to increase the numbers of racial minorities in the officer ranks. Indeed, Haley
intimates that Robinson did not wish to be considered the best African American Army officer;
he wanted to be considered the best Army officer, who also happened to be black. As John
Marzalek noted, this may be part of the balanced legacy of good and bad left by Davis’s fifty-
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year career in the army. I argue further that many of the difficulties that Davis faced throughout
his military career are still experienced by black officers serving through strands of
discrimination and racial bias that have been carried forward in the officer corps. I witnessed
many such challenges through more than twenty years of service in both the regular army and
reserve. I offer several studies conducted by senior officers such as Brigadier General Reno
Butler that reinforce my observations.
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Chapter 1: Coming of Age into the Military (1877-1901)

Benjamin Davis’s interest and eventual entry into the military occurred during one of the
most repressive periods in post slavery African American history. This chapter will explore
Davis’s coming of age into the military as a young officer who entered the Army by the
alternative method of a direct commission following testing and an evaluation board. As the
nineteenth century ended and the twentieth century loomed, popular beliefs of this period such as
social Darwinism cast the Anglo-Saxon race as a superior species over darker races. This belief
directly impacted practically every American institution in society including the American
military. American leaders such as William McKinley and Teddy Roosevelt allowed common
biases against blacks or other people of color to shape their decisions regarding the use of black
soldiers within the military. This drove political and military leaders to unofficially close West
Point admissions to African American candidates by 1900. Several blacks including Davis and
John Green would be allowed to serve on active duty, however they were only allowed to enter
the regular army through officer testing and evaluation boards.
As a young man Davis was heavily influenced by his exposure to active duty black
regiments stationed near his home. Soldiers from the 9th Cavalry Regiment shaped Davis’s
ideology and world view through their professionalism, discipline, and their regimen of order
and purpose. This appealed greatly to Davis as he interacted with men from this unit.
Coming of age for young black men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
invariably led to two paths, one in which over-confident black youth provoked harsh reactions
from the white community or institutions, the other in which youthful ambitions were slowly
18

crushed as young blacks were molded to understand and fit into their place of inferiority within
American culture. Black youth of this era who were fortunate enough to obtain the privilege of
education or formal training that would allow them access to middle class status, had to be taught
to “stay in their place” as people of color. They were usually limited to their own communities of
color in professional or working-class occupations. American society, particularly in the south,
was racially segregated, and blacks were not permitted to move beyond second-class citizen
status, regardless of socioeconomic status, or education. The same was true of the military.
Black officers and career non-commissioned officers could only serve within the four black
regiments that existed in the regular army.
Two incidents that provide a brief glimpse into the social and ideological boundaries
placed upon blacks such as Benjamin Davis Sr. in the early twentieth century included the
seemingly trivial matters of a uniform and a song. The first occurred in 1924 at Tuskegee
Institute where Davis served as a career active duty Army officer on assignment. Davis’s son,
Benjamin Jr. recalled the incident. His father and the family were living in Tuskegee as Davis
served as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Tuskegee Institute.
In 1924, the Ku Klux Klan held a protest march over the matter of the Veterans
Administration having chosen to staff a new veteran’s hospital in Tuskegee with black doctors
and nurses. 1 Although this hospital would be a segregated facility, local whites felt that such job
opportunities should have gone to white professionals in the area. Tuskegee Institute’s President
Robert R. Moten counseled all of his staff, including Davis, to avoid and ignore the protest. 2
Davis instead chose to offer a silent public display of his status and achievement thus far in the
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United States Army. He donned his summer white dress uniform that fully displayed his current
rank of a seasoned Lieutenant Colonel, and sat on the porch of his residence with his second
wife, Sadie, and their three children. Although there was no confrontational activity mentioned in
his son’s recollection of these events, his stance and messaging stood clear to the Klan marchers
as they walked past his home. Aside from the symbolism of his uniform, the Klan marchers
would have observed a well-dressed black man, in the service of his government, with a welldressed family that did not cower behind closed doors as the Klansmen marched by. This
African American family epitomized middle class achievement. 3 This staged image starkly
contrasted against a proffered and constructed narrative of blacks as a simplistic, indolent, and
inferior people that were not competitive in American culture with the Anglo-Saxon race. 4
Such demonstrations of black success and achievement could also draw the ire of the
white community to the extent of retaliation for them “getting out of place.” This usually meant
they aspired only for the same goals and possessions of whites. 5
The second portal into the dual consciousness of Benjamin Davis as an American soldier,
versus simply as a black man surviving in American culture of the early twentieth century, was
reflected in an interview with Edward Coffman and Marvin Fletcher in 1968. During the
interview Davis discussed how American society in the early twentieth-century generally viewed
blacks in the military.
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Davis stated that the attitude of the pre-World War I period was expressed in a song, “All
Coons Look Alike to Me.” Davis, in a rare break from his normal stern persona, laughed heartily
as he related this point to his biographer, Marvin Fletcher, before reverting to his standard
diatribe of duty, honor, and country. His acceptance of this characterization of blacks seemed
“out of character” and contradictory to his action at Tuskegee in 1924. On one hand, he tested
the boundaries allowed him by the authority of the military, his immediate supervisor, President
Moton, and the society of that era. 6
On the other, he pragmatically accepted the demeaning moniker assigned to blacks in
lyrical verse and song. This example of split identity played throughout Davis’s career as he
vacillated between racial and military leadership to consigned acceptance about American
society.
Gary Gerstle offers useful insight into the “give and take” of race versus nationalism
during this era. He presents a blossoming American ideology shaped heavily by overtones of
Anglo-Saxon superiority against the space allowed for minorities to fit within this constructed
American “community.” Gerstle argues that black’s ideas of civic nationalism and racial
nationalism were intertwined as symbiotic ideologies. Whereas civic nationalism represented a
democratic ethos rooted in individual liberty, freedom, and inherent rights, racial nationalism
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reflected a commitment to defining the nation and its citizens in ethno-racial terms. For blacks in
particular their experience offers a particularly axiomatic perspective of the complex interplay
between civic duty and racial nationalism.
Military service in a segregated and openly hostile nation throughout the first half of the
twentieth century compelled blacks to deeply probe the nature of their relationship to the nation.
Black soldiers embraced their identity as American citizens through the civic obligation of military
service. 7
Chad Williams delves deeper into the inevitable conflict between black soldiers and their
various interpretations of American nationalism during this period. He notes, “the sustained
virulence of racial nationalism challenged African Americans allegiance to the nation
exclusively and reinforced the necessity of coalescing around a positive, self-sustaining vision of
nationalism, one rooted in racial pride and self-determination.” 8 Many black soldiers therefore
expressed dual loyalties, to both the United States and to their race. American civic nationalism
increasingly proved empty and, in the case of many black soldiers, explicitly oppressive. 9
Benjamin O. Davis Sr. became a regular Army officer in 1901. At the time that he
attained this feat, there were only three other black officers in the regular Army. He
accomplished this signature event after two years of repeated attempts to either gain admission
into West Point or obtain his commission through testing and a selection board. Few whites of
this era believed that blacks were capable of the intricacies and challenges associated with being
a commissioned officer. Even the majority of black soldiers who served on active duty in the
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late nineteenth and early twentieth century believed that they were better off serving under white
officers in command than one of their own. 10
Most whites within the military and society of this era believed that black officers simply
could not control or lead enlisted soldiers within their own race, and that black soldiers would
not obey orders from one of their own, even if the individual was a commissioned military
officer. James Parker, a white officer of the 4th Cavalry Regiment, who had served often with
black troops, expressed a consensus opinion among the white officer corps in the late nineteenth
century. Parker claimed that black soldiers in general possessed “estimable qualities,” but “they
must be officered by whites else they are of no account, and that their dependence on their
officers was the most commonly invoked qualifier.” 11 The mere thought of black officers
issuing orders to white enlisted soldiers or junior officers was almost beyond comprehension.
The War Department of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries went to great lengths to
restrict black officership.
The first open debates about black soldiers’ capacity for service beyond basic soldiering
had begun during Reconstruction with a proposal to include one regiment of black artillery to
serve in conjunction with four infantry and two cavalry regiments authorized for active service.
Ulysses Grant, Commanding General of the Army, quickly dismissed this proposal based on a
commonly shared view by white officers that blacks were not intelligent enough for such a
technical branch. 12
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Leaders such as Congressman George White, a black Republican from North Carolina,
reasoned that if black soldiers could serve in other branches beyond the infantry and cavalry,
they might be accepted in other expansive roles later, such as the Signals branch, and the officer
corps. Black soldiers had served in artillery units during the Civil War, albeit as basic canoneers,
but their presence historically demonstrated that they were capable of meeting the demands of a
better educated or technically trained soldier.
Charles Young’s father had been assigned to an artillery unit. In 1898, White submitted a
proposal to the War Department to allow blacks into the artillery branch. This proposal did not
go beyond a committee and was largely ignored by the War Department and friendly or neutral
politicians.
In 1901, the discussion was revived, principally from black political leaders in Kansas
and Illinois, but their efforts to have blacks serve in artillery and the signal corps failed to gain
traction. Recruitment of blacks was usually only offered when the nation faced dire
circumstances such as world wars or open civil war. Mae M. Ngai offers insight into how
America struggled with competing dynamics: it constituted racial hierarchies, but needed to use
minority citizens to take up arms in the defense of the nation. This conflict has always factored
into minorities and their military service to the nation. She notes, while “the construction of
racial hierarchies has been an ongoing project in American history since the colonial period, it is
also historically specific. At times, a confluence of economic, social, cultural, and political
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factors has impelled major shifts in society’s understanding (and construction) of race and its
constitutive roles in national identity formation.” 13
As six regiments of black soldiers, four infantry and two cavalry, remained in the active
military following the Civil War, they were effectively used against Native Americans in the
Indian Wars on the Western plains. The reputations of the famed 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments
derived from their dogged subjugation of such enemies as the Cheyenne, Apache, and other
Plains Indians, earning them the moniker of “buffalo soldiers” from the Native Americans. 14
Their devoted service, acceptance of physical hardship, deprivation, and fierceness in combat
against such rivals as the Ute, Cheyenne, Apache, Paiute, Kiowa, and Comanche tribes
established a reputation for the black soldiers as good fighters. But this fame was tempered by
the conventional belief that the blacks had earned this level of proficiency and bravery only
through the extraordinary leadership of white commanders. 15
Despite the proven record of the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments there were repeated
efforts throughout the late nineteenth century to reduce or eliminate the black regiments
altogether.
Between 1869 and 1891 the War Department and Congress reviewed numerous proposals
that ranged from reducing the number of black regiments, to eliminating black enlistments
altogether, to integrating the Army. 16
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A prejudiced characterization of black soldiers was held by most white officers, both
friend and foe. Advocates for black inclusion in the military such as General William T.
Sherman and Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan expressed open ambivalence on the subject.
Both men openly stated that they preferred white soldiers over blacks but believed that black
soldiers were worthy and proven in combat. 17 In 1877 Sherman expressed his personal views
about blacks and their progress in the Army in a letter to Senator and former Union Army
General, Benjamin F. Butler, stating, “The blacks are a quiet, kindly, peaceful race of men. The
experiment of converting them into soldiers has been honorably & in good faith tried in the
Army of the U.S., and has been partially successful, but the Army is not and should not be
constructed as a charitable institution.
Congress limits its numbers for financial reasons, and we must get along with a minimum
number, which should be of the best.” 18 He finished his letter on a positive note recommending
that the army should abolish its color line, just as the navy had a century before. 19 He suggested,
“contact and usage would obliterate prejudice of race, and all regiments would be alike.” 20
Major General Benjamin Butler, who had been the first Union Army officer to utilize
blacks during the Civil War, contested Sherman’s portrayal of blacks. He challenged Sherman’s
authority on the subject, noting that Sherman had never commanded black troops. He, on the
other hand, offered that he had extensive service with black soldiers and civilians alike. Butler
presented blacks as a “docile, temperate, rugged race of men, that could live on little, bear
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privations and…seemed to be the very men for soldiers in time of peace; and if well disciplined,
as soldiers are, in time of war. 21
Sherman contentiously noted that the army was no place for docile soldiers. Sherman
exhorted, “we want and must have men of muscle, endurance, will, courage, and that wildness of
nature that is liable unless properly directed to result in violence and crime, to combat the
enemies of civilization, with whom we have to contend.” 22
He argued that although white men were better suited for such tasks, he was willing “to
take black & white alike on equal terms.” 23 Ambrose E. Burnside called for the removal of all
“color restrictions” on enlistments. From this proposal the Military Affairs Committee was
formed and tasked to study the need for or against continuation of all-black regiments. It sought
testimony from the current Army’s top leadership, including such figures as Sherman, who had
already begun to debate the viability of the black regular army units. The committee also queried
Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, Brigadier General E.O.C. Ord, and a host of junior line unit
officers who had interacted with or commanded black soldiers. Sheridan offered that he had
only seen black troops mostly at inspections, where they “appeared well enough.” 24 Sheridan
was pointedly asked about illiteracy among blacks in general, especially given the lack of
educated noncommissioned officers in black regiments, and whether this negatively impacted
units as a whole. This was followed with a suggestion that it might be better to consolidate the
black regiments and furnish them with white noncommissioned officers. Sheridan responded that
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he opposed the consolidation of regiments but favored the complete elimination of the army’s
color line. 25
How did the black soldiers feel about the Army’s conventional thought on race? In the
late 1960s Marvin Fletcher sent questionnaires to more than one hundred officers and enlisted
men of the 9th and 10th Cavalry who had served in the early twentieth century to gain insight into
their experience.
Most of the men who answered the questionnaire reflected a resigned acceptance of
segregation and leadership from white officers, coinciding with gratitude and a feeling of
privilege for being allowed to serve in the regular army. Many of these men expressed a similar
attitude as Benjamin Davis Sr. in regards to the “race versus soldier” question. Davis heavily
emphasized throughout his life and military career that he was a soldier first and a Negro
second. 26 Similar views were expressed by a retired Colonel A.W. Chilton, who had served with
the 24th Infantry Regiment from 1915 to 1916. Chilton practically admonished Fletcher over his
emphasis on race, stating, “if I may offer a word of advice, many of your questions sound as
though your dissertation were to be about the soldier as a colored man. I suggest that it be about
the colored man as a soldier. As I knew him his time was taken up with learning to be a soldier
and not worrying over his rights. The men I dealt with were soldiers and citizens of a high type.
I can’t say as much of some that are in the public eye today.” 27
Wallace Philoon, who had served in the 25th Infantry Regiment from 1915 to 1917,
offered, “in my opinion, the average negro soldier of that day preferred to take orders from white
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superiors.” 28 Benjamin F. Hoge, who served in the 10th Cavalry Regiment from 1914 to 1917,
offered similar perspective, stating, “naturally the orders of a commissioned officer carried more
weight.
I believe the negro soldier preferred to serve under white officers as a general
proposition.” Hoge also shared that he had served with a single black officer, a major and West
Point graduate, that had kept to himself socially. He intimated that he thought this officer would
have done an excellent job in command, but then reiterated his earlier point that he thought white
officers were preferable as a rule. 29 This officer would have been Charles Young, who was the
only black officer and West Point graduate in this era.
This was the military that Benjamin Oliver Davis entered in 1901. Although in his
developing years Davis had not been exposed to the harsh de facto racism that many other blacks
of his generation had faced, he was still shaped to accept white authority without question.
Davis’s relationship with his father and rearing in the home had also taught him not to question
authority, whether it be white or masculine. Throughout his interviews and statements regarding
the structure and authority of the government or military, this theme resurfaced. He stated in one
personal interview that he had been taught as a child that “children were to be seen and not
heard.” 30
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The overthrow of reconstructed state legislatures and the removal of the last complement
of federal troops forged the beginnings of a new South in 1877, as well as a long path for blacks
towards equality.
Benjamin Oliver Davis Sr. was born into a black middle class family in Washington D.C.
in that same year. (Census records for 1880 indicate that he may have been born in that year, but
Davis insisted in interviews with Marvin Fletcher that he was born in 1877). 31
His father Louis P.H. Davis had been born as a free black to a former slave father,
Benjamin Banneker Davis, and a free born black woman, Lucy Henry, in Winchester, Virginia. 32
Louis Davis began work early in life as a teenage servant to the household of General and Mrs.
John A. Logan in the nation’s capital. Through General Logan’s political connection, Louis had
acquired a position as assistant messenger in the office of the commissioner of internal revenue
which paid him a very good salary of $720 per year.
Both his parents had moved into Washington D.C. from slave territory in Virginia just
prior to the Civil War. Louis Davis was eventually promoted to a similar messenger post within
the Attorney General’s Office, which raised his salary to $840 a year. 33 His mother Henrietta
Davis also worked as a nurse. Her salary, combined with her husband’s, allowed the Davises to
become one of the few black families in Washington D.C. that were able to purchase and own
their home.
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Davis recounted that his upbringing was typical of many children in his neighborhood in
Washington D.C. in the late nineteenth century. His father was gone during most of the week.
Therefore, Davis’s relationship with him was somewhat distant.
He was usually home only on Sundays and holidays, and Davis felt uncomfortable in his
presence. 34 His mother, on the other hand, nurtured, developed, and even disciplined him. 35 She
bore a heavy influence upon him as she gently raised him and his older brother and sister.
Through his most fortunate circumstance of middle class economic security, education,
and instilled values, Davis was exposed to promise and potential that was somewhat rare for
even free blacks in the latter half of the nineteenth century. As the gains and promises of the
post-Reconstruction era waned, Davis grew into manhood somewhat untainted by racism and
many of the limitations that plagued many of his black contemporaries. 36
As a youth and teenager Davis met and interacted with soldiers of the 9th Cavalry, a black
regiment stationed at Fort Myer, Virginia, across the river from Washington. 37 Davis was
smitten from his interaction and experience with the “Buffalo” soldiers.
In a 1968 interview with Fletcher, Davis intimated that he had always wanted to be a
soldier. His interest manifested early as he served as a member of a High School Drill team
known as the Zouaves. His mother had hoped that he would go into the ministry, but reconciled
herself to the notion of her son becoming a soldier.
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She mentally accepted his career choice as she reasoned that “even as a soldier as long as
he was a good man he could get into Heaven.” 38 His son, Benjamin Davis Jr. later recounted
that his father developed a love for the army mystique, its life, its horses, and the smell of
stables, boots, saddles, bugle calls and martial music. Davis had just graduated from high school
and was attending Howard University as a part-time student when the Spanish-American War
began in 1898. 39 Davis, along with many young black men in his neighborhood, eagerly joined
National Guard military units with the hope of serving in the war.
Davis’s began his service in the military when he was only eighteen. In June 1898,
Captain Jesse M. Lee of the 9th Infantry Regiment of United States Volunteer Infantry (USVI)
prompted Davis to take a physical examination as part of the preliminary process to determine
his eligibility for a commission as a lieutenant in the volunteer regiment. 40 During the Spanish
American War, the War Department had accepted some two hundred thousand volunteers who
wanted to serve. Within this number of prospective soldiers the War Department authorized the
activation of ten regiments of black volunteers to fight in Cuba. Only four were actually formed,
the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th United States Volunteer Infantry. 41 The war ended before these units
could be brought into action. However, this opportunity was a springboard from which Davis
began his military career.
These regiments were comprised of all-black enlisted personnel and a scattered number
of black officers, principally kept at the rank of lieutenant. The black community from which the
regiments were raised advocated for commissioned black officers to lead the regiments; their
request fell on deaf ears within the War Department. Blacks were limited to the rank of
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lieutenant in the line units within the regiments. The company and battalion commanders and
principal staff for each regiment were mostly white. This ensured that white leaders controlled
the “all black” regiments. As a rare exception, Captain Lee, a black militia officer, was
promoted to the brevet rank or temporary rank of Lieutenant Colonel and was placed in
command of the 10th Regiment. Charles Young, a regular Army Lieutenant, was promoted to the
brevet rank of Major and given command of one of the regiments. This extraordinary exception
to policy placed Lee in a position to at least offer highly qualified candidates such as Benjamin
Davis the opportunity to test for officer qualification. Davis eagerly accepted the challenge and
took the army physical examination and was found fit for duty. Following the successful
completion of his physical Davis anticipated his selection for a lieutenant’s commission. His
hopes were temporarily dashed as Lee withdrew his support, thinking that Davis was too young.
Instead, Lee offered him a post as the regimental sergeant major. Davis promptly refused. 42
Days later a family friend to his father, Colonel Eli Huggins, sent a young white lawyer,
Robertson Palmer, to Washington to raise a company of volunteers and to approach Davis to
help him in this venture. Palmer offered Davis a deal in which if Davis agreed to help him raise
the required sixty men for the company, he would be made a first lieutenant for the unit. Davis
gladly accepted the challenge and within days helped Palmer form
Company G, Eighth United States Volunteer Infantry, and was appropriately commissioned as a
first lieutenant within the unit. 43
Davis was among nearly one hundred black soldiers who received temporary
commissions in the volunteer regiments. Altogether three of the appointed black officers within
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the regiments were West Point graduates, including Charles Young. Young was promoted to
Major and placed in command of the Ohio or 9th regiment. 44 Several other black officers
commanded black volunteer units from various northern states, but this soon proved
unacceptable to the senior leadership within the War Department. 45 White senior officers and
commanders within militia and active units and at the War Department simply could not stomach
the notion of black officers commanding or giving orders to white soldiers.
Davis and the 8th USVI, were initially sent to Fort Thomas, Kentucky, for training. Most
of the officers and enlisted men of the regiment had little or no military training and were
characterized as “crude and undisciplined” by their regular counterparts. 46
A small corps of veterans from the regular army 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments aided
officers such as Davis in training the men in close order drill, how to ride horses and other basic
military fundamentals. While at Fort Smith Davis befriended several other key officers who
influenced his career. This included such veterans as Andrew J. Smith, who prior to the war had
been a first sergeant in the regular Army 25th Infantry Regiment, and John C. Proctor, also a
former first sergeant in the regular 9th Cavalry Regiment, who taught Davis how to ride a horse. 47
The 8th USVI Regiment was shifted from Fort Thomas, Kentucky, to Chickamauga Park,
Georgia, to replace another black regiment, the 6th USVI, which had been shipped to Puerto
Rico. In Georgia their missions comprised either guard duty for supplies or other sundry routine
tasks, assigned mainly to keep the men busy. 48 As the men became restless with performing
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“busy” work, Davis expanded his job experience, as he was ordered to assume duties as battalion
adjutant, and later officer in charge of prisoners. Given the task over the prisoners, Davis was
torn between his ambition to advance in the military and disillusionment over open
discrimination. Davis and his comrades faced open prejudice, such as signs at local businesses
and parks that expressed, “Dogs and niggers not allowed here.” Yet Davis began to shape his
world view when faced with such challenges. 49 Davis struggled to reconcile the open racial
hostility against him and blacks in general and his dream of an active duty military career. He
attempted to be professionally objective but fair in acknowledging the black man’s plight of his
era.
He noted, “at the beginning of the war I could not secure a commission in the military
except in a colored regiment and then I could not advance higher than the grade of first
lieutenant.” 50 Given his limited experience and interaction in “white” American society to this
point, this struck Davis as odd. He stated, “colored men, regardless of education were limited to
the grade of first lieutenant. That didn’t make sense to me. I couldn’t understand why color
should limit one’s advancement.” 51
In his first test of such conflicts, Davis was assigned to monitor a group of black
prisoners at Chickamauga Park, while they awaited final disposition regarding punishment or
discharge. While he may not have empathized with the black military prisoners who had been
placed under his watch, he treated them humanely.
Eager to make a good impression for his career, Davis took to his given tasks with vigor
and optimism for more challenging duties ahead. He carried out his assignments with such
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notable effectiveness that he received praise and recognition from the white officers within the
regiment. 52
While in the segregated south Davis and the soldiers of the 8th experienced overt racial
encounters with the white populace that lived near their assigned posts. In Chattanooga white
civilians peppered the War Department with requests to have the black soldiers removed from
their city. While stationed in Chattanooga the soldiers of the 8th were harassed, denied access to
many common areas, and openly threatened with an unexploded bag full of dynamite that was
discovered near their camp hospital. 53
The discovery of the explosives was no hoax. Even in Cincinnati black soldiers were
banned from gathering at a local drugstore that was near their point of debarkation. At
Chickamauga Park in Georgia, Davis first noticed with dismay the “Colored-White” signs at the
railway stations. 54 In Kentucky at Fort Thomas, Davis also experienced firsthand the strictures of
segregation within the military as he was compelled to abide by the rules of segregated facilities
on the post. Of the three dining facilities at Fort Thomas, one was for senior officers above the
rank of Captain, but for whites only; a second was for field and staff officers, who were also
white, except for black chaplains; and the third was for black company grade officers and
chaplains. 55
Davis reflected on his sentiments about the racial arrangements for his recently mobilized
volunteer regiment: “segregation as applied to us in the southern camp and the surrounding
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towns, wounded me deeply, and in spite of the progress I was able to make, the scars have never
been wholly eradicated.” 56
Between October 1898 and February 1899, the War Department toyed with actually
deploying the unit to Cuba before it decided against it and disbanded the unit. The decision was
made to not deploy any of the four volunteer regiments. The brevity of the war, ten weeks,
factored greatly in the War Departments decision not to deploy many units. This was followed
with the order to withdraw the commissions of the black officers who either commanded or were
lieutenants within the regiments. The men were mustered out and sent home by early March
1899. 57
Willard Gatewood detailed the black experience in the Spanish American War in his
study, "Smoked Yankees" and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898–1902.
He shares a common view with other scholars of this era that blacks saw military service as a
way of gaining credit for their race to overcome the restrictions placed upon them under Jim
Crow. They faced harsh discrimination not only from civilians in southern communities near
their bases or ports of debarkation, but also within their military units as they prepared for
deployment to Cuba. Gatewood notes that by their mere presence black soldiers acted as unsanctioned protectors of black civilian communities as they were placed in southern regions
where federal soldiers had not been seen since Reconstruction. 58
After Davis was mustered out of the regiment, he volunteered for a two-year enlistment
in the 9th Cavalry Regiment. There were several factors that led him to this decision point in his
life. First, he hoped to secure a commission into the regular Army. Also, he had a friendship
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with John Proctor, who had served with the 9th Cavalry as a First Sergeant, and both men had the
luck to enlist when vacancies became available in the regiment. Their enlistments coincided
with the Army’s need to fill the black regiments with qualified men.
Proctor was readily accepted because of his veteran status, and Davis was taken because
he was literate and capable of performing clerical duties. He was also recommended by Proctor.
Major Martin Hughes, the 9th Cavalry Commander, also played a role in securing their positions
within the regiment. Hughes heartily endorsed the recruitment of Davis, largely based on
Proctors endorsement. Hughes would also be a significant figure in Davis’s successful quest for
a commission.
Davis and Proctor enlisted in June 1899 at Washington Barracks in Washington D.C. and
immediately traveled to Fort Duchesne, Utah via rail and stagecoach. Duchesne had been
established as an outpost in 1886 to control the Ute Indians. It was a small military
establishment that included enough barracks for a regiment sized unit, a bakery, granary, corral,
and hospital. The nearest city was Salt Lake City, some 170 miles away. 59
As an enlisted man, Davis was put to work immediately helping to educate and
administer paperwork for his contemporaries in the regiment. Davis noted that he fit in well
because of his skills at typing, dictation, and writing that he had learned in high school. He
intimated in several interviews that he was shocked and impressed with the fact that most of the
black soldiers in the regiment could not read or write. 60 However, he was fascinated at how
adaptive the men were in adjusting to their literacy handicap.
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They had learned the skills of soldiering through practice and memory. He noted how a
first sergeant memorized the troop’s roll, and as new soldiers arrived he would have the troop
clerk recite the new names until he could remember the names. Other NCO’s memorized entire
drill books after having someone read the instructions to them. 61
Davis took great pride in teaching the men how to write their own names and sign the
payroll. He began by teaching them letters in their names by writing them in large print until
they could recite the alphabet. He then taught them the entire alphabet, and finally had them
connect the letters to spell their names. Most of the soldiers in the regiment learned how to sign
their names to the payroll roster. This was a triumph that engendered great pride and gratitude
from these men because Davis had helped to empower them through some degree of literacy. 62
Davis’s contributions to the unit did not go unnoticed by its white officers. Captain
Guilfoyle, the troop commander that Davis served under, and Major Hughes wrote very
complimentary remarks about Davis in official correspondence and personal letters of reference.
Guilfoyle promoted him to corporal and made him the official troop clerk. As clerk he was
responsible for preparing the morning report, filling out muster rolls, doing payroll sheets, and
handling correspondence for the men.
Davis recalled that African-American soldiers in the regular army regiments looked to
their white officers, especially commanders, as father figures. 63 Most of the white officers had
served for a number of years, in most cases at least a decade, as they were held at their ranks
until vacancies appeared via retirement or death. It was not uncommon to have figures such as
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Major Hughes or Captain Guilfoyle remain in the buffalo soldier regiments until they retired. 64
Most commanders took this role seriously, taking the time to listen, aid, and develop their
soldiers as best as they could within the confines of the military. 65
This created a close and reciprocal bond between the men and their white leaders. Both
sides defended the other, when critiqued by outsiders. The white officers also believed that Davis
struck a different chord from other blacks. Those who interacted and became familiar with him
supported his efforts to become commissioned. When he shared his plans for applying for a
commission within the regiment, most blacks were stunned. Davis recalls that when many of the
veterans of the regiment found out that he applied for a commission, they admonished him: “we
thought you had some sense.” They also directly asked why had he applied. 66
He told them that he was fully qualified to apply per the current army regulations, but this
did not satisfy them. They would not relent until he told them that their white regimental
commander, Major Hughes, had asked him to apply. 67 In later interviews, Davis reflected on the
challenge that ambitious blacks faced within the military and society during this period, stating,
“the trouble with colored men was that they thought that it wasn’t their place to be officers.” 68
Davis noted, “I wanted to enter the regular army. My father tried to secure for me an
appointment as a cadet at the US Military Academy. While he was making this effort, I looked
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up the requirements for a commission. I got ahold of a book entitled: Three Roads to a
Commission in the US Army. The three roads mentioned were; by appointment from civilian life,
by appointment as a graduate cadet, U.S. Military Academy, and from the ranks of the regular
army by competitive examination. My father through a friend was able to reach the President of
the United States only to be informed that for political reasons the President could not at this
time, appoint a colored boy to West Point. Again, the handicap of color was brought home to
me.” 69
Although Hughes initially had strong reservations about supporting a black candidate for
an officer’s commission, after working with Davis for over a year, he became his strongest
advocate. Major Hughes had expressed his confidence in Davis’s ability as a soldier and leader
in an evaluation in which he stated “he thought that he was out of place.”
Davis did not understand the meaning of this assessment until Hughes gave him a strong
recommendation to apply for a commission. 70 Hughes followed this recommendation with
personal letters to members of the commissioning board, urging them to give Davis every
opportunity to succeed. 71
In September 1899, Lieutenant Charles Young returned from duty as brevetted
commander of a militia regiment in Ohio and returned to his active duty regiment, the 9th
Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Duchesne, Utah. This would be the first occasion in which Benjamin
O. Davis Sr. would meet Young. At this time Young was Davis’s troop commander.
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Davis was impressed with “the only colored line officer in the Regular Army.” 72 He
served under Young in Troop I and was taken by Young’s presence and ability to inspire the men
in his command. Davis in particular remembered Young’s penchant for music. He taught,
directed, and organized the men into several different choirs. He also encouraged other musical
talents with the men in their spare time. He noted, “nothing at that time seemed to lift up their
spirits as a song started by the Lieutenant at the head of the column.” 73
In addition to his promotion of music, Young organized football and baseball teams and
spent extra time drilling the men on horsemanship. Young also promoted racial pride as he
educated his men about his hero, Toussaint L `Ouverture, the liberator of Haiti. Young openly
expressed to his men, such as Davis, that Ouverture was his inspiration for someday becoming
the first “Black General.” 74
Davis thought highly of Young but noted the different approach that each man took
regarding racial issues. Davis reflected, “Young and I were opposites. He was very sensitive of
his color. I was an officer and I expected to be treated as such. 75 I was not concerned as to
whether people like me, I wanted them to respect me and they did. I did my duty. That’s what I
set out to do—to show that I could make my own way if I knew my job.” 76 Charles Young
sought at least the opportunity to show that a black man could perform as well as a white man in
uniform. He believed that if Davis could pass the tests leading to a commission, this would be
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further proof that blacks were just as capable as whites, within the military and society in
general. 77
As a First Lieutenant and veteran buffalo soldier, Charles Young assisted Davis in
preparing for his battery of tests required for commissioning. He wrote a glowing letter of
recommendation and personally tutored Davis in math. In August 1900, Davis submitted his
application for a commission along with the strong letters of recommendation from Major
Hughes and Lieutenant Young.
Young lauded Davis as “temperate, polite, intelligent, trustworthy, faithful to the duties
of his office, and capable of filling” any position to which he may be appointed in the Army.” 78
Hughes emphasized that if Davis received a commission, he would fill the position to the
satisfaction of the country. 79 His father, Louis Davis asked people that he knew in Washington
to send letters of recommendation on his son’s behalf. 80
Davis’s application was accepted and he along with a number of other candidates were
subjected to a battery of tests starting with a physical examination. The physical narrowed the
field to twenty-three candidates, including Davis. The twenty-three candidates were then given a
series of written tests starting with English grammar and composition. Five of the twenty-three
quit following this examination. 81 This was followed with testing on the Constitution of the
United States, international law, mathematics, geography, history, and army regulations. Davis
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passed each of his tests but scored poorest in history, attaining a score of only 67. 82 He scored
highest in math with a 95. Both Davis and Young celebrated this achievement, as their peers
queried Davis as to “what college he had attended” to earn such a score. 83
Following the written portion of testing, the candidates underwent one hour of physical
strength testing and one hour of oral questioning on drill and ceremonies. Davis scored a 95 on
this portion. 84 The board then reviewed each candidate’s military record, letters of
recommendation, and other supporting evidence such as letters sent from supporters. Candidates
who had met the requisite scores were then required to appear before a final board. Davis had
been deployed to the Philippines with the 9th Regiment before the final board. He had to travel
back to Fort Riley, Kansas, to appear before his final hearing. 85 As Davis appeared before this
panel he was quizzed again about history. To the board members, he was able to answer most of
the questions given to him. He was asked how he had made such a remarkable turnaround on the
subject. Davis responded that he had gone to the post library after each examination to check his
answers from the test. 86 He concentrated especially on history because he had scored so poorly.
The board found Davis’s answer and overall performance satisfactory and informed him that he
had passed the battery of tests required for commissioning. Davis found out later that he had
earned an average score of 86 and ranked third among twelve men in his group. 87 There was one
other black candidate within the group who had been as successful as Davis, John E. Green.
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Davis and Green remained cordial and professional acquaintances for the next thirty years in
their careers as army officers.
Davis telegrammed his mother about his success. Even prior to her receiving the
message, local black newspapers had picked up the story and published the account of his
achievement. The Washington Bee predicted a great future for him and reflected racial pride
about his accomplishment noting in the story, “His infatuation for duty, love for obedience, will
make him that brilliant military strategist of which the race is bound to be proud.” 88 Of particular
note in this story, neither the writer nor editor chose to mention “love of country,” which usually
aligns with discussions about soldiers and military duty. Louis Davis did not realize the story
was about his son because the name mentioned in the paper was Benjamin, not Ollie, as he
customarily referred to him. 89 Friends in Washington, and the soldiers that he had served with at
Fort Duquesne, heaped praise upon him. Charles Young felt that he had helped to personally
advance the cause of African-Americans with Davis’s success.
Although Davis had passed his final examination board in March, 1901, it would be
several months before he received official orders that allowed him to receive his commission.
Major Hughes assured Davis that the delay was normal, and that it had nothing to do with race.
He further reassured Davis by sharing with him that several troop commanders had requested
him by name, to be placed within their troops as a lieutenant or platoon leader. During this
interim period, he returned to his regiment in the Philippines for combat duty against Filipino
insurgents in Samar. 90
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Davis remained with the 9th Regiment until he finally received his official orders for his
commission. Davis was discharged as an enlisted soldier and took his oath as a second
lieutenant. Following his induction, Davis officially began his career as a commissioned officer
of the regular army. 91
Davis had been fortunate as a young black man coming of age in late nineteenth century
America. He was born free, accorded with middle class status, and provided with opportunities
for education and a professional career of his choosing. Regardless of whatever career path
Davis may have chosen, a young black man of his means would have been expected to
successfully enter his field and make a positive impact for race and community. As Davis
entered his chosen profession of the military, he was unsure of his charge and debt to African
Americans. Instead, he chose a private path towards self-gain as he became molded and
indoctrinated within the closed culture of the American military. Although success within the
military would force him to assume greater responsibilities beyond his life and his family’s,
Davis would always default towards self-interest. This became a part of his persona and public
character.
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Chapter 2: Army Career and Race Leader (1901-1919)

As Davis entered the regular army as a new commissioned officer, America emerged in
the new century as an industrial power that hoped to mimic European practices of imperialism
and colonialism. The US had just defeated Spain in the 1898 Spanish-American War, sent the
navy and soldiers to Peking to help quell the Boxer Rebellion, and used its military to quell
rebellious insurgencies in the Philippines and Haiti. Domestically, although progressive reform
measures permeated American culture, social Darwinism cast blacks and other minorities as
inferiors, relegated to either serving whites or remaining segregated within their own socially
dictated enclaves. The Army that Davis entered in 1901 remained segregated and limited for
black officers. West Point had stopped admitting black candidates during this era. Debates
continued in Congress throughout the early twentieth century regarding the question of keeping
the four black regiments in the regular army. Davis was undeterred by this milieu of background
noise as he began his duties as a regular Army Second Lieutenant.
Benjamin Oliver Davis Sr. stood poised to impact the world as he donned the uniform of
a regular army commissioned officer. His career ambition of entering the regular Army as an
officer had been fulfilled. He was described by fellow soldiers as “positive in manner, standing
at 5’ 11, broad shouldered, erect, clean shaven, and stood ram-rod straight as he spoke with
decisiveness.” 1 Soldiers and cadets would later comment about how knowledgeable he was
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about the army, and how he was highly interested in excellent performance of his soldiers and
officers. 2
The Army would undergo reorganization following the Spanish-American War. This
was its third reorganization in less than fifty years. Following the deficiencies exposed by the
Spanish-American War, Congress had authorized the War Department to increase the size of the
Army by expanding the size of the regiments and by adding five regiments of infantry and five
of cavalry. No new black regiments were created. 3 The War Department concluded that
increasing the size of the four black regiments was sufficient. Leadership within the black
regiments remained with mostly white officers. Under this most current reorganization plan,
there were 1,135 officer vacancies, and yet, Second Lieutenant Davis and John E. Green and
Captains Charles Young and John R. Lynch were the only line black officers in the regular
army. 4
Of the four black regiments, there were more than 200 potential commissioned officer
vacancies. 5 The War Department willfully accepted shortages within its officer ranks before
attempting to recruit more blacks to fill such vacancies. Even when military leaders were willing
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to add more black soldiers to the four black regiments, Congress refused to authorize such
changes. 6
In addition to America’s growing trend towards white nationalism, the turn of the
twentieth century also witnessed the emergence of the United States as a world power. Black
soldiers within the four black regiments bore witness through participation as key actors in the
final subjugation of Indians in the West.
They were also present as the United States shifted its attention to neighboring Spanish
territories in Cuba and the Philippines. The United States defeat of the long-time colonial power
Spain, in the Spanish-American War, solidified its own status as an imperial power. Black
soldiers within the buffalo soldier regiments dutifully participated in this expansion, under the
command of white officers such as John J. Pershing, Benjamin Grierson, and Martin Hughes,
who would become Davis’s first commander. The few black officers that served within their
regiments offered little commentary that dissented from the military mantra of “they did their
assigned duties” as best as they could.
At any given point between 1878 and 1900, their number would only have been three or
four in the regular service, spanning the short careers of lieutenants Henry Flipper, John
Alexander, John Lynch, and later, John Green and Charles Young.
With the defeat of Spain, Filipinos had hoped to gain their independence from powerful
European states and to establish themselves in nationhood. President McKinley’s decision to
ignore pleas for Filipino independence and to impose American “benevolent assimilation” upon
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the newly liberated Filipino people eventually led to open resistance against their former
American allies. After the Filipino nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo attempted to organize
conventional military resistance against American occupiers, the US committed to wholesale
military intervention in 1899. From 1899 to 1902 fighting between the Filipino insurgents and
American military forces resulted in the deaths of some 4,234 American soldiers and 16,000
Filipinos soldiers. Filipino civilian deaths numbered as high as 200,000, mostly from disease
and starvation. 7
Errant disregard for the lives and property of the Filipino people marked the American
campaign to contain the insurrection. Many likened the military tactics, such as lynching
prisoners and violent reprisals against civilians, to racial atrocities in mainland America. An
example of how white soldiers viewed, and treated Filipinos can be taken from an account of a
soldier who was credited with the opening shots that triggered the insurrection. Private William
Grayson, of the 1st Nebraska Volunteers recounted the following incident on February 4, 1899,
“About eight o’clock something rose slowly up not twenty feet in front of us. It was a Filipino. I
yelled ‘halt!’…He immediately shouted ‘Halto’at me. Well, I thought the best thing to do was to
shoot him. He dropped…Then two Filipinos sprang out of a gateway about fifteen feet from us, I
called ‘Halt,’ and Miller fired and dropped one. We retreated to where six other fellows were,
and I said, ‘Line up, fellows, the niggers are in here all through these yards.’” 8
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By the time that Theodore Roosevelt declared an end to the insurrection in 1902, more
than 101,000 American troops had been deployed to the Philippines, including all four regular
army regiments of Negro troops. The War Department’s decision to send all its black regular
army soldiers to the Philippines stemmed in large part from the rationale formed by military
leaders in the post-Civil War era.
Key leaders such as Grant, Sheridan, and Sherman had passed down their conventional
belief that black soldiers were hardier and better suited to service in the warm climates of
America’s southwest territories and tropical climates than their white counterparts. This proved
to be a flawed premise. As Davis and numerous other black soldiers deployed to the Philippines
they fell victim to malaria, heat, and yellow and dengue fever, like their white counterparts.
These diseases incapacitated thousands more soldiers than guerilla bullets. Mosquitoes and the
hot moist climate of the Philippines were the culprit. Following this experience, the myth of
black invulnerability to the tropics was conclusively debunked. 9
As both Davis and Young traveled to their Far East destination, the African American
community questioned America’s policies of brutal repression and domination against their
fellow brown and black brothers in the Caribbean. Prominent figures such as Booker T.
Washington, who usually espoused a supportive and accommodating stance with the
government, voiced a common view held by many blacks as he noted: “My opinion, is that the
Philippine Islands should be given the opportunity to govern themselves….Until our nation has
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solved the Indian and Negro problems, I do not think we have the right to assume more social
problems.” 10
Washington also noted in a speech given in October 1898 about the patriotic services
rendered by blacks throughout American history, that “one victory continued to elude the
nation—the battle to conquer racial prejudice, and that this cause was “as far reaching and
important as any that has occupied our army and navy.” 11 Even black soldiers questioned the
motives and purpose of US involvement in the Philippines. A sergeant within one of the black
regiments fighting in Cuba wrote home, “American rule in the Philippines would be only a
repetition of White rule in the south and American rule on this island today. The sole aim and cry
would be to ‘Keep the nigger down.!’” 12 Another soldier offered, “I feel sorry for these people,
you have no idea the way these people are treated by the Americans here. I know their (whites),
feelings towards them as they speak their opinions in my presence, thinking I am white.” 13
Open critique, however, was either muted, and or isolated within the black community
for fear of repercussions against blacks at home who appeared to be unpatriotic in a time of
war. 14
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Davis and Young would participate in the final US military campaigns to eradicate
guerilla resistance in Samar province. Commander of American military forces in the Visayas
region that included Samar province, Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, sought a different
means of subduing the last strongholds of Filipino resistance. This included methods that on the
surface were not immediately lethal, including the deprivation of food and destruction of villages
suspected of harboring or supporting guerillas. 15 American soldiers burned crops, stored stocks
of rice and grain, shot livestock, and destroyed habitats within villages. He closed three key
ports on the southern coast, Basey, Balangiga and Guiuan hoping to deprive the rebels of
supplies, reinforcements, and weapons and ammunition from other islands. Samar had been a
major center of commerce for Manila hemp, which was used to produce ropes for sale to
Americans, and other traders. The money was then used in turn to help finance Filipino forces
on the island. 16 General Hughes then ordered the US 9th Infantry Regiment to occupy the town of
Balangiga on Samar Island to mop up sporadic resistance within the province. Although initially
there wasn’t much friction between the Americans and Filipinos, tensions between them changed
dramatically when American soldiers arrested and detained eighty male farmers. These men
were held in tents without food and water for several days. American soldiers had also been
accused of raping local village women.
On the morning of Saturday, Sept. 28, 1901, hundreds of native fighters mostly armed
with bolo knives, some of them disguised as women church worshippers, staged a successful
surprise attack on U.S. troops as they were eating breakfast in Balangiga. 36 men of Company C,
9th Infantry Regiment were killed outright during the attack (including all commissioned

15
John Bigelow Jr., Reminisces of the Santiago Campaign. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers), 1899;
https://archive.org/details/reminiscencesofs00bige
16
Ibid.

53

officers). Eight more men died from wounds as the company withdrew to a small nearby town
called Basey. Four more soldiers were missing and presumed dead, for a total of 48 American
dead from that encounter. The natives suffered 28 deaths and 22 wounded.
U.S. military authorities retaliated with a "kill and burn" policy to retake Samar. From
October 1901 to March 1902 a combined force of American soldiers and marines led by
Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith of the US Army, killed at least 2,500 people in the province.
General Smith ordered all males who were capable of bearing arms from the age of 10 and
higher to be shot by firing squad. He issued orders regarding how he expected the campaign to
be carried out, stating, “I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn; the more you kill and
burn, the better it will please me…The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness.” 17
The killing of so many civilians led to an inquiry that resulted in the court martials of
General Smith, Major Littleton Waller, commander of the marine battalion involved in the
campaign, and Captain Edward Glenn. Smith and Glenn were found guilty, resulting in Smith’s
forced retirement, and Glenn’s dismissal from the service. 18
In May 1901, Second Lieutenant Benjamin Davis was sent to the Philippines with Troop
M, 9th Cavalry Regiment. 19 Davis’s personal views about race juxtaposed squarely against his
responsibility to impose American dominance over the brown people of the Philippines. If this
responsibility weighed heavily on his mind, Davis did not show or express it to his family. 20 He
and his men were given the charge to aid the 9th Infantry in mopping up the final hold-outs of
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Filipino insurrectionists in Samar province. Like most other American military leaders fighting
the insurgents, Davis found his task quite elusive and difficult.
Davis, Young, and other black soldiers witnessed firsthand American brutality and racist
practices executed against the people of the Philippines. The harsh way Filipino insurgents and
potentially innocent civilians were treated reminded many black soldiers of their own homeland
experiences. 21 Many captured insurgents were summarily executed. Often this was done by
hanging or shooting, practices all too familiar to black southerners in uniform. American soldiers
were unable to easily discern insurgents from civilians, and therefore erred on the side of military
action versus caution when presented with unclear circumstances. White soldiers routinely
referred to Filipinos, hostile or not, as “niggers,” “black devils,” or “gugus.” 22 White volunteer
units, proved to be almost messianic in their zeal to indiscriminately kill Filipinos, including
civilian men and boys as well as insurgents. 23
Davis kept his opinion of the war to himself as he dutifully attempted to carry out the
assigned missions of locating and subduing Filipino resistance in Samar. Davis’s combat
experience in the Philippines was somewhat limited. Although he led several risky patrols into
the jungles of Samar in the eastern Philippines, he never made contact with the enemy. The
closest that he and his men came to potential action occurred on May 27, 1901. Davis led a
patrol of twenty-five enlisted men and six native bearers and guides on a reconnaissance patrol to
Villa Real, a small town that was approximately twenty-five miles north of the 9th Cavalry’s
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established base at Santa Rita. 24 This small patrol marched overland for twelve miles seeking to
find information about Filipino guerilla activity.
At the end of the day Davis and his patrol found themselves on a coastline of the small
strip of the island. He knew that any attempt to return in the dark would have been foolhardy
and dangerous. Davis established a defensive perimeter and spent the night at their location.
The following morning, he seized five boats from local natives and continued his mission of
searching for Filipino insurgents by using the boats to travel along the coastline. When he and
his men reached the village of Bongon, Davis described seeing “white flags of all descriptions
hanging from the windows of the houses.” 25
After acquiring more guides and bearers, he continued his trek to Villa Real. Finding no
insurgents, Davis questioned local natives about the whereabouts and activities of hostile
Filipinos. He was told that there had been no insurgents in the area for more than a year. Having
no choice but to believe the reports about insurgent activity, Davis led his men back to their
regimental base-camp by retracing their original overland route. 26
In August 1901, Davis was reassigned to Troop F of the 10th Cavalry Regiment. The
reassignment was normal practice for black soldiers from the buffalo soldier regiments. This
rule generally applied to enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers
alike. Davis would spend the next twelve months on the island of Panay with his new regiment
executing similar tasks as he had been given in Samar. In September 1901, Troop F was split
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into separate detachments, with Davis being placed in charge of approximately twenty-five men
and garrisoned at the town of Lambunao. 27
He and his men were given the mission to act as a stabilizing force and to show presence
as agents of the newly established United States civil government in the Philippines. Davis
embraced his task wholeheartedly. He learned to speak both Spanish and Visayan, the local
language. Davis showed an innate ability to learn different languages with fair ease. This
capability did not go unnoticed by his superiors. Davis received an “excellent” rating on his first
officer evaluation report. His regimental commander, Colonel Samuel Whiteside, thought that
Davis was quite intelligent and adaptive. Years after the deployment, he told Davis that several
white company officers had wanted him to be assigned to their unit.
The men who served under Davis did not express much sentiment about him. Even for
this early stage in his career, those who knew or served under him mostly expressed that he was
a good officer and a strict disciplinarian. Unlike his contemporary Charles Young, Davis did not
share emotional sentiments or bonds with his men. He did not disclose such views in any of his
letters or interviews. Despite this, he was highly regarded. He was often described as stern, but
well liked. 28
After an uneventful year, Davis and Troop F were sent back to the United States. As the
neophyte second lieutenant Davis had a relatively uneventful deployment on Panay, Captain
Charles Young experienced combat firsthand as he led his soldiers through several violent
encounters in Samar province. During one such engagement in Samar, as Young and his troop
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were traveling upriver on a chartered gunboat called the Hercules, his patrol came under fire
from both banks. Young calmly stood amidst a hail of bullets striking all around him firing his
revolver and urging his men to return fire to repel the ambush. 29 Another veteran of his troop in
the Philippines recounted a patrol in which Captain Young led his men through a “terrific
tropical storm” into the teeth of enemy fire. “Clothes tied in a bundle on his head, cartridge belt
and revolver held up, [Young] waded a river with his men under fire from both banks where
natives were in ambush.” His men nicknamed him “Follow Me,” and many vowed that they
would have died for him. 30 Young was also noted for gaining the confidence of the people of
several Filipino villages such as Blanca Aurora for helping them to rebuild following destruction
by other Americans. 31
General American conduct during the Filipino Insurrection reflected a regressive racial
trend that permeated America culture in the twentieth century. Key figures within the War
Department, such as the Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker, 1916-1921, and Commanding
Generals of the Army John Schofield, 1888-1895, and Nelson A. Miles, 1895-1903, consciously
limited the numbers of blacks allowed into the military. This went so far as to accept officer
vacancies within the black regiments for over two decades because they would not allow new
black officers into the regular Army. 32 Baker stated as he assumed his duties as Secretary of
War: “there is no intention on the part of the War Department to undertake at this time to settle
the so-called race question.” 33 Opposite of this stance, Baker also fended off southern
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politician’s attempts to reduce or remove the four black regular Army regiments. He prolifically
defended the legacy of the black regiments, reminding attackers of their valorous service to the
nation during the late nineteenth century, especially on the western frontier. 34 In spite of his
paean to the buffalo soldier regiments, Baker accepted the standard posture of white political and
military leaders in keeping the numbers of blacks limited to the four regiments and keeping them
segregated. 35
American leaders of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in practically every
institution, including the military, balked on the question of how far blacks be permitted to
participate within the American enterprise. The presumption that black soldiers were inferior
became a hardened and accepted principle. Memories of black service in the Civil War and
Indian Wars waned with the retiring and dying off of veterans who were sympathetic towards
blacks in the military such as Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant.
White officers such as Generals Schofield, Miles, and Samuel Baldwin Marks Young,
who presided over the Army from 1895-1908, generally sought to not only separate, but to limit
black participation within the military. 36 Racial stereotyping and prejudice grew more
pronounced in the military with the 1896 United States Supreme Court ruling of Plessy v.
Ferguson. With this ruling the court articulated a racial philosophy to legally segregate the races
in a “separate but equal” manner that many whites conveniently believed would benefit all
concerned. 37
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Practices of open racial hostility and discriminatory practices against blacks in the
military lasted for more than fifty years in the twentieth century. But this only followed national
patterns regarding race. Such measures were carried out informally because there were no
written policies or guidance regarding how black soldiers were to be treated. 38
As white nationalistic fervor surged, the specific question of producing more black
commissioned officers gave way to the conventional view that blacks were not “officer”
material. 39 This stance plagued the few serving black officers and severely restricted any
opportunity for more to enter the military as commissioned leaders. 40
Positive impressions about blacks and their proven record of commitment, patriotism,
and professionalism from past wars had eroded by the turn of the century. For many southern
whites, memories of black soldiers, marching triumphantly through devastated cities during and
after the Civil War, cast a long dark shadow upon the Anglo-Saxon race, as the North and South
mended their past differences through memory and reinterpretation of the Civil War. 41
White nationalism, combined with clashes of black regular soldiers stationed near whites
in the south, caused many whites in general to re-evaluate the risks associated with blacks in the
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military. 42 Tempered respect from past supporters gave way to suspicion and doubt about the
need for blacks in uniform.
Following the Brownsville incident, between 1906 and 1916 there were annual proposals
calling for the elimination of black regular units altogether. These were submitted by southern
white political figures such as Congressmen John Nance Garner and James L. Slayden of Texas,
Frank Park of Georgia, and Thaddeus H. Caraway of Arkansas. 43 One former white army
officer, Captain J. A. Judson, offered in a letter to the Army and Navy Journal, that “there were
enough whites in the country to fill the service. There was no need for Negroes or any other alien
race. 44 One of the proposals called for discharging of all blacks from the Army by the middle of
1907. Most of the proposals argued for rescinding the federal statutes that authorized the four
black regiments.
A third bill introduced in the Sixty-Third Congress (1913-1914) would have prohibited
blacks from serving as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the Army or Navy. 45 None
of the proposals or bills reached the House or the Senate for a vote. Secretary Baker summarily
dismissed any bill or proposal limiting blacks in the military beyond their current force structure.
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He justified his stance by noting the “gallant service” record of blacks in the military from the
American Revolution to their current era. 46
Popular figures within the media of this era helped to further sharpen the racial divide by
minimizing or ignoring blacks’ roles in previous American wars. Two white iconic figures of
this era, Thomas Dixon, Jr. and David W. Griffith, purposely portrayed demeaning
characterizations of blacks in print and film. Dixon, in his novel The Clansman, described
blacks as “half-child, half-animal, and left to his will, roams at night and sleeps in the day.” 47
Griffith cemented this character assassination of blacks in his 1915 film adaptation of the
Clansman, The Birth of a Nation. Within the film, Griffith not only portrayed black soldiers as
half-witted childlike creatures, but also challenged their past records of heroism in battle through
his depiction of them as cowards and pawns who could not stand up to white authority. 48 In
Griffith’s film, the portrayed black soldiers threw down their weapons en-masse and ran away
when confronted by the might of white armed Klansmen. 49 With the ringing endorsement of
such public figures as President Woodrow Wilson, the film solidified for millions of white
Americans the notion that blacks were an inferior race to whites. Life began to imitate art as
these contrived stereotypes found within the novel and film spurred senseless degradation and
acts of violence against blacks.
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As the issue of serving a nation and government that had historically denied democracy
to the black race was a heavy burden for new generations of black soldiers who entered the
service in the early twentieth century.
Having to enforce American “democracy” as it was being denied to their own segment of
the population, young black soldiers walked on a tenuous tight-rope. Adrienne Lentz-Smith
encapsulates this dilemma, noting, “African American soldiers had to perpetuate the very racial
ideologies they sought to escape, even as they often had to impose civilization by barbaric
means.” 50 Conversely, within this framework of contested space, many white Americans began
to identify black soldiers as a distinct threat to what they viewed as American democracy. The
symbolism of a black man in uniform, potentially armed and threatening to racist whites, clashed
with the standard view of soldiers as patriotic “protectors” of American liberty. 51
White insecurities and fears about armed black regular soldiers were realized in two
confrontations between black soldiers and white civilians in Texas in 1906 and 1917. The
August 13, 1906, incident began after several minor racial encounters between black soldiers of
1st Battalion, 25th Infantry Regiment and white citizens of Brownsville. 52 Local whites within
Brownsville claimed that armed black soldiers had entered the town arbitrarily firing and killing
a bartender, Frank Natus, and wounding police lieutenant M.Y. Dominguez in the arm, resulting

Adrienne Lentz-Smith, Freedom Struggles: African Americans and World War I (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 2011), p.57.
51
Leon Litwack. Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow, (New York: Vintage Books, 1999).
204-208.
52
Garna L. Christian, Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 1899-1917. (College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 1995) 69-91; Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971).
50

63

in the loss of the limb. Some 167 black soldiers of the 25th Regiment were released from active
duty without benefits. 53
When members of the regiment refused to reveal who may have participated in the
incident, President Theodore Roosevelt intervened in the military courts martial process and
summarily mass-punished several companies by ordering the discharge of these soldiers, without
due process normally allowed soldiers in military hearings. 54
Benjamin Davis spoke briefly on this topic as he recalled memories about this period in
his 1968 interview. Davis was serving in his first tour at Wilberforce University when the
Brownsville, Texas incident occurred in 1906. Davis commented on the incident, noting, “we
weren’t concerned about Brownsville—it was the Army.” 55 He also mentioned W.E.B. Du Bois
and the NAACP within this discussion, noting that he knew about them, but viewed both the
organization and the man with suspicion. 56 Davis was early in his military career when the
Brownsville race conflicts occurred. Coming from his sheltered background, he had no
inclination to challenge the military by defending the soldiers who had participated in the
incident. Neither Davis, Young or Green had anything to gain by protesting against the
treatment of the black soldiers involved in these affairs. So, each pragmatically did what they
could to weather such affairs by keeping their own matters in order within the military to
continue their active service.
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Although Charles Young did not specifically mention the Brownsville incident, he
empathized with his fellow soldiers about trouble with local whites while stationed with his
regiment in San Antonio, Texas. Young wrote a heated letter to Booker T. Washington asking
him to intercede on behalf of black soldiers stationed in Texas by speaking to the president and
other people to assure them that what they were hearing about his soldiers was not true. Young
noted that, “despite what the newspapers might say about his men breaking Jim Crow laws and
being involved in drunken brawling, ‘the conduct of his soldiers has been exemplary,’ both
officers and men are making a concerted effort to avoid trouble.” 57
The Houston Race Riot of 1917 was a much more serious incident, resulting in the deaths
of sixteen local whites and four black soldiers from the 24th Infantry Regiment. This incident
involved some of the most seasoned and racially conscious black soldiers in the regular army.
Prior to the outbreak of violence, soldiers within the unit noted that they had endured a steady
stream of verbal and physical abuses by Houston’s white residents and police officers. 58
According to local white officials, conflict between the two groups sparked almost immediately
upon the soldier’s arrival and refusal to comply with the city’s Jim Crow laws.
The soldiers reached their breaking point on the night of August 23, following rumors
that Houston police officers had killed a fellow soldier, Corporal Charles Baltimore, who had
gone to the police station to inquire about the status of another soldier whom the police had
beaten during an earlier incident involving a local black woman. 59 Although the rumor proved
false, nearly 100 of the battalion’s members procured weapons and marched into town,
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determined to avenge Baltimore’s death. Shots were soon exchanged between the soldiers and
groups of armed white civilians and police. Following this horrific incident, murder charges
were filed against thirty-four members of the 24th Infantry Regiment. The Army ordered the
regiment to immediately vacate Camp Logan and report to Columbus, New Mexico. In the first
of three trials, thirteen men were sentenced to death and hanged on December 11, 1917. 60
Forty-one men were sentenced to life in prison. 61 In subsequent trials ninety-three more
men were tried, from which eleven more were sentenced to death, and eighteen given jail terms.
Under pressure from the NAACP, President Wilson eventually commuted ten of the death
sentences to life imprisonment and made all subsequent military executions subject to his
review. 62 In the wake of this mutiny, whites across the country called for black soldiers to be
trained in less contentious environments, such as to the North or West. 63
As America prepared for possible entry into World War I, several key questions were
raised about the participation of blacks in mobilization and the war effort. Should segregation
remain, in what manner would blacks be used in either a segregated or integrated force, and
where would black soldiers be allowed to train, were matters surfaced as America mobilized.
With these concerns in mind, Congress passed the National Defense Act in 1916 increasing the
size of the Regular Army, however additional black units were not authorized.
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The Brownsville incident and Houston riot loomed large in future decisions about black
servicemen in the Army. Military commanders in the War Department considered these
watershed events when addressing the question of blacks and military service. Such incidents
confirmed doubts about blacks being able to control their emotions against a backdrop of overt
racism from local whites in communities close to military bases. Several white newspaper
editors in Texas objected to the training of black troops in the South, arguing that it was
indisputable fact that the very presence of African-American soldiers was a source of friction,
and that such friction should not be injected into an army. 64
Leon Litwack notes that the language used by whites to describe race relations during the
turn of the century became increasingly apocalyptic. 65 Southern whites began to use the term
“race war” as a potential outcome if blacks tried to achieve political or social equality.
Many noted with confidence that if a violent showdown were to come, they were
confident that the outcome would be the virtual elimination of the black race. 66 Such fiery
rhetoric shaped white responses to the prospect of significant numbers of federalized black
soldiers in the South again. Many old Confederate army veterans and “redeemers” passed down
narratives about the venerated “Lost Cause,” or belief that God was with the South even though
it had failed to prevail during the war, the ending of slavery, and the destruction of white
southern racial order. White southerners were defiant, to the point of violence if necessary,
against any attempt to alter race relations in the South. Edward Blum notes that such a harsh
stance was not ameliorated until “northern whites rejected their plans for radically reforming the
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nation, honored the ghosts of the southern lost cause, and promoted second-class status for
African Americans.” 67 This messaging was passed down to subsequent generations of white
southerners who otherwise would have had no perspective about such emotional sea change
events in southern history. 68
By the turn of the century, military heirs who had been indoctrinated under the ideology
of the great “Lost Cause” had risen to key levels of command and influence over the entire US
Army. Generals James Franklin Bell and Hugh Lenox Scott, both from Kentucky, served as
Chiefs of Staff of the Army from 1906-1921, and issued policies and guidance to army units that
maintained policies that limited the numbers of black soldiers allowed on active duty to the four
black regiments. 69 Under their leadership, the numbers of black regular army officers were also
kept to a minimum. And yet, black soldiers such as Davis continued to serve and seek
advancement within America’s military. Through their military experiences within this era, black
soldiers and veterans from the buffalo soldier regiments continued to redefine the meaning of
their service to the American people, both black and white. To the black troops themselves, their
service and sacrifice reflected their great desire to prove to an uncaring nation their right to full
citizenship and participation after war. They were fighting to be free, not to return to a life as
marginalized or lesser Americans. Chad Williams succinctly describes how black men and
women within the service and as veterans served as “historical actors and symbolic figures that
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fundamentally shaped the nature of American society.” Although Williams centered his study on
blacks during World War I, I would argue that this analogy can be used for black military service
during any era.
Davis and Young spoke extensively about this period as being one of the most difficult
during their careers. During America’s entry into World War I, thousands of black servicemen,
two and three generations removed slavery, continued to test the informal boundaries placed
against blacks. Anglo-American nationalism clashed against their ideals of inclusiveness and
opportunity for all ethnic groups.
The military uniform became contested “space.” Blacks insisted on their right to serve
and participate in the American community, while whites saw this as a dangerous development
that could potentially lead to their demand for social equality. 70
A white militia commander in South Carolina noted, “the uniform would transform the
Negro “from a docile, tractable and peaceable individual into an offensive, insolent creature,”
and the military experience acquired by blacks would “have a demoralizing effect on them when
they return.” 71 This tension grew to such an extent following World War I that many blacks
were forced to take their uniforms off as they traveled home within the United States. 72 Another
white officer in the South Carolina state militia threatened to court-martial and remove any of his
men who dared salute a black officer. He rationalized this breach of military protocol, stating,
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“we have enlisted to fight for our country and not to practice social equality with an inferior race
whom our fathers held in bondage.” 73
Despite the ordeal black soldiers faced, most who chose to serve within the Army or
Navy of this era still viewed their service as an opportunity for upward mobility. They
associated military service with such positive features as racial pride and black masculinity.
Black soldiers noted that military service offered at least a chance for poor black men, especially
for many southern blacks who had been consigned to a life of sharecropping or agricultural
peonage, to escape the worst conditions imposed upon them by southern white supremacy.
Through their service in the Army, many black men for the first time in their lives
developed an understanding about how their service to the nation intersected with their claim for
citizenship and manhood. Military service, in addition to offering black men a new life,
symbolized the connection of black people to the nation and its defense. This concept had been
abjectly denied to them as civilians. Many of these young black men who opted for a career in
the military developed a strong sense of civic nationalism, which in a sense, was their way of
showing gratitude for being allowed to serve.
Most who entered the service did so with the pragmatic view that military service would
not completely shield them from general racism within American society, but still offered them
previously unforeseen opportunities. Most were optimistic and proud with being given the
privilege to serve under the federal government. Most in their own way identified positively
with the institution of government, personified through their uniform. Most blacks took comfort
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in knowing that they served a larger and more powerful structure than their repressive local
authorities and state governance. As they entered an army infected with racism, military service
provided varying degrees of social, political, and economic freedom. Many, following the
prophetic vision of Frederick Douglass, believed that their service would help to promote a
definitive claim for their rightful place as first-class citizens of the country. 74
The black community and leaders of this period, including Richmond Planet editor John
Mitchell, Jr., Illinois congressman Oscar Depriest, and even Booker T. Washington, railed
against the military’s failure to address the limitations imposed upon blacks in the military in the
late nineteenth century. They were particularly concerned about the military’s failure to address
the officer shortage. White American leaders and lay people considered the complex dichotomy
regarding whether the past proven black service record in combat was enough to trust blacks to
lead soldiers as commissioned officers. 75 An undisclosed white writer of the late nineteenth
century, summed up well this vexing point in a letter he wrote to the Army and Navy Journal in
1899, arguing that “experience up to that time had not justified such requests.” 76
He further noted that “education could not remove innate inferiority. The ability to lead
comes from generations of cultivation, and the American Negroes were descendants of weak
African tribes easily overcome by vigorous neighbors.” The writer concluded his assertion
noting that “while blacks may make excellent soldiers, but the qualities that make a good soldier
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and those required for an officer are not necessarily the same.” 77 Mitchell campaigned
specifically for increasing the numbers of black officers within the black regiments.
He noted, “a race of people who, denied the right of suffrage, outraged, butchered, with
their rights ruthlessly trampled upon…that would kiss the hand that smites [it] and begs the
privilege of dying for their oppressors is degenerate indeed.” 78 Using his paper, Mitchell drew
considerable support from the black community as he circulated such provocative slogans as:
“no officers, no fight.” 79
Being a black commissioned officer and leader added an additional dimension to the
expectations and responsibilities placed upon military men. Those rare members of the “talented
tenth” who were fortunate enough to represent their race through service in the military as
officers unwittingly had to put their professional and personal lives on public display. The choice
to seek a commission during this era made them “race men.” Extremely high standards of
personal conduct and behavior were imposed upon black officers by the military and the black
community. In a public sense they were expected to be practically perfect. 80
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This included such features as being religious and attending church, being married and
with family, not displaying any negative public behavior such as drunkenness, or fighting.
Officers in general were also expected to maintain their finances and never succumb to bad
habits. 81
In interviews conducted of over one hundred former black servicemen who had served in
one of the four black regiments from 1891-1917, Marvin Fletcher received a myriad of responses
regarding the nature of their service. Several consistent themes emerged from the interviews that
helped to illustrate some degree of autonomy and agency felt by black soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and commissioned officers from within these units. Most of the
respondents used such expressions as privilege, patriotism, and honor. Pride in their affiliation
with Charles Young was also noted by several of the interviewees. Jerome Howe of the 10th
Cavalry Regiment from 1913-17, wrote about how Young was highly esteemed by his fellow
officers. 82 Retired Colonel Joseph King, who served with Young in the 10th Cavalry Regiment
noted, “the only colored officer in the regular service that I came into contact with was then
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Young of the 10th Cavalry in the punitive expedition into Mexico. He
was highly respected by everyone who came into contact with him.” 83 William Pope, who served
with the 25th Infantry Regiment at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, from 1907 to 1913, wrote, “I
considered the 25th to be a very fine regiment and I am proud to have served in it.” 84
The individual assignment of the few regular army black officers such as Young and
Davis sometimes drew the personal attention and involvement of such key figures as the
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Secretary of War and even, on the occasion of Young’s placement following the SpanishAmerican War, President Woodrow Wilson. Young’s command over a white lieutenant in the
10th Cavalry, Albert Dockery, had drawn the ire of Mississippi Senator John Sharp Williams,
after Dockery complained of his lot of being assigned to a black regiment with a black
commander. 85 Williams forwarded a letter from Dockery to Wilson, from which Wilson
encouraged the Secretary of War to establish a policy preventing blacks from holding command,
in any capacity, over white soldiers. Wilson personally intervened on behalf of Dockery by
writing to the Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, informing him that “a Southerner” found it
“not only distasteful but practically impossible to serve under a colored commander.” 86 In a very
non-traditional role for the President of the United States, Wilson asked that Baker transfer the
white soldier to avoid “some serious and perhaps even tragic insubordination” by Dockery
against Young. 87
Although Benjamin Davis was sheltered somewhat from such prejudice by his middleclass upbringing, he understood the challenges of becoming an officer in an era of regressive
race relations. He also understood the importance of serving as a commissioned officer versus as
an enlisted man. From his earliest interactions with Buffalo soldiers that he had encountered
growing up, he dreamed of serving in the cavalry. Davis almost immediately chose to pursue
military service in the regular army first, and as a commissioned officer second.
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His mother did her best to convince him to go into the ministry instead but was not able
to sway her son away from the military into the clergy. 88 Davis had taken to a bitter cynicism
regarding organized religion following several encounters in his church. Davis noted, “my
experiences with one or two of the older members of our church, had not been pleasant. 89 Many
years later during his service during World War II, in letters to his wife, Sadie, or daughter,
Elnora, he offered several caustic statements regarding his lack of faith in organized religion. 90
Davis also expressed open dismay over his daughter’s choice for a Master’s thesis on Father
Divine while she attended Howard University. 91 Nonetheless, this is what drove Davis to enlist
in the regular army. Davis fully intended that this was only to be a temporary status until he
could earn his commission through an appointment to West Point or by testing. A commission
was tantamount to his life ambition of becoming a cavalry officer in the 9th or 10th Cavalry
Regiment. 92
Charles Young
In many ways, Young embodied the American spirit of success “against the odds,” more
so than Davis. In both his civilian life and military experience, Young came from more humble
beginnings to achieve a more notable record of experiences and successes in the military than
Davis. Young was the first African American superintendent of a national park (the Sequoia
National Park), the first black military attaché, and the first African American officer to
command a Regular Army regiment.
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Most of Davis’s tenure in the regular army was spent on staff. Davis commanded only
once, with the 369th New York National Guard Battalion from 1939 to 1941. Young surpassed
every given metric for military success and criterion for selection to senior officer ranks or
general officership. He was only denied due to his failing health and racial prejudice. He
undoubtedly influenced Davis in his career choice to endure the regular army experience and to
persevere no matter what the odds were.
Charles Young, who served with Davis at Fort Duchesne as the only black officer on
active duty, also encouraged Davis to apply for the commission. By the time that Davis sought a
commission into the Army in 1900, there were only three means to obtain a commission. This
included West Point, direct commissioning through testing and an examination board, and
through a combat commission. 93
Young had graduated from the West Point Military Academy in 1889. He was the third
and last black allowed to attend West Point until Davis’s son, Benjamin Davis Jr., was admitted
in 1932. Young was fully aware of the difficulties that Davis would face in applying and being
vetted for an officer’s commission. He had struggled to attain his commission from West Point.
It took him five years to graduate versus the normal four, after failing his plebe or first year at the
academy for deficiencies in mathematics. 94 He then fell behind his class again by an additional
two months because of his inability to pass his engineering test. 95 For the entire five years that
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Young was at West Point most of his classmates ignored or refused to have anything to do with
him. 96
Fortunately for him, three of the five years that he attended West Point, he shared rooms
with John Alexander, the second black officer to attend and graduate from the academy.
Alexander mentored, tutored, and encouraged Young until he graduated in 1887. 97
Unlike Davis’s experience of growing up in a middle-class setting somewhat protected
from the harshest experiences of overt racism and economic instability, Young was born to
parents who had endured slavery in Kentucky. He was born in 1864 in Mason County,
Kentucky, freed from slavery by this point, but brought into the world in such destitute poverty
that his survival was uncertain. 98
His father, Gabriel Young, had served in the Union Army during the Civil War with the
Fifth U.S.C.T. Heavy Artillery. 99 Gabriel Young served one year on active duty at Vicksburg,
Mississippi, performing various tasks such as clearing the Vicksburg battlefield area of
skeletons. 100 He was awarded a disability pension seventeen years after his discharge for loss of
hearing from target practice in the summer of 1865. 101 Gabriel Young’s status as a Civil War
veteran became an integral part of his identity as a freedman. His discharge notice was written
with glowing terminology recommending him to the public at large for being faithful, reliable,
trustworthy, honest, a thorough soldier, and a gentleman. Charles Young spoke very highly of
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his father and thought much of his service to the nation, as characterized in the discharge
certificate. He noted that this was one of his father’s and his most treasured possessions on
earth. Young spoke of his father with pride, offering that he was a man “whose heart glowed
with love of country, liberty, and civic duty, [who] taught me my patriotism, [which] with
us…was no fair weather word.” 102 These values became hallmarks of Young’s self-identity.
As a newly commissioned lieutenant in 1889, Young entered an army that had downsized
to only 28,000 men in uniform and on active duty. In all, there were only eight black
commissioned officers that served in the army between 1866 and 1898, all of whom were
required to serve in the black regiments. Five of these officers were chaplains, and therefore not
allowed command or leadership roles over troops.
This left the three academy graduates, Henry Flipper, John Alexander, and Young, as line
officers and potential commanders. With Flipper’s dismissal in 1882, and Alexander’s untimely
death in 1894, Young was left alone to carry the banner of prowess and competence in the army
for black commissioned officers.
Although Young did not challenge the social segregation of the officer corps, he
vigorously defended himself against unrealistic standards applied to him by his white superiors.
He was cited on efficiency reports by his first commander, Colonel Joseph Tilford, for “failure to
correctly inspect boxes at guard mount, and failure to salute at the proper distance from a
commanding officer.” 103 Young offered measured defensive responses that was considered to
border on insubordination. Young argued that although he was perhaps guilty of errors or lapses

102
103

David Kilroy, For Race and Country, 28-29.
Ibid.

78

in duty, in his first six months on active duty, he insisted that he had made every effort to correct
his deficiencies and that he was never guilty of intentional neglect. 104
After his difficult experience at West Point, Young had learned that it was better to
challenge his superiors head-on over even the most trivial matters of army policies. In a final
show of defiance over these minor offences, Young offered that he would decline his pay if it
could be proved that he had willfully neglected his duty. 105 The matter was dropped.
Young was assigned to Fort Duchesne, Utah, in the fall of 1890. At Duchesne, his
efficiency reports improved greatly and he was freed from harassment by white superiors.
Young served there for four years, building a reputation in which he was described by superiors
as an officer who possessed “untiring zeal, fidelity, and well directed energy.” 106 Although
Young would be detached from his regiment in 1894 to become the professor of military science
and tactics at Wilberforce University, he would return to Duchesne in a second tour of duty in
time to intersect with Davis’s arrival in 1899.
Young’s selection and tenure as the 9th Ohio’s USVI commander derived from black
public pressure, including such black newspapers as the American Citizen of Kansas City.
Papers ran headlines expressing “No officers, no soldiers.” 107 Republican political bosses in
states such as Ohio caved to such pressure from black voters, resulting in a rare exception to
military command policy by allowing Young command of the 9th Ohio. Even with this showing
of black agency and political power, Young assumed his post with mixed feelings. Although he
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was pleased that he had been selected for command and promoted to the temporary rank of
Brevet-Major, he had hoped that he would be allowed to rejoin the 9th Cavalry Regiment in the
event of war. He eagerly sought the opportunity to serve with his regiment in combat with a
regular army unit.
This, he hoped, would open new doors of opportunity for him in terms of promotion and
assignment within the regular army. This vision was at the forefront of his personal thoughts and
desires as he and the 9th Ohio left Columbus, Ohio, in parade-like fashion with fanfare, as
thousands of black well-wishers sent them off. Young was certain that he and his regiment
would participate in the dangerous but honorable calling of war in Cuba. Young pledged to the
assembled body of supporters that the 9th Ohio would do its part to uphold past traditions of
black men at war. 108
The destinies of Young and Davis were intertwined, as Young would not see combat in
Cuba. Instead, they were sent to Camp Alger, Virginia. They got no further to action than
various stateside military training bases. The only adversary that Young’s regiment faced, like
the 8th U.S. Volunteers, were white citizens living near their respective camps. While at Camp
Alger, Young was forced to relieve two of his officers who were accused of raping a young
white woman. Both men claimed that the sexual encounter was consensual, but Young believed
that he had no choice but to force the men to resign or initiate courts-martial proceedings to give
the local populace the appearance that the Army would discipline its own. 109
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After four months at Camp Alger with no combat orders, the 9th Ohio was transferred to
Camp Meade, Pennsylvania, in August 1898. By this point the war was over, and Young’s men
grew restless and openly accused him of using his volunteer command to position himself for
promotion in the regular army. Some of Ohio’s black newspapers reprinted letters from men in
the regiment charging Young with cultivating his own ambition and ego and pandering to white
visitors and officers at the expense of his own men.
Young furiously replied, “we are trying to make soldiers out of these boys, and the
yellow journals are trying to turn them back into tin soldiers.” 110 Young continued to be
assaulted with charges of drilling the men “to death” to please white spectators. Young
responded by writing to the Adjutant General’s Office in which he denied any career motive as
he executed his duties in command, and countercharged that most of the malcontents were
married men anxious to get back home to their wives. 111 The final straw to Young’s authority
came in the form of one of his men, Corporal Robert Allen, writing to Senator Mark Hanna,
claiming that his request to secure a discharge through regular channels had been stymied by his
military chain of command, ending with Young. Despite Young’s vehement protest and
argument that Corporal Allen had not presented his application in a “respectful and soldierly”
manner, Senator Hanna used his influence to overrule Young and facilitated the discharge. This
incident made Young more anxious than ever to return to the regular army. 112
Before Young was granted his wish to end command, the 9th Ohio Regiment was
transferred once more. In November 1898 the unit was sent to winter quarters at Camp Marion,
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South Carolina. Camp Marion was a remote site some 22 miles from Charleston. The men were
confronted with quarters overgrown with pinewoods, a poor water supply, and a hostile white
populace. These circumstances lowered the spirits of the men even further in an already
dispirited regiment. Young recognized the potentially explosive situation and took steps to avoid
possible conflicts between his men and local whites. Young ordered company commanders to
ensure that their men did nothing to reinforce hostility between local whites and them.
He encouraged his men to “treat all whom they meet with respect and courtesy.” These
measures apparently worked as local newspapers reported that “the people of Summerville are
very pleased with the record of Major Young whose battalion…has behaved in a most exemplary
fashion.” 113 In January 1899 the order finally came for Young and his men to muster out.
Young, as well as his men, were quite relieved to end their active status with the 9th Ohio. 114
Young briefly returned to Wilberforce University to spend time with his family, as he
waited for orders returning him to the 9th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Duchesne. He briefly
considered asking for an assignment at Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, but quickly changed his
mind when he found out that Booker T. Washington would not allow the arming of cadets, out of
concern over the controversy it might cause with local whites.
After his experience and difficulty with the 9th Ohio, Young would have none of the
gradualist approach offered by Washington in attempting to train cadets without weapons. He
thought that such a notion was absurd. 115 This attitude distinguished the difference between him
and Davis. By the time that Young met Davis he was the sole remaining black officer on active
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duty who had graduated from West Point. Young embodied everything that Davis sought in a
military career. From graduating from a pedigree institution to attain regular Army status, to
earned respect for meeting and exceeding the standards imposed upon black officers in line units,
Davis trailed Young. Young’s example as an officer of the line set a high bar for Davis to
follow. Although he never expressed envy, he most certainly begrudged Young’s status.
While Young felt a larger calling to aid and mold “the next generation” of black officers
and soldiers towards the betterment of the race, Davis distanced himself from this approach by
leaning upon common thematic tropes sold by the military. Obedience, discipline, loyalty to
nation and service, manhood, and military competence were Davis’s counter that trumped
responsibility to a specific race or group of Americans. Davis often cited these core values as key
ingredients that led to his success in the military.
Young was eleven years ahead of Davis and John Green in time in the military and
therefore held senior rank above both throughout his and their careers. Given their unique status
as regular army officers they inadvertently crossed each other throughout their army
assignments.
Although Young has no record of interaction with John Green, he mentored Davis as
much as possible when they shared duty assignments. Were it not for Charles Young’s
encouragement and support Davis might have left Wilberforce during his first assignment there.
Young had challenged Davis to complete his tour as a black officer at a historically black college
so that he might influence future generations of young black men. 116 As a guest lecturer at
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Stanford University in December 1903, Young challenged Washington’s philosophy of
promoting industrial and agricultural training as prerequisites to break barriers that had precluded
blacks from educational and political inclusion. He noted, “he rejects the white man’s efforts to
stifle black aspirations, the pointed finger of scorn, and attempts to sugar coat the situation with
sycophany or sweet talk.” He offered that the only answer was higher education for African
Americans and repeated his call for the nation to give blacks a “white man’s chance.”
Young’s speech was well received by Stanford and the black community. A story written
the following day by a local newspaper noted that Young had caused quite a sensation and
described him as the senior colored officer in the army, a West Point graduate, and an able
officer. 117
Davis’s service in the Philippines had provided him with first-hand experiences about
how the US military operated in war. He witnessed firsthand the dual nature of the Army as it
carried out combat operations while also attempting to restore the Philippines through nation
building measures.
During his time in the Philippines Davis would have been exposed to several conflicting
dynamics about American culture. As the robust American military overwhelmed a fledgling
third world people, he would have been briefed on their military mission to liberate the Filipino
people, while having to subjugate them. Davis would have also experienced the conflicting
dynamics of serving their country at war against racist taunts from their white comrades. Willard
Gatewood in his study of blacks engaged in wars in the late nineteenth century notes that men of
the Twenty-fifth Infantry Regiment had scarcely landed in the Philippines in 1899 when, as they
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marched towards Manila, a white spectator yelled: “what are you coons doing here?” 118 He also
observed that white soldiers refused to salute black officers and delighted in taunting black
soldiers by singing a familiar tune to Davis, “All coons look alike to me” and “I don’t like a
nigger nohow.” 119 Many African American soldiers openly expressed chagrin over their
complicity in imposing American racism upon another group of darker people. Davis did not.
Davis only spoke in terms of his military assignments and difficulties associated with executing
them. 120
Davis’s experience in the Philippines was so marginal that it would have had little
influence on promotion and career advancement for him. Although Davis had served in a
combat zone in Samar, he had not experienced actual fighting against the Filipino insurgents.
Following his nine month deployment in the Philippines, Davis was assigned to Fort
Washakie, Wyoming, with two other white officers, Captain Thomas Carson and Lieutenant
Raymond S. Einslow, and seventy-six enlisted men. 121 This remote post was about 150 miles
away from Rawlins, Wyoming. This assignment was a frontier post designed to maintain a
federal presence and keep peace between Native Americans and whites. But by this point, there
was practically no unrest between the parties. Two other troops were added to the post two years
later, which increased the size of the garrison to more than 200 enlisted men and eleven
officers. 122 Davis remained the only black officer in the region, as Charles Young was sent to
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serve with elements of the 9th Regiment at Sequoia National Park in San Francisco. John Green’s
assignment was undisclosed as he left no record for this period.
Davis found himself completely isolated most of the time during this assignment. He
could not fraternize with his men, nor was he allowed to mix company with the white officers.
He spent most of his time tending to his various assigned duties, including adjutant, commander
of Ordnance, Engineering, Signal, and Recruiting details, and summary courts martial officer. 123
He was also sent out to lead hunting parties as the post depended on wildlife to supplement their
ration of food. Davis led several such expeditions. He noted that they tried to make sure that
every man got to go out at least once during their enlistment, as hunting and locating oneself in
the country was part of the training. 124
On his first trip, he and four enlisted men covered 275 miles stalking and killing elk in
the region around the fort, known as the Jackson Hole country. 125
In October 1902 Davis took thirty days leave to return home in Washington to visit
family and court a childhood friend, Elnora Dickerson. Davis had not seen his parents and
family since earning his commission. The Dickersons, like the Davises, had attained middleclass status through hard work, property ownership, and by virtue of their light complexion.
Elnora’s parents, Edward and Lydia Dickerson, had moved to Washington D.C. from Virginia
following the end of the Civil War. The Dickersons had nine children, and Elnora was third
from the youngest. Edward Dickerson made a fair living serving as a porter or teamster. This
enabled him to purchase a home on the same street as the Davises. Davis had befriended Elnora
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in school at the age of thirteen. He proposed to her while on leave and she accepted. They were
married on October 23rd, 1902. 126
Light complexions were quite a noticeable feature within the Davis family. Davis
mentioned several times in interviews the light complexion of his mother, noting that he had
known nothing of his maternal grandfather but from “the appearance of my mother, a sister and a
brother, I am of the opinion that they were fathered by the master, or a close relative of his.” 127
The benefit of light complexion and some European features such as straight hair offered
potential privilege to the Davis clan. Adele Logan Alexander explains how some “light-skinned
African-Americans did harbor at least covert feelings of superiority, and their darker skinned
cousins justifiably resented those assumptions.” 128
Davis did not discuss the skin tone distinctions within his own race, but his choice of
marriage partners, through his first wife Elnora, and second wife, Sadie, as well as the chosen
partners of his children, Benjamin Jr. and his daughter Elnora, showed how the Davis family
maintained a racial code of keeping lighter complexioned blacks within their family. To have
married a darker complexioned person would have been seen by many within the social circle of
the Davis family as a step down.
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Figure 1: Davis and Davis Jr. in official military photos

Figure 2: Davis and son with wives
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Elnora traveled back with Davis to Fort Washakie. With Elnora, Davis settled into a
more comfortable life at his remote outpost. During this period, he sought promotion to First
Lieutenant and began to try to convince his command structure and the War Department that his
time as a Lieutenant in the Eighth USVI should be counted as time in grade as a lieutenant. 129
Initially the army replied that his prior service before entering the regular army could not be
counted. However, three years later, the War Department reversed its decision and granted
Davis his tenure as an officer in the volunteers. This decision placed Davis as number three on
the order of merit list for promotion to First Lieutenant in the Cavalry. 130
Davis continued to serve in his primary duties as a cavalry officer and in additional duties
as post-exchange officer in charge, education officer for enlisted men, and post adjutant, post
quartermaster, and post commissary. Davis excelled in all these duties. His efficiency reports
reflected how well he managed the myriad responsibilities placed upon him. 131 Davis
participated in officer development programs that included the study of such topics as Cavalry
Drill Regulations, Small Arms Firing Regulations, and Administration. His demonstrated
proficiency exempted him from final testing in these fields. Davis took so well to the formal
study of military doctrine that he was nominated to attend the General Service and Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 132 The college was established in 1881 by William Tecumseh
Sherman as the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, (later simply the Infantry and
Cavalry School), a training school for infantry and cavalry officers.
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The establishment of the school was an effort by the Army to professionalize its officer
corps. The creation of the school was one measure of many the Army took to formally train and
educate the officer corps.
Although Davis was not accepted, his writing and demonstrated proficiency in military
doctrine made him stand out amongst his peers. Following one unsuccessful attempt to pass a
promotion board in 1904, Davis scored high enough on the 1905 promotion board’s test to be
recommended for promotion to First Lieutenant by a panel at Fort Robinson, Nebraska. The
Army accepted the board’s recommendation and issued orders promoting Davis to First
Lieutenant on February 28, 1905. 133
Following his promotion, Davis was assigned to the 10th Cavalry Regiment at Fort
Robinson, Nebraska, in April 1905, before being ordered to duty as professor of military science
and tactics (PMS&T) at Wilberforce University. Davis followed in the footsteps of Charles
Young and John Alexander in this black officer assignment. Davis was not pleased with the
assignment because Wilberforce was a religious institution. He immediately drew the ire of the
university’s president, Dr. Joshua Jones, when he did not attend church on his first Sunday at the
school. Jones immediately called in Davis to ask him why he had not attended. Davis curtly
stated the “he didn’t feel like it, and if he didn’t like it, he offered that Jones should write back to
Washington and have him sent back to the regiment, because that was what he wanted
anyway.” 134
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Jones did not write to Washington about the matter, and so it was dropped. However,
Davis and Jones continued to quarrel over other matters. Davis shocked school officials when he
had liquor delivered to his residence. This was clearly against the university’s policy that
prohibited alcoholic beverages. Davis glibly ignored protestations from school staff about the
matter and continued to balk at the authority of the school and president. As Davis refused to
honor the rules and norms of the school, President Jones retaliated by refusing to back Davis on
matters such as disciplining students who did not wear their uniforms to morning chapel service
and to class. 135
Davis was only allowed to teach military instruction for three hours per week, which he
found to be ridiculously inadequate. Jones would not relent and eventually the conflict between
the two reached the War Department. President Jones accused Davis of being petty and
unreasonable. Davis accused Jones of being unwilling to accept the discipline he envisioned that
was needed at the school. General Staff officers at the War Department concluded that Davis
had legitimate complaints, but also that many of the problems between the two men stemmed
from Davis’s “excessive demands.” 136
As Charles Young departed Wilberforce University he rented a furnished home to Davis
at $24 per month. Davis and Elnora lived in the Young home for several years before purchasing
their own home to make a suitable arrangement for the arrival of their first child, Olive Elnora
Davis, who was born in April 1905.
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While at Wilberforce, Davis and Elnora became quite comfortable with other faculty
members at the school and other blacks from nearby Xenia. Davis also took the opportunity to
socialize with two other black regular officers that visited Wilberforce during the golden jubilee
of the university. Chaplains William T. Anderson and George W. Prioleau visited the campus
along with Booker T. Washington during the university’s celebration of its 50th anniversary. 137
Oddly, Davis expressed little interest in meeting Washington.
One of Davis’s additional duties while at Wilberforce was to act as a regular army
official who oversaw the training of the District of Columbia’s First Separate Battalion. Each
year, Davis visited the unit to inspect, provide instruction, and supervise drills and field
exercises. 138
Davis took delight in putting many of his written theories to the test with actual units.
The D.C. militia units found his help to be very beneficial and continued to solicit the War
Department for his support. He was also commended by the District’s National Guard
commander, Brigadier General Ernest Davis. Davis had become such a commodity to the
university and the D.C. militia unit that he was extended for an additional year after his normal
three-year tour was up. 139
Following the turbulent school year of 1908-1909, Davis quarreled with a new university
president, William Scarborough, and was eventually reassigned back to the 9th Cavalry
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Regiment. 140 He was then immediately reassigned for duty in Liberia as an American military
attaché. The U.S. decision to appoint Davis to this post reflected the transition of American
interest in such third-world countries as Liberia, Haiti, and the Philippines. The motives for the
establishment of Liberia had ranged from the plans of well-intentioned abolitionists who sought
to resettle freed African American slaves, to darker motives by such key figures as James
Monroe, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Abraham Lincoln, to rid America of an unwelcome
darker race by sending them back to their continent of origin. 141 The American Colonization
Society had founded the colony in 1820 for freed slaves with the hope that masses of former
slaves from the Americas would flock back to Africa. Although this mass exodus did not occur,
there were enough occupants by 1847 for the colony to declare itself a nation. 142 The new nation
of the Republic of Liberia struggled to gain a foothold and requested financial support from the
United States in the form of loans to help build an infrastructure and economy.
Against a backdrop of potential European encroachment and the continuing issue of
barely being able to maintain basic goods and services required for a nation and people
throughout the nineteenth century, the small nation survived. The American government largely
ignored Liberia’s plight until the turn of the century.
By 1908, when the independence of Liberia appeared to be threatened by possible
interventions of Great Britain or France, the United States government dispatched a commission
to investigate the situation. 143 The commission determined that the United States government
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should endorse and back a private loan to Liberia to help refinance its debt or face the fact that
the small bereft nation would turn to European competitors. The commission also recommended
that the United States military should send soldiers to train Liberia’s frontier police. These
ancillary provisions were written into a loan agreement made between American investors and
the government of Liberia. Although Ernest Lyon, the U.S. minister who arranged the loan, had
no prior association with Davis, he requested that Davis be assigned as the military attaché. 144
After a brief engagement with Davis in 1909, Lyon formed a positive impression about Davis,
noting that he was a “bright young lieutenant” who would be of great assistance to him, but also,
that he would serve as a good agent for the government. 145
The assignment of military attachés to developing nations served a more sinister purpose
than simply presenting diplomatic agents of the American government. These assignments were
placed under the supervision of the Military Information Division (MID), in which the attachés
were charged with gathering military intelligence and compiling geographic surveys. This
information became critical in the successful implementation and practice of America’s gunboat
diplomacy. In its pursuit to safeguard such American interests as trade routes, access to valuable
raw materials, and military bases, the United States had regularly intervened in the affairs of
nations in Central America, the Philippines, and the Caribbean. Military attachés played a vital
role in the establishment of U.S. hegemony in these regions and parts of Africa in the early
twentieth century. Military attaches in Venezuela and Colombia had served the U.S. well in
facilitating American intervention in Panama in 1903. This led to the successful American
completion of the Panama Canal.
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When Charles Young was assigned to Haiti and the Dominican Republic as an American
military attaché in 1904, his role was similar. He was charged with gathering needed
information for a potential American invasion and the establishment of a military presence.
Young wrote detailed reports on both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Within these reports,
he drafted detailed maps on both countries, from which he compiled and drew this information
directly from his own personal reconnaissance on horseback and authored a 284-page
monograph and handbook on Haiti. 146
U.S. Marines used portions of his monograph and maps when they invaded Haiti in 1915.
The commanding officer, Brigadier General Smedley Butler, commented that the Marines found
the information on Haiti in the War Department files invaluable for planning in the American
intervention. 147
Davis faced a dilemma with his assignment to Liberia. He had just completed a four-year
tour of detached duty at Wilberforce, and he wanted to return to an assignment with his cavalry
regiment. However, the three black regular army officers of this period were limited essentially
to three assignments within the black regiments, at historically black colleges, or as attachés to
nations of color. Davis reasoned that such a post would not hurt his career. Over the next
several months, he and Elnora made plans for their tour in Africa. Davis thought that it would be
best to take his wife and five-year old daughter, Olive, with him to Liberia. 148 During his
preparation, Davis was briefed on what his key tasks would entail. This primarily included
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sending and maintaining reports about Liberia’s military readiness. The U.S. government and
War Department was interested in the organizational make-up of Liberia’s military units, staff,
training, morale, and mobilization system. As with Young in Haiti, Davis was also told to keep
the United States informed about important military events as they occurred within the country.
The Davis family set sail for Monrovia on April 2, 1910, and after a brief interlude in
Liverpool, England, arrived in Liberia on 9 April 1910. 149 The primitive conditions in Liberia
were a shock to Davis and Elnora. They were immediately challenged by the tropical heat and
climate, the lack of clean running water near their residence or his work space, and the lack of
food that they were comfortable consuming. 150
All three family members became ill from some combination of these issues. Davis
suffered most heavily, as he experienced frequent bouts of blackwater fever. 151 During his tour
of less than one year, he would lose as much as sixty pounds. 152
Despite his constant bouts of illness, Davis set upon executing his tasks of reviewing the
Liberian military structure. He concluded that its military force was an inept structure, including
the Liberian Army and militia. He witnessed a mutiny in which Liberian Army soldiers
threatened the Secretary of War for nonpayment of wages. He also observed the Liberian Army
using such nonconventional methods to subdue a rebellious tribe by starving them into
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submission. Davis took earnest interest in trying to reform the Liberian Army. 153 He suggested
that they be reorganized under an American cadre that included two officers and three noncommissioned officers.
In his recommendation Davis offered that the two cadre officers should include himself
and Lieutenant John Green, whom he wanted as his quartermaster. 154 His plan was not taken
seriously by Secretary Lyon, but the Liberian government had taken note of Davis’s interest in
their affairs. Several months after his proposal, he was offered an appointment in their military,
to lead their army. 155 Davis asked the War Department if they would approve such a measure.
Chief of Staff of the Army Leonard Wood determined that he could not constitutionally serve
both countries. 156
However, he was approved to act as an advisor, if he would not accept any compensation.
Davis had left Liberia by the time that General Wood sent this message to Liberia. 157
Davis had found his overall experience in Liberia to be rather frustrating. He did not
think the Liberian government took his ideas seriously and that the American government was
indifferent to the situation there. 158 In July 1911, he wrote the War Department and requested
that he be allowed to return to one of the black regiments, noting that he had been away from
troops for over six years. 159 His request was approved, based more on his poor health than on his
argument of being away from his unit for such an extended period.
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Davis and family left Monrovia in October 1911 to return to the U.S. Charles Young
followed Davis in this assignment and stayed in Liberia for four years. He absorbed the
recommendations and information that Davis passed on to him and implemented many of these
measures. 160
After spending a brief period of leave visiting family in Washington, Davis was
reassigned to the 9th Cavalry Regiment and stationed at Fort D.A. Russell in Wyoming. 161 He,
Elnora, and Olive moved to the remote outpost in January 1912. Although they were isolated
and kept from socially interacting with other officers and spouses, the Davises had become
accustomed to such conditions. There were few black civilians in Cheyenne with whom the
Davises could have interacted that fit within military custom. For the most part, the Davis family
was left to themselves. In this setting, Elnora gave birth to their second child, Benjamin O.
Davis Jr., on 18 December 1912. 162
The following year Davis and the 9th Cavalry Regiment were transferred to the Mexican
border to act as an American reactionary force to respond to Mexican cross border raids into the
U.S. Unsure of the length of this deployment, Davis sent Elnora and the children back to
Washington until he returned. Davis spent three years on this assignment patrolling the border
between Hachita, New Mexico, and Nogales, Arizona. The regimental headquarters was kept at
Douglas, Arizona. 163
The Mexican Revolution against the dictatorship of President Porfirio Diaz, launched in
1910, regularly spilled across the United States-Mexico border, costing American lives and
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property. When Victoriano Huerta assumed the presidency of Mexico through a military coup in
1913, the U.S. government viewed this as an unfavorable development in the region. The Taft
and Wilson administrations considered Huerta’s ascendance to power as a threat to American
economic interests. Due to the political and social upheavals that dominated Mexico for several
years, relations between the two nations remained tense throughout the early twentiethcentury. 164
Ever mindful of the Brownsville incident, Davis attempted to stay ahead of racial
problems between white residents and his black soldiers. He kept his men away from whites and
took great pains to publicly communicate with local law officials. He openly conceded their
legal authority over his men. When Davis was assigned an area of the border to patrol, he rode
ahead of his men to contact the sheriff and town officials to ensure that there was a clear division
between the military and local authority. During his coordination visit, he made his unit mission
clear to the civilian authorities and asked permission to detail an NCO and several of his men to
police his soldiers during off-duty hours.
Davis recalls that in every case the local authorities were quite compliant and offered
their full cooperation and support to him. Davis also briefed his men about the inherent risks
associated with breaking racial barriers. He noted to them “that we could do a better job if we
had the cooperation of the citizens among whom we were placed.”
In explaining this approach, Davis offered that he disliked the situation, but believed that
he could not change it by himself. 165 In the prime of his military career, Davis opted for this safe
approach in race relations.
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This pattern of avoiding direct conflict while working quietly behind the scenes to
ameliorate concerns of both races became a signature tactic of his during his active years in the
military. Davis’s stance of working within the system was noticed by the military and the black
community. The military rewarded Davis’s devotion to the army by continuing to promote him
and offer assignments that were career enhancing. The black community celebrated his status as
an active duty officer but stopped short of presenting him as a “race” man.
Despite mediocre efficiency reports that cast a negative light on him, with such
descriptive verbiage as “ordinary,” “too fat,” and “lacking initiative and enthusiasm,” Davis was
eligible for promotion to captain by 1915. In February 1915, he was reviewed by an officer
examination board, which included a thorough physical examination and oral and written testing
on topics related to his skills as an officer. The board recommended that he be promoted. In
December 1915, Davis was promoted to captain. It had taken Davis fourteen years to make the
prestigious rank of captain, from which he could now command a company, or serve as a
primary staff officer at battalion, brigade, or even division. Within the peacetime army of this
era, such a lengthy period for promotion was normal. Many officers retired at the rank of captain
following twenty-plus years of active service.
Following his promotion, Davis was reassigned to Wilberforce University as a professor
of military science and tactics (PMS &T). Despite his turbulent relationship with the
university’s president, Dr. Scarborough, the headmaster was pleased to hear that the War
Department was sending Davis back. 166 The family moved with Davis back to the college in
early spring 1915. For nearly two years Davis and his family lived a somewhat quiet and
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uneventful life in Ohio. In their second year back at the college, Davis and his wife were
overjoyed at the birth of their third child, Elnora Dickerson Davis, in February 1916. The family
was then upended by unexpected tragedy. Days after delivering the child, Elnora Davis died
from an embolism. 167 Aside from the trauma of his wife’s death, Davis was posed with the
quandary of what to do with an eleven-year-old, a three year old, and an infant. The War
Department would be empathetic only to a point. It granted emergency leave to make funeral
arrangements and coordination for care of the children, but he would have to return to duty
within a month or so.
Fortunately for Davis, a teacher at Wilberforce, Sadie Overton, agreed to look after the
children. The Overton family hailed from Mississippi. Sadie’s father, Lawrence Overton, had
served as a member of Mississippi’s congress during Reconstruction. Lawrence and his wife
Izella Overton instilled the value of education in their three children.
All three attained college educations with Sadie, the youngest, receiving a bachelor’s
degree from the University of Chicago and a Master’s degree from Ohio State University. 168
Davis and his children took well to Sadie. Benjamin Jr. and Olive suggested to their father that
he should go ahead and marry the single teacher. 169
However, trouble between Davis and Scarborough sparked again. Davis complained that
the college took neither his suggestions nor his plans for disciplining students very seriously. In
early 1917, Davis wrote the War Department asking to be relieved of duty from the college and
returned to troop units. He argued that conditions at the school were such that he was “unable to
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render service commensurate with his rank, pay, and allowances.” 170 Following an investigation,
army officials agreed that Davis was being used primarily as a symbolic figure, “simply for the
advertising…it gives them.” 171 Scarborough retaliated against Davis by writing to the War
Department, arguing that he wanted to leave the college to take care of his children and that he
could not work within the framework of civilian authority. 172 The War Department removed
Davis from the college and refused to fill the vacancy with another black officer. This turn of
events granted Davis his wish, while depriving Wilberforce of an active duty officer.
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Davis was ordered to return for duty with the 9th Regiment in the Philippines. The
regiment had been assigned to Camp Stotsenburg, Luzon, in 1917. As the United States was
mobilizing, training, and preparing for the possibility of involvement in the war in Europe, all
four of the black active duty regiments were sent overseas to perform duty in Hawaii and the
Philippines. By any metric of military logic, this seemed an odd assignment for more than
10,000 regular army veterans, many of whom were combat tested. As the Army struggled with
the prospect of preparing for a war that would take potentially millions of men in uniform, the
current regular army strength in 1917 stood at approximately 250,000 men. This policy reflected
not just the duality of American consciousness during this period, but also the paradoxes within
the nation as America prepared to go to war. Americans had re-elected Woodrow Wilson to a
second term as president on the evocative premise that “he had kept the nation out of the war,”
from the war’s inception in 1914 to 1917.
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As early as 1915, the United States began to prepare for war through such efforts as the
Preparedness Movement. This campaign was led by former Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt. They aimed to strengthen the United States military by
training reserve officers at a summer training camp in Plattsburg, New York. This camp served
as the origin of the Army Reserve Officer Training Program.
President Woodrow Wilson at first opposed the movement. He believed that such a
measure would jeopardize any hope he had of brokering peace in Europe. Several organizations
were formed around the Preparedness Movement and held parades and organized opposition to
Wilson's policies.
A limitation of the movement was that it omitted most groups based on socioeconomic
and racial categories, including working class men in eastern seaboard cities, rural men from
small towns, most ethnic minorities, and even state National Guard units. Founders of this
movement showed expressed open contempt for the National Guard. Many of the figures
associated or former members of the regular army believed that the National Guard was too
political, poorly armed, ill-trained, too inclined to idealistic crusading (as against Spain in 1898)
and lacked the ability to appreciate the complexity of world affairs. The guard was one of the
nation's few institutions that (at least in some northern states) accepted African-Americans on an
equal footing with whites. 174
As Allied forces in Europe suffered massive casualties, and near starvation, they turned
to America for support. Pro-war advocates such as Teddy Roosevelt called for America’s entry.
There were several other movements that plagued and distracted Wilson from focusing
on a decision for war. This included an anti-war movement led by such prolific figures as Jane
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Addams and Eugene Debs. The NAACP and such black notables as W.E.B. Du Bois, Ida B.
Wells, and William Monroe Trotter pushed for a federal anti-lynching bill. 175
Lastly, the suffragette movement led by Alice Paul and Lucy Burns garnered the support
of thousands of women as they pushed for a constitutional amendment that would enfranchise
women throughout the nation. Wilson, himself, was an odd mixture of conflicting values.
Woodrow Wilson sold a prophetic vision of “making the world safe for democracy,” even as
various groups such as blacks, German-and Italian Americans, and dissenters in general were
denied basic American rights of protest. 176
Within this setting, American leaders began to discuss what role should blacks play in the
war. In a sense, blacks in the military became a representative microcosm for blacks in general,
as American leaders struggled with the question of how best to employ them in the war effort.
Senator James K. Vardaman of Mississippi spearheaded a movement in Congress to prevent the
enlistment or re-enlistment of any person of the “Negro or colored race” in the military service of
the United States. 177 Secretary of War Newton Baker actively spoke against this proposal,
leading to its defeat in Congress.
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Options for the disposition of blacks included such features as including them within the
American forces but keeping them segregated from whites, integrating them within the military
to fight as equals, or using them as a labor force for logistical support for the war, both in
country and overseas. Colonel E.D. Anderson, chairman of the Operations Branch of the
General Staff, recommended that the army not employ the majority of blacks in combat.
Anderson argued that after the best black soldiers were removed from the draft pool, the
remainder of “these colored drafted men be organized in reserve labor battalions, and put to work
at useful constructive labor that furthers the prosecution of the war.” 178 The Chief of Staff of the
Army, Hugh Lenox Scott, and Secretary of War Newton Baker accepted this recommendation.
Joel Spingarn, one of the co-founders of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People or NAACP, was one of the first to suggest that a separate officer training
camp for blacks be developed. 179 This proposal rekindled the debate about the use of black
officers. Early in 1917, a group of black leaders testified before a Senate Subcommittee on
Universal Military Training, chaired by Senator George E. Chamberlain, a Democrat from
Oregon. The group consisted mainly of black professionals who lived in the Washington D.C.
area. The appointed leader was Giles B. Jackson, an attorney from Richmond, Virginia. This
committee submitted a motion to allow blacks to participate in war preparations. They also
argued that establishing a Negro military training school similar to West Point and Annapolis
was crucially important to the black community. 180
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This proposal followed an initiative in 1915 to get West Point reopened to black students.
Editors of black newspapers such as the Washington Bee argued that “in view of current military
needs, Congress should open West Point to all youths eligible to compete.” 181 This plea was not
considered or acted upon. The black businessmen then shifted their argument to a separate
Negro officers’ school. They told congressional leaders that the project would be beneficial for
all concerned and stressed three arguments: first noting the past demonstrated fighting quality of
black soldiers, the second emphasizing that such specialized training was given only to “select”
black draftees, and third assuming that this project would fit within arrangements already made
by the government and military. 182 Finley Wilson, editor of the Washington Eagle, led
testimony within the group, citing that “the loyalty, valor and fidelity of the colored man of this
country” were proven in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Spanish American War,
and the Mexican conflict. 183 He carefully omitted the Civil War for fear of offending southern
congressmen. Jackson Hayes, an attorney from Richmond, noted that black soldiers could be best
trained by black officers, and that “we are not drawing the color line; it has already been drawn
long ago.” 184 Hayes was referring to the current policy practiced by West Point and Annapolis.
He also offered that wealthy white friends in Richmond were willing to donate land for training,
if the federal government would foot the bill for all other expenses. This proposal was accepted
by the committee, but when presented to President Wilson and the House of Representatives for
action, it stalled. 185
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A key obstacle to such initiatives for black inclusion in military preparation was black
apathy for the war. Much of this stemmed from the general treatment blacks had received from
the nation as a whole. The voiced sentiment expressed by many blacks was “that the Germans
ain’t done nothing to me, and if they have, I forgive ‘em.” 186 Much of the black press in larger
cities opposed American intervention or the participation of blacks in the war. A Washington
Bee editorial responded to a statement made by a Colonel H.A. Rucker about blacks being
needed in the war effort: “if war comes, the colored man is not wanted and it would be a white
man’s war between Germany and the United States. Every colored militia in the South has been
disarmed and even in the schools, the students are only permitted to practice with wooden guns.
The Bee asks Rucker if the colored man would be justified in offering his services to a
government which discriminated against him?” 187 Other papers such as the Bystander offered:
“The President is doing or saying nothing to stop lynching at home. We think that if a real
expression from the ten million Negroes were made, they would vote against such a war on
Germany.” 188
Such sentiments did not stop continued initiatives by select groups of blacks and whites
who were sympathetic to the black community. Figures such as Spingarn saw benefit and
opportunity for blacks through the war. Spingarn stood out as a unique figure as chairman of the
executive committee for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) from 1913 to 1919. 189
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A close friend of W. E. B. Du Bois, Spingarn was a white man of means and wealth. He
had resigned a post at Columbia University to devote his time, energy, and money to the
NAACP. 190 Prior to the war, Spingarn also joined the army as an intelligence officer, where he
was able to observe firsthand the stark disparity between blacks and whites within the military.
As chairman of the NAACP, Spingarn felt obligated to effect change within the segregated
military. Fourteen officer training camps had been designated to train new officer recruits to
meet the demands of a much larger army. However, none of the camps would allow black
officer candidates.
Spingarn campaigned for a black officer’s training camp. He did not believe that he
would be able to convince military or political leaders to allow blacks to train with the white
officer candidates. His approach, therefore, was to establish a segregated facility for wellqualified young black men. 191 Spingarn single-handedly promoted the image of black officers as
a symbol of black civic nationalism to his white peers. He believed that this project could dually
benefit both blacks and whites.
Spingarn also consulted with Major General Leonard Wood, a former army chief of staff,
about establishing a separate training camp for black officers. Wood was open to the project,
contingent upon Spingarn being able to provide 200 college educated black prospects who
wanted to become officers. 192 Spingarn eagerly accepted the challenge.
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Spingarn’s initiative received considerable criticism from the editors of the black press.
Many felt that he had betrayed the black community by compromising his stance on fighting
segregation.
An editor from the Chicago Defender noted, “No one denies that we sorely need efficient
military training for officers, privates and every citizen, but we do not want it, nor will we take it
in a ‘Jim Crow’ way, if we never get it.” 193 Spingarn rebutted such claims, noting “the camp is
intended to fight segregation, not to encourage it.” 194 In a pragmatic appeal, he also offered a
sanguine promise that “colored men in a camp by themselves would all get a fair chance for
promotion, and that they were making a serious mistake, if they did not take advantage of ANY
opportunity to serve as commissioned officers in the army during this great war.” 195 Spingarn
believed that as blacks demonstrated their patriotism and fidelity towards the nation, whites
would allow them more rights and opportunities. Spingarn had discussed the question of black
officers and their role in the national army with Secretary of War Baker in early 1917.
Baker, like most white leaders affiliated with the military of this era, was deeply
concerned about the prospect of black officers commanding white soldiers. 196 His concern
stemmed from the likely, if not certain, opposition it would generate within the military, but he
kept open to a segregated training facility for black officer candidates.
Spingarn believed that Howard University, one of the most prominent northern
educational institutions, was a perfect base for potential recruits for such a camp. Spingarn
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spoke to students at Howard in March 1917, noting that the creation of such a camp was in no
way connected with the NAACP and its call for civic agitation towards equality, but that
acceptance of the project would not exclude the continuous agitation for justice. 197
He offered that it would give blacks a greater opportunity to agitate more effectively and
efficiently. The Central Committee of Negro College Men (CCNCM) was formed by students
and supporters at Howard following Spingarn’s call to action. The university agreed to host the
camp. It circulated a petition that garnered some 1,500 signatures of potential applicants. The
campaign appeared headed for eventual success. By May 1917, Howard supporters had raised
enough money to dispatch recruiters for the program to other black colleges, including such
historic black schools as Fisk University, Lincoln University, Morehouse College, Atlanta
University, Tuskegee Institute, Hampton Institute, Morgan College, and Virginia Union
Seminary. 198
Spingarn met again with General Wood, who facilitated another meeting with Secretary
Baker. Baker agreed to present the camp proposal to the General Staff. Baker intimated to
Spingarn and representatives from the CCNCM that he personally opposed separating the races
for military training, but that he was in no position to change the race problem in the country. 199
Spingarn did not feel optimistic about Baker’s promise. He felt that without pressure from
Congress or the White House, the military would not relent from its current practices. Given
Woodrow Wilson’s re-introduction of segregation throughout the federal government upon his
election and assumption of control in the White House, Spingarn had good reason to doubt the
success of his plan.
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The factor that saved the proposal was the black press, which swung to favor Spingarn
and the CCNCM’s initiative for training black leaders. Black papers such as the Chicago
Defender now lionized the black would-be candidates for the black officer’s camp, noting,
“those of our Race who would fight in the field will be taught tactics by graduates of
Hampton.” 200
Even some white news organizations such as the Boston Globe chimed in on allowing a
camp to train commissioned black officers: “Negro regiments would not need white
commanders, for the Negro race has acquired such confidence in itself that Negro troops will
follow such leaders as Col. Charles Young of the Regular Army as they would any white
officer.” 201
With support from the black press, students and supporters of the CCNCM began to
petition and lobby their congressmen. Murray Hulbert, a Democrat from New York City, and
George H. Tinkham, a Massachusetts Republican, supported the proposal. 202 In September
1916, when Mississippi Congressman Vardaman had proposed a bill banning further enlistments
of black soldiers, Hulbert spoke out to the Congressional committee and later directly to Newton
Baker about the matter. In his speech to Congress, Hulbert recounted the valorous records of
black soldiers in previous wars and quoted the verbal support offered by Baker, noting that the
Secretary of War had assured him that bills “to prevent the enlistment or reenlistment of people
of the colored race in the military service, would receive the adverse recommendation of the War
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Department.” 203 He further noted that Baker had expressed to him that black soldiers
participating in the recent Mexican expedition had “conducted themselves with the greatest
intrepidity, and reflected nothing but honor upon the uniform they wore.” 204
With such support, the CCNCM petition was approved by over 300 Senators and
Congressmen. The matter now fell solely to Secretary Baker. On May 21, 1917 Baker
authorized the establishment of a black officer’s camp at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. The official
announcement was made on May 23. Baker shared how he had arrived at his decision to support
the petition for the camp through a letter to President Wilson: “After considering their requests I
came to the conclusion that a training camp for colored people ought to be established…It has
now been definitely fixed at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, with the full concurrence of the authorities
at Howard University…So far as I know, the question is settled wisely from the point of view of
the army, and certainly from the point of view from the colored men.” 205
News of the successful initiative for training black officers was warmly received in most
black communities throughout the nation. Black leaders and lay people throughout black
communities in the country believed that this was a breakthrough in race relations. They hoped
that it would lead to hundreds of black officers leading black troops in war abroad, who would
then be able to return home to lead the fight to secure their rights at home. Joel Spingarn,
W.E.B. Du Bois, Charles Young, and other figures associated with the drive for the camp
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believed that this success would transform American society. In conversations, news articles,
and books of this era, there was a recurring theme that the race would be advanced as a result of
the war.
In a statement regarding their success, the CCNCM offered: “The race is on trial…If we
fail our enemies will dub us cowards for all time; and we can never win our rightful place. But if
we succeed then eternal success; a mighty far-reaching step forward; 1250 Colored Army
Officers leading Negro troops. Look to the future, brothers, the vision is glorious.” 206 One
minister decreed at a rally, “If they fight for democracy in France, and return home to fight it out
also here in Tennessee, Georgia and every other southern state, then the ‘Jim Crow’ camp will
not have been tolerated in vain.” 207 One student at Howard University recalled, “The news was
heralded far and wide, faculty, administrators, and students joyously shook hands and cheered in
celebration that made the entire campus seem like an old-fashioned Methodist prayer
meeting.” 208 There was almost a euphoric sense emanating from the black community, as to
collectively express the emotion that blacks had finally won one fight after years of regressive
policy and setbacks.
Much of this euphoria ended with a jolt when news spread throughout the black
community that Colonel Charles Young was being forcibly retired from active military service
for poor physical health. Charles Young had been heralded in the black community as the select
pick to lead the black officers training camp. Newton Baker, MG Leonard Wood, Teddy
Roosevelt, and Joel Spingarn endorsed Young as the most natural choice for commander of the
camp.
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W.E. B. Du Bois and practically every black public figure saw no other military
representative more suitable than Young as leader for this initiative. And yet, following a
physical examination dated June 11, 1917, Young was retired for various afflictions that came
with age and stressful duty. He was diagnosed with chronic intestinal nephritis (Bright’s
disease), high blood pressure, sclerotic arteries, and hypertrophy of the left ventricle. 209 Despite
these conditions, a promotion board allowed him the final gesture of service-related gratitude by
promoting him to full colonel and placing him on an unlimited retired list, where he could be
recalled to active duty if needed. 210
By the time that Young was ordered into retirement, he had spent 29 years on active duty.
The stress associated with military duty as a regular Army officer wore down the most fit
soldiers in service. The physical ailments that Young suffered from were considered as normal
for a career officer at his age. Many of his white contemporaries that would serve in Europe
during World War I were just as physically worn as Young. By forcing him into retirement, the
War Department had only John Green and Benjamin Davis to contend with concerning due
promotion and potentially embarrassing field commands, in which white officers and soldiers
would be subjected to commands from a black superior. Given the persistent harsh racial bias
against blacks during the Progressive Era, senior officers in the War Department were compelled
to limit the roles of black officers and the disposition of the black regular units.
In several key moves, the War Department resolved its dilemma of what to do with its
complement of active-duty black officers and units. Young was retired, Davis and Green were
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sent to assignments away from the fray of the mobilization and war in Europe, and the black
regiments were sent to Hawaii or the Philippines for garrison duty.
The white commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Charles C.
Ballou, replaced Young as commander of the camp.
Green was sent again to Wilberforce University. Davis was sent to the Philippines.
Davis’s promotion to captain placed him in contention for a possible command of troops headed
to Europe for combat. In keeping with its policy of prohibiting black officers from commanding
white troops (if possible), the War Department ushered Davis away to the Philippines to serve
with his 9th Cavalry Regiment throughout the war.
Davis did not express any feelings, positive or negative, about the authorization of the
Des Moines camp for black officer training. He was kept in the Philippines for two years, and
away from his broken family following the death of Elnora. He corresponded frequently with
Sadie Overton and decided to marry her at first opportunity. He hoped to reunite the family with
their new mother-to be upon his return. Davis also experienced and reacted to racism firsthand as
his regimental commander, Colonel John W. Heard, asked to have Davis removed from the
regiment, because Heard preferred white officers and did not like mixing races within the officer
corps. 211
In letters to Sadie Overton, Davis reflected bitterly upon racism in American culture as he
endured his lonely assignment. Davis noted, “the United States was a great country, but
unfortunately it possesses many little folks who were promoted only because they were white.”
He further asserted “everyday we have seen evidences of discrimination, that is why I am here
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today.” He ended the letter reasoning that the only reason that he remained in the Army was
because of his poverty, and that someday he should try to find a place “where he could be
without contact with” whites. 212
As Davis languished in the Philippines, on October 14, 1917, the United States Army
commissioned 639 black officers out of approximately 1250 candidates at Fort Des Moines,
Iowa. Within this group, there were 106 captains, 329 first lieutenants, and 204 second
lieutenants. 213
At the conclusion of the training, the military had yet to develop formal policies
concerning the use of the black officers, or for that purpose, black soldiers in general. 214 Two
new all black divisions were created during the mobilization for the war, the 92nd and 93rd
divisions. Unlike other American infantry divisions, the 93d was limited to four infantry
regiments, three of which were comprised of National Guard units from New York, Illinois,
Ohio, Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and Tennessee. Being
made up of mostly draftees and National Guardsmen, the 93d lacked any sort of consistency in
its experience or composition. The unit also lacked its full number of combat units and support
elements, and as a result never attained full divisional strength.
The 92nd was organized in a manner similar to the other American divisions, the 92d was
made up of four infantry regiments, three field artillery regiments, a trench mortar battery, three
machine gun battalions, a signal battalion, an engineer regiment, an engineer train, and various
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support units. 215 The overwhelming majority of the commissioned officers assigned to these
divisions were white.
Some of the black officers who were commissioned from the Des Moines Camp would
be assigned to combat duty in regiments such as the 369th and 370th. However, the majority
were assigned to duty with the bulk of black soldiers in service during the war, in services of
supply (SOS) battalions. None of these “reserve” commissioned officers were retained on active
duty following the war.
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Chapter 3: Davis at the Rubicon (1920-1940)

Davis had endured his baptism by fire as he served on active duty for nearly two decades
as a regular army officer. He returned to the United States following his second assignment to
the Philippines. As a senior officer he had faced the full brunt of American racism through his
regimental commander who openly expressed his desire to get rid of Davis for a white officer.
The United States had tested its international prowess by playing a major role in ending World
War I, and by 1920, sending troops to Russia to aid in the fight against the Communism.
Domestically, the Progressive movement bore the fruit of some positive change in the nation.
Women had been granted the right to vote with the passage of the 19th Amendment to the
Constitution, and child labor and general labor protection laws were beginning to take shape
following the threat of anarchy, communism, and socialism, as alternatives to the status quo
government and social pinning’s of American democracy. As America entered the 1920s, there
were glaring contrast within its culture. Substantial gains had been made from the Progressive
movement, but main stream culture and political leadership of this decade were markedly
conservative and Anglo-Saxon Protestant-centric. African Americans faced severe backlash as
black soldiers returned from Europe or military duty. White paranoia and fear about blacks
“getting out of their place” because they had experienced more tolerant cultures, resulted in open
race riots against blacks across the nation.
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Large numbers of blacks who had migrated northward, to the mid-west and west, also
prompted extreme reactions from whites. Many of the white rioters were recently settled first
generation southeastern or east European immigrants, who themselves were treated as
marginalized citizens.
Although the numbers of lynching’s of blacks declined slightly in the 1920’s, they were
still viewed as common place practice in some parts of the nation. 1 The Ku Klux Klan was
revived and spread beyond the South into the Mid-west, west, and even parts of the north. Davis
ignored much of the social and political backdrop of American culture as he continued to
advance in his military career. This chapter will explore his actions and development as he
secures his career by attaining career retirement status and moves beyond this towards senior
field grade officer status. He did not contemplate attaining general officer rank during the 1920s
or 1930s.
Davis came out of the doldrums of depression from his experiences in the Philippines
when he returned to America in July 1920. One of the few bright spots for Davis while assigned
there was when Davis married Sadie Overton. He had arranged for her to travel to Manila to
secure their union in December 1919. 2 Davis returned to the United States and an assignment to
Tuskegee Institute as Professor of Military Science and Tactics. Following the death of Elnora
and with Davis stationed in the Philippines, the Davis children were cared for by their paternal
grandparents, Louis and Henrietta Davis.
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The children would later express that their grandfather was not happy with this
arrangement and was rather distant and harsh to them. 3 Having lost their mother and with their
father away from them in the Philippines, the children were miserable. Their other grandparents,
the Dickersons, also shared in the caretaking of the children. The children noted that the
Dickersons treated them much more warmly than the Davises. 4 They were overjoyed when their
father returned to the United States with their new stepmother, Sadie. With his assignment to
Tuskegee Institute, the entire family gained a period of normalcy in their lives. 5
Davis arrived at Tuskegee with the rank of lieutenant colonel. The War Department
continued its practice of assigning senior active duty black officers to the traditional assignments
for black officers, such as commanding ROTC detachments at historically black colleges. Davis,
John Green, and Charles Young had begun these very same assignments as lieutenants.
During Davis’s second year at Tuskegee, Charles Young died suddenly on January 8,
1922 at Grey’s Hospital in Lagos, Nigeria. Young had attained the most senior rank, full bird
colonel, allowed a black officer to this point in the Army. He stood on the cusp of possible
consideration for general officer. His death ended this aspiration for his family and the black
community that had followed his career. The small sample of black regular officers was reduced
by a third with Young’s death. He had passed quietly in his sleep without pain or trauma. He
was fifty-eight years old.
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Many of Young’s contemporaries thought he was in his prime as a man and military
officer. Dr. William Walker, an American doctor working in Nigeria, cited his cause of death as
chronic nephritis and cardiac failure. 6 Young’s unforeseen death was made more abrupt by a
quick burial. British colonial authorities buried him with full military honors the day after his
death. Several formally dressed British and Nigerian military officers attended the funeral to pay
deference to a “senior” American military officer. 7
This was done more so from the practice of paying respect to a fellow “comrade-in-arms”
since practically none of the officers or officials who attended the funeral knew Young
personally. A photographer recorded a well-intentioned but obviously amateurish effort by a
Nigerian squad to render a standard “twenty-one gun” salute in honor of the deceased AfricanAmerican leader. 8 The bishop of Nigeria, who presided over the hastily prepared ceremony,
lauded the life and character of Charles Young, noting that his life was “proof positive of his
ability and integrity,” despite serving a country renowned for its prejudice. 9
The death of Charles Young shocked the nation, African Americans in particular.
Friends and loved ones were taken aback. Young’s death was widely publicized in not only the
black press, but also in national publications such as the New York Times. He was memorialized
as a “noted U.S. Cavalry Commander” and a “picturesque and interesting figure in American
Army Life.” 10 Historian Rayford Logan offered that to many “contemporary Negroes he was
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regarded as a martyr on the altar of racial discrimination.” 11 Logan recalled an exchange
between Young and a young white missionary in Nigeria following his forced retirement and
reactivation. In his final years of military service, Logan noted that Young had begun to share
moments of raw emotion with people outside of his circle of trusted friends and family.
Following general conversation with the Methodist missionary, Dr. Emory Ross, Young shocked
Ross by suddenly and tearfully asking him, “Lad, how would you like to be a nigger?” 12
W.E.B. Du Bois was devastated by the sudden passing of his friend. In the February
1922 issue of The Crisis, Du Bois memorialized him, titling an ode, “Charles Young, Soldier and
Man and unswerving Friend.” 13 He also bitterly reflected on his friend’s death, declaring that
Young’s life example had been a “triumph of tragedy.” 14 Du Bois articulated that Young had
endured the “Hell” of West Point through the insult and intrigue of thirty three years in the
Army. 15
Du Bois called the American response to Young’s death “official hypocrisy,” as the
Warren G. Harding administration and War Department attempted to capitalize on his death by
offering symbolic gestures to honor him, hoping that this would salve some of the harsh racial
rhetoric cast against the Army. Du Bois believed that its treatment of Young made such lastminute displays of affection almost laughable, if not cruel. Young was honored with a full-dress
funeral procession and burial in Arlington National Cemetery, where he would be laid to rest
next to white American icons such as George Washington, Robert E. Lee, and Ulysses S. Grant.
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Du Bois sought to debunk the myth that the government attempted to convey. The Army
portrayed Young as a fallen and fully sanctioned American hero. Through the Crisis and other
public forums, Du Bois pointed out the harsh hand dealt to Young by the Army and nation
throughout his life and military career. Du Bois argued the callous and hostile manner in which
the Army had treated Young, from West Point to his final assignment to Nigeria, caused his early
death. Following the news of his demise in Africa, a memorial ceremony was held at New
York’s City College in May 1922.
Among the audience of mourners and key figures were Joel Spingarn, Brigadier Fred W.
Sladen, and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. During the ceremony, Du Bois set off a firestorm of
controversy as he publicly charged that his friend had died from a “broken heart” because the
War Department had unjustly denied him a field command during World War I. Sladen, who
had been a classmate of Young’s and was currently serving as commandant at West Point,
delivered a pointed rebuttal to Du Bois’s allegation.
Theodore Roosevelt Jr. attempted to soften the contrary rhetoric between the two by
offering that Young had “by sheer force of character, overcame prejudices which would have
discouraged many a lesser man.” 16
Du Bois did some soul searching following the death of his friend, given the treatment of
black soldiers following their return from the war. He had encouraged black support for the war
through his “close ranks” call to arms. Du Bois had promoted the message that black soldiers in
the First World War operated as symbolic representations of egalitarian advancement within
American culture. He hoped that this would turn the tide against the white nativist ideology that
was rampant in early twentieth century America. His analysis was shaped partially by his own
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personal investment in the war, as he courted the possibility of serving within the Army as a
military intelligence officer. Du Bois fantasized that black support for the war might help to
better racial conditions for African Americans throughout the country. Du Bois thought that
African American involvement in the war might evoke something akin to the atmosphere of the
nation during Reconstruction following the Civil War. In a rare case of optimism in regard to
race in America, Du Bois had hoped that black service to the nation in a time of war would elicit
a general shift in white attitudes towards blacks.
Unfortunately, the opposite reaction occurred. White Americans throughout the country
reacted negatively to returning black soldiers. White reactions ranged from paternalism, to
vitriolic determination to keep blacks “in their place” of subjugated second-class citizenship. 17
Many held the view that blacks had become spoiled from their service overseas by interactions
with other whites, particularly the French, who treated them better than had their fellow white
Americans. Images and stories of black men dancing and carousing with white French women
were widely spread, playing upon the most paranoid conceptions of black men sexually
exploiting white women. 18 The specter of sexual relations between black men and white women,
consensual or non-consensual, hung over military policy regarding blacks and their allowed
interactions with Europeans. 19
African-Americans, both within the military and in general, got along well with the
French people. France was the only Allied nation that allowed African Americans to serve
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equally in combat. The War Department had incorporated the 369th, 370th, 371st, and 372nd
Infantry Regiments into the French military. Assigning the division to the French army allowed
General Pershing to simultaneously fulfill his pledge to provide France with American combat
troops while freeing him from the stigma of how to best use black soldiers within the Armed
Expeditionary Force (AEF). 20
New York’s National Guard 93rd Provisional Division with the 369th, 370th, 371st, and
372nd Infantry regiments served well with the French. The 369th Infantry Regiment, also known
as Harlem’s Hell-Fighters, earned the French meritorious unit citation, the Croix de Guerre. 21
Unfortunately, in keeping with a standardized informal practice, most of the black officers within
the division, including commanders, were replaced with white officers. This created a great deal
of dissension within the ranks of black soldiers because many of their officers had served with
the units from their inception as state militia units. 22 Several soldiers refused to acknowledge
white commanders as their colonels. One black soldier within the 93rd, Harry Haywood, recalled
some of his comrades remarking, “What are we doing over here? Germans ain’t done nothing to
us. It’s those crackers we should be fighting.” 23 This sudden change in leadership would plague
the regiments in combat in France. By the time of the Armistice, there was only one black
officer within the 93rd Division, James Reese. 24
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Historian Chad Williams also notes how African Americans deeply impacted French
society through jazz music and their ability to entertain the masses through song and dance. He
notes that for average French citizens, “African-American musicians played a significant role in
the fetishization of blackness that emerged during the war and flourished during the post-war
period.” 25 Black regimental bands took France by storm, introducing the nation to jazz. This was
done largely by unintentionally disguising traditional military tunes infused with jazz.26
The American military’s contrived stereotypes regarding black soldiers and white French
women were based largely upon observations and reporting from a black musician and officer,
Walter Loving. Loving had spent time in the military as an enlisted soldier in the late nineteenth
century. After being honorably discharged in 1898, Loving rejoined the regular Army in 1899 to
become a member of the 48th Regiment Band U.S. Infantry Colored. 27 After organizing a
chorus in the Philippines that successfully performed for the Emperor of Japan that same year,
Loving was charged by the Governor-General of the Philippines, William H. Taft, to organize a
band for the government. He was appointed as a Second Lieutenant in 1901 for his efforts and
success. Following on the heels of his success in the Philippines, Loving and his band would
perform in Hawaii for Queen Liliuokalani and at Taft’s presidential Inaugural Ball and
Reception in 1909. 28 In 1917 Loving was called to serve with the Office of Intelligence and
promoted to the rank of Major.
Loving served stateside during World War I. His charge was to investigate subversive
activities within the African American community. 29 He carried out his assigned task by
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attending meetings and rallies in plainclothes and developing a network of informants. In one of
his reports he asserted that African American socialists were "the most radical of all radicals."
He alleged that "vicious and well-financed propaganda" campaigns run in black newspapers
were the impetus for the Chicago race riot of 1919. 30 David Levering Lewis called Loving "one
of the Army's most effective wartime undercover Negro agents." 31
Shortly after the armistice, Loving sent a memo to his white superiors in the Military
Intelligence Bureau that actualized many of their fears about American blacks coming into
contact with foreign white women. Based upon conjecture and supposition by way of
conversations with fellow black soldiers that were serving stateside or returning from Europe,
Loving surmised that allowing black soldiers to remain in France for an extended period of time
would lead to more interracial unions. 32 Loving’s study played directly into a general theme of
white American paranoia regarding black men and white women. The belief that black men
could not control their lust for white women fed discriminatory policies and actions taken by the
government and military for the next several decades.
Loving’s intelligence gathering and reporting on black subversive activity had also been
crucial in the Army’s decision to withdraw its offer to commission W.E.B. Du Bois into the
Military Intelligence branch of the military. 33 Loving undermined Du Bois, claiming that he
never was popular in the black community because of his elite status as an accomplished
academic. Commissioning him into the military, Loving offered, would only add fuel to black
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radicals’ charges that there was an illicit relationship between Du Bois and the government. He
concluded that Du Bois could best serve the nation by continuing as editor of the Crisis. 34
Although the war transformed how black servicemen viewed themselves and their nation,
black soldiers, at home and abroad, continued to endure harsh and embedded racism within the
military. The armistice brought little respite to black service members throughout the country
and those who were still serving overseas.
Discrimination and abuse followed them as they demobilized and returned home. Stories
of black servicemen having to perform denigrating duties and routinely suffering harsh
discrimination at the hands of its own military filtered back to the United States through the
black press and through figures such as Du Bois, Kathryn Johnson, and Addie Waites Hunton.
Sanctioned or not by the U.S. government, these observers visited black soldiers throughout
France.
Johnson and Hunton had lobbied for the Young Men’s Christian Association (YWCA) to
send them abroad as volunteers with the hope that they would be allowed to serve black
servicemembers. 35 Johnson was a graduate of Wilberforce University. While at Wilberforce, she
had crossed paths with Du Bois and Charles Young. Of Young, she recalled her pride in “a fine
soldier and good man, as he drilled a new generation of African American men. 36
Du Bois, Johnson, and Hunton observed black soldiers performing a myriad of
drudgework duties, noting that the majority of black soldiers served in Black Service of Supply
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(SOS) units. Tasks for these men ranged from grave digging to loading ships. Their duty was
almost nonstop, as they were required to work seven days a week, with few breaks for recovery
or leisure. Even when white supervisors of the black servicemen complained about the work
schedule, the general response was that they were only niggers. 37 Black soldiers continued in
their backbreaking labor long after the signing of the armistice. Their duties also included
salvaging battlefields, clearing barbed wire, filling trenches, and removing unexploded shells.
The worst duty assigned to these soldiers was the responsibility of reburying the dead and
constructing cemeteries.
Such subservient tasks rang historical tones of the unequal treatment of servicemen,
assigned by race. 38 Following their experience, Du Bois, Johnson, and Hunton realized the
futility of hoping for a dramatic transformation in racial conditions.
For Du Bois, the perceived failure of black soldiers, and black officers in particular, was
as much an attack on his own character as on the soldiers themselves. His rejection by the
military stung him deeply, as he had to weather a storm of criticism and personal attacks by
fellow blacks in academia and the press for advocating support for the war. Du Bois soberly
accepted that military service and an embrace of American nationalism had failed as a tactic to
improve race relations. African Americans instead had to ready themselves for a protracted
struggle in order to hold the nation accountable for its pledge to champion the tenets of
democracy. 39
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Despite their harsh treatment in the war, black soldiers emerged from the war as leaders
in the continuing battle for social and political rights in the United States. The black press and
community at large welcomed returning black soldiers with fanfare and adulation, either ignorant
or unaware of their role in the war.
Following Du Bois’s rejection by the Army, he devoted himself to using his skills as an
academic to chronicle the black effort in the war through a study he titled The Wounded World
Manuscript. For Du Bois, personally, and African Americans, broadly, the First World War and
African American military service symbolized the elusive prize of equal citizenship in the United
States, a prize that Du Bois felt was ever so briefly within his grasp.
He publicized the systematic discrimination African-American soldiers, especially those
of the Ninety-Second Division, faced in every aspect of their military service, emphasizing the
organized effort to discredit, remove, or limit black officers.
Barring this elusive dream, Du Bois hoped to capture the social and military experience
of African-American soldiers in the war. He drafted hundreds of pages that detailed the black
experience in the war. Du Bois intentionally highlighted soldiers’ heroism and bravery,
countering charges made by white military officials that most black soldiers and officers were
incompetent and cowardly, with an insatiable lust for white women. 40
Benjamin Davis was stunningly silent both about the death of Young and the treatment of
blacks after the war. Young had served as an important example and friend to Davis during his
formative years in the Army. If Davis felt some form of gratitude or indebtedness towards
Young, he left no indication upon Young’s death. He apparently expressed no condolence or
support for the widowed Mrs. Young. Yet Young cast a long shadow on Davis’s life. As the
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Iota Omega chapter of Omega Psi Phi commemorated the memory of Charles Young on what
would have been his fifty-ninth birthday in 1922, Davis was asked to speak about his association
with him. Such a request was typical for a prominently successful black figure in a college
setting. Davis served as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Tuskegee Institute in
Alabama from July 1920 until July 1924. 41
One individual who recalled the talk noted that it was an “intimate and illuminating”
presentation. 42 Davis used this opportunity to highlight his affiliation with Young to this select
audience of young black men, talking about Young, “as I knew him.” The manner in which he
touted his affiliation with Young countered his normal behavior in regard to his association with
African Americans. He had treated presidents David Jones and William Scarborough of
Wilberforce with open contempt about the issue of discipline, as well as other petty matters.
Yet, Davis never openly criticized racist white commanders such as Colonel Randall
Heard, who had purposefully attempted to cashier him out of his regiment during duty in the
Philippines. 43 He stated, “I believed strongly in discipline, self-discipline, as well as obeying the
law. President Scarborough was a good man but he found it easier to say yes than no.” 44 He had
also openly questioned the motives and legitimacy of W.E.B. Du Bois, the Crisis, and the
NAACP, following the Brownsville incident in 1904. 45
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With Young’s passing, only Davis and John Green remained on active duty. The officers
who had been commissioned from the camp at Des Moines, Iowa, were discharged from service
or placed in reserve or national guard units following the end of the war. Davis and Green were
promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned to command ROTC detachments at historically
black colleges where each officer had served before.
Davis went back to Tuskegee, and Green served again at Wilberforce. Davis was told to
regard himself as a commander of a regular Army unit. His assigned mission was to provide
instruction in basic infantry subjects, to develop discipline, and to increase public awareness of
the program.
As the black community and nation mourned the death of Young, Davis initially
flourished in his new assignment at Tuskegee. He received above-average annual evaluations
and noteworthy attention from the commander of the Fourth Corps, General David Shanks,
during an inspection of the ROTC program at Tuskegee. Shanks noted that he was quite
impressed both with the program and Davis’s contribution. 46
Although Davis would eventually develop an enduring supportive relationship with
Tuskegee’s president during his tenure there, Davis first experienced conflict with Robert R.
Moton. Moton was a stalwart Republican and open supporter of a line of conservative political
figures, including Presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover. As he
assumed the presidency of Tuskegee, Moton was described as a man “whose life has been
devoted to promoting friendly race relations and to making men and women appreciate the
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dignity of labor, the educational value of work, an interest in the common things in life, the
meaning of education as a preparation for service.” 47
He carried forward the message of his predecessor, Booker T. Washington, in his
inaugural address, offering to fellow members of the African-American race, “our progress in
this country, has been wonderful, and we have every reason for rejoicing, but shiftlessness,
disease, inefficiency, and crime are entirely too prevalent among our people. Color and conduct
still count in this question. But let us remember that conduct counts more than color.” 48
Davis and Moton clashed over a somewhat minor matter concerning live ammunition and
a firing range during his first several months at Tuskegee. Davis asked for 48,000 rounds of
ammunition and iron-plated targets to comply with the Army’s policy regarding gallery-type rifle
marksmanship. Moton thought the requested amount of live ammunition was excessive. He
would not endorse the request for fear that having such a large quantity of ammunition available
at the college could stoke racial concerns within the white community. He rationalized, “I doubt
very seriously whether it would be the best thing for us to bring in such a large amount of
ammunition.” 49 Moton believed that racial tension between whites and blacks in Tuskegee could
escalate following recent Ku Klux Klan protests over the staffing of a VA Hospital with blacks.
The presence of a great quantity of live ammunition could exacerbate the problem. He
offered alternatives such as requesting an exemption from the training and a more realistic
proposal to have Davis and his cadets travel to Atlanta to pick up smaller quantities of
ammunition. The Army agreed with Moton’s second proposal. 50
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Following his previous pattern of conflict with HBCU presidents Jones and Scarborough,
Davis was furious over losing to Moton. 51 He considered a request for a transfer back to one of
the black cavalry regiments.
Part of the tension between Davis and Moton lay in Davis’s belief that he was too senior
for an ROTC assignment at this stage of his career. In a rare use of race as a bargaining tool,
Davis submitted an appeal to the War Department, voicing his concern that conditions in the
South would not “permit my family to enjoy the advantages and comforts permitted in other
sections of the country.” 52 In February 1922, Davis presented his request for transfer in a note to
the adjutant general. He complained that he could not offer proper instruction to cadets at
Tuskegee. Although the principal issue behind his request was inadequate training facilities, his
complaint about the South resonated with the staff reviewing his request. He also argued that he
should have an assignment that was commensurate with his rank of lieutenant-colonel and that
was more accommodating to raising his children. He offered to go to any other part of the
country or to any foreign-service duty, except Liberia. 53
Moton would have none of this. Moton saw the value in keeping Davis at Tuskegee as a
complement to the status of Tuskegee’s ROTC program. Following the initiatives to train black
officers for duty in World War I, there was great potential for HBCUs that produced cadets ready
to be commissioned into the Army. He felt that either Davis or Green could complement the
growth of Tuskegee’s developing ROTC program. When asked by the War Department if he
would consent to Davis’s transfer, he responded with a negative response. 54 Davis sought an
assignment close to home as an instructor for black high schools in Washington D.C. or Howard
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University. Moton offered that he would only consent to the transfer of Davis if the Army
replaced him with Green. 55
Davis’s relationship with Moton was intriguing. Davis was a novice at the art of politics,
while Moton was as skilled and groomed as a public figure could be. Davis was an undeclared
conservative, Moton a conservative political power-broker who, as the heir to the “Tuskegee
machine,” had the attention of the White House. Moton wooed and seduced Davis with
invitations to his home and at public events at Tuskegee, as he attempted to lure Davis into
serving at Tuskegee. Moton’s underlying motive could have been applied to either Davis or
Green. The use of the regular Army officers to further the prestige and ties to American virtues
associated with regular military service was a tempting draw for Tuskegee’s second president.
Moton and Tuskegee’s political clout factored into the decisions about moving Davis or
Green. Garnet Wilkinson, assistant superintendent of schools in the District of Columbia,
attempted to help Davis acquire a transfer to Washington. He coaxed Davis with a potential
assignment at prestigious Howard University, as Davis sought a more congenial environment
near his birthplace. He attempted to coach Davis about the proper wording that would convince
the War Department to approve his transfer, offering that he should cite health reasons for
himself or his wife. 56 Davis decided to use his own justification. He claimed that his service to
black high schools and at Howard University would be of more value to the nation than his work
at Tuskegee. 57 Moton’s considerable influence convinced War Department officials to deny
Davis’s request and ordered him to remain in place for the time being. After several months of
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consideration, Army leaders resolved that transferring Davis would create more problems than it
would solve.
Davis accepted his fate. He served at Tuskegee for almost two more years, into 1924.
Near the end of Davis’s requisite three-year assignment, Davis again attempted to influence the
War Department’s decision about his next assignment. He wrote a note to the chief of cavalry
suggesting that he be considered for five possible assignments. 58
He ranked his choices. First was the Eighth Regiment of the Illinois National Guard, an
all-black unit; his second choice was the Fifteenth New York Regiment, a black National Guard
unit that had not been federally recognized; then the First Separate Battalion, District of
Columbia National Guard; his fourth pick was reassignment with troops in the Philippines; last
was the 10th Cavalry Regiment. 59 The chief of cavalry responded that Davis should receive
another assignment, but not with regular troops. 60 This was a slight to Davis’s career record.
Although he had been required to serve in assignments limited to black officers, he had
performed as well or better than many of his white contemporaries of equal rank and tenure, but
the chief’s comments reflected the Army’s position that black officers be kept away from regular
white troops by assignment to all black National Guard units or to HBCUs.
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Army leaders decided to forego set policy regarding the mixture of regular Army and
national guard soldiers and assigned Davis to serve as an instructor with the Second Battalion,
372nd Regiment of the Ohio National Guard. This assignment partially fulfilled Davis’s request
to be removed from the South, but he faced hostile district commanders that did not want to be
responsible for evaluating or supervising him. 61
In short, they did not want him assigned to their command. Davis voiced no complaint to
the War Department over this questioning of his credibility by white commanders. He quietly
allowed the key leaders involved in the decision to sort through the dispute. This had become his
methodology in dealing with the bureaucracy of officer management. He knew that most white
commanders were opposed to having black officers assigned within their commands, for one
reason or another. In most cases, white commanders saw the assignment of a black soldier who
was not a subordinate as too much disruption. Both inside and outside of the military, most
whites could not fathom the idea of young white men being ordered about by a Negro. Yet,
Davis had no problem with challenging the authority of black leaders, as evidenced by his
disputes with HBCU president’s David Jones, William Scarborough, and Robert Moton. This
trend continued as Davis grew older and more secure about his station as a military figure.
The 372nd was a small unit that comprised only three hundred enlisted men and fifteen
officers. The battalion had four companies that were located in Cleveland, Columbus,
Cincinnati, and Toledo. 62 Davis was responsible to both federal and state authorities and
required to travel to each unit. As a regular Army officer, his orders were issued by the Army

Harrison Wall to Baltzell, 11 Jan. 1924, John Weeks to Slemp, 22 Jan. 1924, and Sixth Corps to Adjutant General,
24 Jan. 1924, Davis 201 file; David Shanks to Adjutant General , 31 Jan. 1924, ibid.; Whipple to Romer, 1 Feb.
1924. Davis Archives.
62
Wilkinson to Adjutant General, 11 Feb. 1924, Davis files; Adjutant General to Wilkinson, 14 Feb. 1924, Davis
Archives; Wilkinson to Davis, 19 Feb. 1924, Davis files; Davis 201 file.
61

137

corps commander within the district, while technically being loaned to the state by the federal
government. His assignment required that he not be the principal instructor to the soldiers of the
372nd, but rather act as a supervisor over their officers, and non-commissioned officers who
would train their own men. 63
This was a common Army practice known as “train-the-trainer.” Davis served in this
assignment throughout the 1920s. He served more than five years in this capacity. He was
practically on his own and away from the normal reins of authority.
For Davis’s military career, this stint was both a blessing and a curse. He was left alone
to train his unit and relatively isolated from the political machinations necessary for
advancement and job security. With him and John Green as the only black regular active duty
officers during this period, they were exempt from normal career path assignments. Normally,
an officer would have been expected to rotate between staff and troop assignments to prove their
value as a field leader or as a staff planner. Although both officers were “defaulted” back to this
rhythm in between select black assignments, mostly, they were not held to this standard career
pattern.
Another key figure involved in Davis’s military assignments was Tuskegee’s Emmett J.
Scott. Scott, like Moton, saw the value of having a senior black officer affiliated with black
institutions of this era. Scott was probably the most influential black person in Washington
during World War I.
Educated at Howard University, Scott served Booker T. Washington as a confidant,
personal secretary, speech writer, and ghostwriter at Tuskegee Institute until Washington’s death
in 1915. He served for eighteen years with Washington. Given his affiliation with Washington,
Davis 201 file; Marvin Fletcher Interview with Elnora McLendon, 1972, Davis Archives,; Benjamin O. Davis Sr.,
interview with Edward M. Coffman and Marvin Fletcher, 2 June 1968, Davis Archives.
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Scott was appointed by President Wilson to serve as special advisor on black affairs to Secretary
of War Newton Baker. Baker sought black help to address reports by intelligence officials of
potential black unrest and susceptibility to German propaganda.
This became especially relevant following race riots propagated by whites against blacks
in East St. Louis and Houston. Baker met with Tuskegee’s president, Robert R. Moton, and
Chicago philanthropist Julius Rosenwald to discuss how best to address the nation’s precarious
racial climate. Based upon a recommendation from Moton, Baker accepted Scott as his special
assistant on October 5, 1917. The majority of the black press praised Scott’s appointment and
gave Baker high marks for the move. The Richmond Planet asserted: “When Secretary of War
Baker gave Hon. Emmett J. Scott an appointment in Washington, he did about the best thing he
could have done.” 64 Scott’s conservatism made him a perfect fit for the War Department, who
used him to buffer criticism from high-level black critics such as Du Bois and William Monroe
Trotter. Both Trotter and Du Bois treated their former Tuskegee rival’s selection with guarded
skepticism.
In his role as confidential advisor, Scott assumed responsibility for addressing all matters
relating to blacks and the war effort. This included such issues as intervening on the
government’s behalf on complaints of racial discrimination by black draftees and soldiers, as
well as fostering black patriotism, both within and outside of the military. Scott worked closely
with the Committee on Public Information and the Richmond Planet.
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He essentially managed the War Department’s public relations campaign directed
towards the black community. Along with Joel Spingarn, Scott organized and presided over a
conference of African-American newspaper editors held in Washington, DC, from June 19 to 21,
1918. The editors listened to speeches from Baker, George Creel, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and several other military and government officials. They vented
their frustrations and endorsed a rather general statement drafted by Du Bois which called for an
end to lynching, Jim Crow in public travel, and discrimination against government employees. 65
Scott also assisted the United States Food Administration in its efforts to promote patriotism
through food conservation and helped to resolve several flagrant cases of racial discrimination
against black soldiers.
Notwithstanding the importance of his contributions, Scott described the limitations of
his position and absolved himself of responsibility for solving the nation’s racial problems. 66
Numerous complaints lodged by black soldiers and the NAACP went unanswered. In the
tradition of his former employer and mentor, he did not demand black civil and political rights.
Instead he extolled the values of patriotism and loyalty above all else. Yet, Scott’s appointment
represented a milestone within government and society of this era. He was the highest ranking
black figure directly involved and within the federal government during the war. In spite of his
noteworthy achievement, many of his black contemporaries thought that his conservative views
and lack of resources severely limited his overall effectiveness and long-term impact.
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Following the war, Scott served as business manager and treasurer at Howard University
until 1932. Scott’s and Davis’s paths crossed in 1923, as Davis sought his release from
Tuskegee. In a synchronized effort with Garnet Wilkinson, Scott enticed Davis to come to
Howard University, noting, “it has always seemed fitting to us that you should have this berth.” 67
Despite their best efforts, Scott and Wilkerson were unable to convince the War Department to
assign Davis to the Washington D.C. area. Davis dutifully carried out his assignment in Ohio.
In 1929, as the Army and Davis looked for a new assignment, Robert Moton requested
that Davis be returned as Professor of Military Science & Tactics at Tuskegee. In a somewhat
odd move, Davis volunteered for foreign service. Maybe Davis thought that this was a careerenhancing move after serving domestically for more than ten years. Neither he nor any of his
family offered any insight into this choice. Meanwhile, Moton appealed personally to President
Herbert Hoover for Davis to be reassigned to his college.
Following the end of Davis’s advising tour in 1929, Moton immediately wrote Secretary
of War, Newton Baker, to send Davis back to Tuskegee. In an impassioned plea, he noted,
“Colonel Davis has served acceptably as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Tuskegee;
and his return to the Institute would enable him to render a conspicuous service to the country.” 68
Here Moton revealed some animus towards Davis, as he cast him as a somewhat
marginal officer while still valuing his unique status of being only one of two black officers in
the Army. By 1929, it was only Davis, as John Green had retired. Moton appreciated this point
so greatly that he was willing to ignore Davis’s shortcomings and their past troubles.
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Moton tested the limits of his political power by confronting the War Department about
its racial policies concerning black officer assignments, noting, “Colonel Davis is the only Negro
officer of his rank in the US Army; and for considerations well known to all of us it has not thus
far been found desirable to assign him to his regiment.” 69 Moton also played on the dual notes
of military service and patriotism, offering to the War Department that “one thousand young
men” were available to Davis for molding for military service. 70 His final bargaining chip was an
admonition warning President Hoover that “sending Davis to Liberia would arouse such protest
from the Negro press throughout the country, and will have much more serious consequences to
the administration in the near future.” 71
Hoover called Moton’s bluff. Both Davis and Moton were rejected by the Hoover
administration and War Department. The War Department chose to send Davis to Wilberforce
again. Moton was sent formal correspondence from Hoover’s private secretary stating, “the
assignment of Colonel Davis was made upon the request of the Secretary of State and is not
considered advisable to make any change in his order.” Moton also had written Davis sharing
his effort to get him reassigned to Tuskegee, offering, “Tuskegee needs you very much.” 72 Davis
ignored Moton’s plea.
Davis was assigned back to Wilberforce in September 1929. 73 Davis, Sadie, and their
youngest child Elnora traveled back to his first college assignment. Olive and Benjamin Jr.
remained in Cleveland with Olive’s new husband, George Streator. Streator was a Memphisborn black man who had met her when she taught at Western Reserve University.
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Benjamin Jr. lived with the newlyweds for more than a year as he attended Western
Reserve University. Benjamin Sr. and Sadie purchased a home in Xenia, which was close to the
college. It served as a home to many of their old friends.
Although Wilberforce was considered the premier black college for ROTC, its program
had fallen into disarray before Davis’s return. During an annual Army inspection, the ROTC
program was rated as unsatisfactory in the 1928-1929 school year. Upon Davis’s arrival, he
struggled to gain necessary support from the school for the ROTC program. Several students
were dropped from the program because they had not taken such pre-requisites as trigonometry
and logarithms. The school was also very slow in providing necessary supplies and uniforms.
John Green had left the ROTC program in disarray as he prepared to retire. The school’s
program had gone from the Army’s number one program to failing. 74 Davis found himself
working very hard to rebuild the program to its former prestige. Davis’s efforts paid off as the
program rated great improvement at the end of the 1929-30 school year. 75
Davis, now fifty-two years old and the only black officer in the regular Army, was
rewarded for his hard work and seniority with a promotion to full colonel in March 1930. 76 With
this advancement, Davis became the highest ranking black officer in American history to that
point. Black news organizations such as The Chicago Defender celebrated this landmark
achievement by lauding Davis with such headlines as “a much-deserved honor” to the veteran
officer. 77
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Robert Moton praised Davis in a congratulatory letter: “what excites my admiration is not
your rank as such, but what it represents in your own case in the way of persistence, patience,
efficiency, and character.” 78 He went on to note that Davis could not have won such a place in
the United States Army “without unusual merit.” 79
The most important assignment that Davis embarked upon in the 1930s was the escorting
of wives and mothers of fallen black veterans to France. Giving in to numerous requests from
widows and mothers of Americans who had been killed or died while serving overseas in France,
Congress finally relented to allow these women to visit the graves of their husbands and sons in
Europe. In 1929 Congress authorized pilgrimages to European cemeteries, at no cost to those
women selected for the journey.
All mothers and un-remarried widows of someone buried or memorialized at American
cemeteries in France received an invitation. Over the course of the program, 6,654 women
participated, of which 168 were black mothers or widows.
Although these pilgrims represented the diversity of the American Army in World War I,
the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps racially segregated the women. African-American women
travelled in separate groups, often on commercial ships as white women were sent across the
ocean in luxury liners. Segregating the Gold Star mothers and wives created a storm of
controversy within the black community. Several black news editors and community leaders
discouraged black women from participating in the program. A majority of black women
followed this advice and declined participation in the program. The tour was characterized as a
perpetuation of Jim Crow, even in death and in service to an apparently ungrateful nation.
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In response to a complaint letter from Mrs. M. E. Mallette, president of the Keith
Improvement Association in Chicago, F. H. Payne, the assistant secretary of war, wrote: “I regret
that you protest against that part of the pilgrimage regulations of the War Department which
provides for the formation of groups of colored gold star mothers and widows. The large number
of mothers and widows who will make the pilgrimage, together with the necessity of providing
suitable accommodations for all, made impracticable the sending of the pilgrims in one body,
and made the organization of groups necessary.” 80 The War Department responded to the black
media backlash, offering that the decision to segregate was the result of careful consideration of
the interest of the people involved. 81 While many objected, a small segment of AfricanAmerican women participated in the program. Davis escorted these women on their pilgrimages.
Davis was offended by the Army’s decision to segregate the pilgrimages. Yet he still saw
opportunity through participation in the program. Army leaders expressed to potential
candidates should “possess a high degree of tact, be sober and dependable in habits, and be
qualified in all respects to conduct parties of mothers and widows.” 82 The Chief of Cavalry
nominated nine officers for this sensitive post. Davis was not included. 83 Davis went to Moton
for help. He saw this as a career-enhancing move and as an opportunity for his family to travel
with him. Davis offered his qualifications to Moton with racial overtones, highlighting that he
was the only black officer for the bereaving black women. Davis pleaded, “let a colored
officer…look after the Colored Gold Star Mothers.” 84
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He also told Moton that he had travelled the battlefields and that he had a speaking
knowledge of the French language. Moton saw a reciprocal benefit in supporting Davis in his
venture and forwarded Davis’s qualifications as well as his recommendation to Secretary of War
Patrick Jay Hurley. 85 Hurley accepted Davis and placed his name on the list of officers assigned
to the pilgrimage. Davis warmly thanked Moton for his support, expressing, “I cannot
adequately express to you in words my appreciation for this action of yours.” 86
As a full colonel, Davis was now financially secure enough to bring members of his
family with him as he traveled to Europe. Davis’s salary was more than $5,000 per year, which
exceeded most middle class white Americans of this era. He received permission to bring his
wife, daughter, and even friends with him on his travels. The youngest child, Elnora, was left
with his mother in Washington. Davis paid the fare for his family, as the Army paid his fare for
each trip. In early July 1930, the first group of pilgrim mothers met Davis in New York, and
after a brief ceremony at City Hall they departed on the American Merchant for France. 87 From
1930 to 1933, Davis traveled to France, carrying out his duties with the African American Gold
Star mothers and widows. His family, mainly Sadie and Olive, traveled with him to Europe,
enjoying the best hotels and accommodations that a colonel’s pay could provide. As he executed
his somewhat somber task, Davis took very good care of the women in his charge. He saw to
their every need as they traveled from their debarkation port in New York until they arrived in
France.
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Once they arrived in France, European officers took over the tour and led the Americans
to burial and touring sites throughout the region where fighting had taken place. Davis either
waited for their return on the ship, or, he too, toured the region with his family. 88
The Army’s Quartermaster Corps put a great deal of effort in developing programs and
accommodations for the Gold Star mothers. They developed a full tour that combined with the
more solemn purpose of honoring the war dead.
This tour included a wreath laying ceremony at the tomb of France’s Unknown Soldier,
followed with sight-seeing around Paris. The towns near the Meuse-Argonne, Oise-Aisne, and
St. Mihiel cemeteries did not have restrooms or cafes that could efficiently serve the groups. The
quartermaster therefore built, within ninety days, rest houses at each of these cemeteries. The rest
houses had tables, comfortable chairs, and restrooms, as well as kitchen facilities. Each rest
house had a shady porch for the hot weather and a large, open fireplace for the cooler days. 89
The Quartermaster carefully planned the reception at the cemeteries. To make the visit as
personal as possible, they did not permit any other ceremonies that may have conflicted with the
Gold Star mother visits, focusing instead on each woman's visit. Each pilgrim was given a grave
locator card. A cemetery staff member guided each woman to their deceased family member’s
grave. The guide then gave the woman flowers or a wreath to put on the grave and took a
photograph. They subsequently traveled to other American cemeteries and visited the battlefields
and memorials.
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Cemetery staff decorated the graves with the flags of the U.S. and the host country.
Pilgrim members were also provided with a chair to sit and reflect near the headstone of their
loved ones. Each pilgrim received a photograph of herself at the tombstone, where she also laid
the provided memorial wreath. 90 They were then provided with three copies of the photograph
commemorating the event. Many of the women who attended the pilgrimages expressed that
such personal touches added to the dignity of the pilgrimages and demonstrated the
government’s commitment to the cemeteries.

Figure 3: Gold Star mother in France

One of the African American Gold Star mothers who accompanied Davis on the first
pilgrimage was Katherine Bell Holley. Holley, an African American schoolteacher from
Hedgesville, West Virginia, made the journey to France to visit the grave of her husband, Pvt.
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Lewis A. Holley. Twelve years earlier, on October 4, 1918, Private Holley, Company B, 542d
Engineers, United States Expeditionary Force, France, had died of pneumonia. Holley died at the
Naval Base Hospital #65 at or near Brest, France. 91
Holley was one of the 53,000 American soldiers who died in France during the First
World War. 92 He was buried on October 7, 1918, in the American Cemetery in Lambezellac,
France, northwest of Brest. On June 10, 1920, the Graves Registration Service (GRS) of the
Quartermaster Office reburied Holley in a different site in the cemetery at Lambezellac, and on
October 25, 1921, the GRS moved his remains to the American Cemetery in Oise-Aisne, where
Katherine Holley viewed his gravesite. 93
The Gold Star Pilgrimage provided the chance to travel to France for several thousand
women who might otherwise not have been able to visit their loved ones' graves. Although
Katherine Holley left no written record of her experience with Davis on her pilgrimage, he was
duly recognized by the War Department. Another Gold Star mother commented that Davis was
“a lovely host, and that he was a real big brother to them and went out of his way to make them
very happy.” 94
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Davis escorted six groups of African American Gold Star Mothers on pilgrimages to
France. For his work he received letters of commendation from the Secretary of War and
Quartermaster General. 95
Davis sought his next assignment. He initially chose to return to Liberia, but then had
misgivings about it. He noted that “Liberia is not a very inviting place for one who has not been
there, and that he would only go if there was a real need, but that he would not go “as an
ornament.” 96 He was possibly concerned about how the harsh environment might impact Sadie.
President Moton of Tuskegee also took interest again in Davis. He wrote to the War
Department to discourage their effort to send him back to Liberia, and instead reassign him back
to Tuskegee. Davis’s seniority in rank at this point made him something akin to a political
football. Bowing to pressure from Moton and fear of negative black press, the War Department
sent Davis back to Tuskegee. 97 Davis was also kept on the list as a Gold Star Pilgrimage tour
guide. He led pilgrimage tours until 1933.
It was during this period that Davis’s son, Benjamin Jr., applied for and received
acceptance into the West Point military academy. Oscar DePriest, a black Republican
congressman from Chicago, helped secure the appointment. In the fall of 1932 Benjamin Jr.
entered West Point. He was the first black cadet to be admitted in thirty-seven years. 98
As the younger Davis settled in at West Point, Sadie and Davis Sr. sold their home in
Xenia, Ohio, and moved back to Tuskegee, Alabama.
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Davis performed well as Professor of Military Science & Tactics at Tuskegee.
Enrollment of students in ROTC peaked at 634 during his tenure there in the 1930s. 99 He was
known as a strict disciplinarian by the students under his command, but he was also well
respected for his reputation for looking out for the best interest of the cadets. 100 Cadets at
Tuskegee and Wilberforce would later affectionately refer to him as the “old man,” as he
presided over their instruction and attended various mandatory public services with them. 101
Davis continued to seek other posts that were more befitting a full colonel. He spoke to
the chief of cavalry, General Guy V. Henry, about a better assignment such as PMS & T at
Howard University. In a memo he complained that “as a black man in Alabama, he was
subjected to racial disturbances and insults hurled at him by any white hoodlum.” 102 He also
reiterated that the Army did not want to assign him to a position where he could command
whites. Davis also reiterated within his memo that he was the only active duty officer assigned to
full time duty with an ROTC detachment. 103
Davis even sought another possible assignment to Liberia by 1937. He wrote a letter to
Lester Walton, United States minister to Liberia, “I am wondering if Liberia could use me in
connection with any military program to meet any probable contingency that may arise in
connection with its exploitation by any foreign power.” 104 The Army denied his request by
informing Walton that the slots for military attaché were already filled.
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By 1938 Davis continued to languish in what he considered as minor roles for such a
senior officer. He faced certain retirement after more than thirty-five years as an active duty
officer with no prospect for better assignments. He had even begun to contemplate retirement in
correspondence with Robert Moton. Moton encouraged him to remain on active duty until he
made general officer rank. 105 Davis did not believe that such a prospect was likely. The general
atmosphere of the nation did not help Davis’s chances for promotion beyond colonel. 106
The Great Depression still dominated the American society even as trouble in Europe
brewed. African Americans suffered as a community throughout the 1930s, but developed and
strongly supported civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and the Pullman Porters
Association.
Several key events forestalled his fate of a forced retirement. Davis Jr. graduated from
West Point in 1936 as the first black officer to complete the academy since 1889 when Charles
Young graduated. 107 The second career saving measure was that he was assigned to command
the 369th Regiment in New York. The graduation of his son from West Point was celebrated
Moton Letter to Davis, 4 June 1934, Davis Archives.
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throughout the black community, and although Davis Sr. was not seen as an active voice for
racial progress, his station as an active duty colonel was noticed by black leaders and the
community. Many middle class blacks within the African American community credited Davis
Sr. with passing down a legacy that enabled his son to complete the academy.
Although Davis had been assigned to act only as an instructor to the 369th Regiment, as
he had done with the 372nd Battalion, New York’s governor, Herbert H. Lehman, quickly moved
to make him the regimental commander. This move drew high praise from the black community
and press. Davis’s assumption of command of the 369th Regiment was celebrated and noted in
several key newspapers.
The Chicago Bee noted that he was one of the ablest officers in the Army, and a man who
would grace a general’s epaulet with dignity. 108 Black writers began to advocate promotion for
Davis, noting that “he has been denied active duty by the implacable bigotry and prejudice of the
United States Army because his rank would have placed above white officers.” 109 The New York
Amsterdam News and New York Herald Tribune celebrated the father-son pairing at Davis’s
assumption of command ceremony, titling their story as a “great moment for the Soldier pair.” 110
The Chicago Defender titled its story, “Meet New York’s Royal Family.” 111 The family attended
a regimental dinner and review before his actual assumption of command. Davis spoke briefly,
offering “it is a great pleasure for me to be here with you this evening with such a regiment. I
feel that we will all be competent and capable to fulfill all the duties which our commander-inchief may assign us.” 112 At his actual change of command ceremony Davis did not speak.
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Following Governor’s Lehman’s speech and introduction, he merely bowed and saluted before a
crowd of more than twenty-five thousand spectators. 113 Davis now held national attention as a
senior figure within the military.
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Chapter 4: Davis Triumphant (1940-41)

1940 proved to be a crucial year for blacks and the military. Although attitudes about
blacks serving within the military had not appreciably changed from earlier decades, the passage
of the Burke-Wadsworth Bill, the first peacetime draft, codified laws that protected blacks, or
any person entering the military against discrimination. Section 4A of the new law prohibited
discriminatory practices that had been commonly accepted up to this point. It did not address
segregation, so this practice continued, but blacks now had legal backing against discrimination
within the services. Black political and social leaders such as Walter White, and A.P. Randolph
did not see this measure as a significant gain for blacks, but, it was a step towards progress. 1
Europe had been at war since September 1939. Following Germany’s seizure of most of
western European by the summer of 1940, America’s involvement in the war in Europe and
Asia, was imminent. On the eve of France’s defeat in June 1940, President Roosevelt had
directed the transfer or diversion of large stocks of World War I weapons, ammunition, and
aircraft to both France and Great Britain. Following the defeat of France, weapons and munitions
helped to replace Britain’s losses from the evacuation of its expeditionary force at Dunkerque. 2
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Additional aid to Britain materialized in September, when the United States agreed to
exchange fifty over-age destroyers for offshore Atlantic bases and the President announced that
future U.S. production of heavy bombers would be shared equally with the British. The US also
agreed to openly share military bases and support with Canada in August 1940 following its
decision to follow Great Britain into war in September 1939. The Lend-Lease Act of March 1941
swept away any pretense of American neutrality by openly avowing the intention of the United
States to become an “arsenal of democracy” against aggression. 3
By early 1941 American policy had shifted its focus from hemispheric defense to limited
participation in the war. Military leaders and President Roosevelt reasoned that the United States
might be drawn into full participation in the not-too-distant future. They assumed that the US
would have to be involved in simultaneous operations in the Pacific and the Atlantic. Given this
estimate, they agreed that Germany was the greater menace and therefore, should the United
States enter the war, it would concentrate on defeating Germany first. British Prime-Minister,
Winston Churchill, and his military planners, shared this strategic concept with American
leaders. 4
The African-American community was more divided in support for entry into World War
II than they had been for the First World War. Many remembered the extreme reactions of
whites as blacks returned from war in Europe. Race riots in 1919 and military’s policies that
continued segregation and limiting black inclusion within the services, made blacks
apprehensive.
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Public figures such as William Hastie, Dean of the Howard University Law School, and
later civilian aide to the Secretary of War, expressed that blacks were committed to making the
World War II experience different from World War I. He noted, “We will be ditchdiggers, we
will be aviators, or anything that any other American should be in the whole program of national
defense. But we won’t be black auxiliaries. 5
By 1940 Davis had reached the apogee of his military career. He had attained a rare
status as a regimental commander. This was an extraordinary achievement for this era. His
predecessor and mentor, Charles Young, had only been selected for a squadron level command,
one level lower than Davis. There had been a few blacks who had served as regimental
commanders before and after World War I, but these were in state militias. Davis had also served
more than thirty-five years on active duty and attained the enviable rank of full colonel. These
were hallmark achievements for a black soldier in a military force that embraced segregation.
He could have retired, known only to select military or local historians. But events leading up to
the United States involvement in World War II propelled him to higher recognition and service
to his country and community.
By a regular army career timetable, Davis should have already been forced to retire.
Although age-wise, Davis was only several years older than white peers of equal rank, his career
had progressed more slowly than most of them. He had made lieutenant-colonel at 43, and
colonel at 53. However, Davis had spent more than ten years as a lieutenant colonel in the
1920s, while white contemporaries of that era usually only held this rank for four. 6
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He had also spent ten years as a full colonel in the 1930s. 7 The norm for white officers at
this rank was seven years, and the majority of officers normally retired after attaining this level
of rank. Davis also held the disadvantage of a lack of formal education above high school. In
1940 twenty two percent of the Army’s senior officers had not attended college. Davis fell
within this group. Davis had also been denied formal military schooling normally associated
with advancing officers beyond the rank of captain.
Black officers were not permitted to attend the normal career enhancing schools such as
the Command & General Staff College or the Army War College during most of the early
twentieth century. This was not considered as a hindrance to their career, because not all white
career officers attended these schools either. Without this, Davis would have understood only
company-level operations. Although many senior white peers faced a similar dilemma, Davis
continued his learning through “on-the-job” training. 8 Due to his unique status as one of only
two black combat officers in the regular Army in 1940, he could ill afford to make mistakes due
to lack of training. 9 This placed Davis in an awkward spot as the black press and community
pushed the War Department to assign him to roles of higher responsibility that were actually
beyond his level of competence. Being Professor of Military Science and Tactics at black
colleges required no more than a basic knowledge of military organization. This allowed black
officers such as Davis to operate within a “safe” zone of competency in the eyes of the Army and
civilian community.
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However, shifting to duties such as a regimental or higher commander, Davis would have
been expected to know how to integrate forces, structures, and support for battalion and brigade
sized formations. This information would have been taught at the Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or the War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
Due to the normal cyclic rotation assigned to black officers, Davis had not been allowed to
attend either college. By the usual metrics associated with promotion boards, the War
Department could have easily denied Davis further promotion or continuation on active duty.
Debates about allowing black officers the same educational opportunities as whites had
rekindled following World War I. The NAACP, select black leaders, and supporters such as Joel
Spingarn pushed for more inclusion following the debacle of the black experience in World War
I. In 1920 Major M.T. Dean, a black infantry officer, drew up a general proposal setting the case
for fuller black inclusion to special assistant to the Secretary of War, Emmett J. Scott. Following
the systemic practice of organizational structure changes after each war, this opened a prime
window to advocate for a more robust force structure for blacks. Dean began his proposal
arguing that “the Negro, desires military training in ALL BRANCHES of the service in time of
peace.” He noted that the Negro was “a vital part of the force within the nation, and that holding
himself so, sought full recognition of his proper place therein.” 10
The National Defense or Kahn Act of 1920 provided legislation that established the
Army of the United States as an organization of three components: a) the Regular Army, b) the
National Guard, and c) the Organized Reserve. 11 The Organized Reserve included the Officers’
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Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps and Reserve Officers Training Corps. 12 This act also
limited the maximum strength of the army to 30,000 officers and men. This included the four
regular army black units, largely because most Army leaders and civilians at the time believed
that the Negro regiments were required by law and could not be disturbed without Congressional
action. 13
Dean’s memo requested that four key changes be made within a pending bill that was a
sub-component of this act, the Army Reorganization Bill (S3792) of 1920. This included:
a. An infantry division, complete with all auxiliaries, composed of persons of the Negro
race with officers of the same race be formed. This division was to be part of the
permanent strength of the US Army and its officers allowed to attend all requisite
service schools and staff and war colleges on the same terms as other officers of the
Army.
b. Enlisted personnel of at least four regiments of infantry consist of persons of the
Negro race and officers as well.
c. Enlisted regiments of at least two regiments of cavalry shall be persons of the Negro
race and officers as far as possible be of that race.
d. Enlisted personnel of at least two regiments of field artillery consist of members of
the Negro race and officers as far as possible be of that race. 14
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Dean’s proposal never reached the Army reorganization bill. The original bill, which
made no provisions to change current force structure for blacks, was submitted and approved by
Congress on June 4, 1920. 15 The refusal to address black inclusion within the military helps
explain why figures such as Davis were deprived of military schooling. Black soldiers and
officers had little chance for careers in the military because they were not allowed to compete
with white peers for advancement.
However, as the potential for war in Asia or Europe loomed, the subsequent required
expansion of the military helped to keep Davis’s career afloat. Also, given his unique seniority
and status, Davis’s name entered the highest levels of political and social debate in Washington
D.C. as black support for the inevitable conflict was again courted by key American leaders.
Given the brutal experience that blacks had faced during and after World War I, leaders such as
Roy Wilkins, A.P. Randolph, and Walter White, advocated for better conditions for African
Americans in and out of the military.
This discussion had begun as early as 1934, when the NAACP’s Charles Hamilton
Houston wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, harshly noting that
“the Army cannot expect to slight and neglect Negroes in times of peace, and then suddenly
imbue them with patriotism by waving the flag on the declaration of war.” 16 Houston had served
as an officer during World War I.
He, like many other of America’s most educated and talented black youth, had bought
into the promise of expanding black officer’s presence within the military through the single
black officer commissioning program at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. Aspirations for this program
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failed to materialize as every graduate from the program was either released from the military or
placed into reserve component units. Houston had graduated from the program with other future
black notables such as George W. Lee and Charles P. Howard. Lee used his skills as an officer
to become an influential community organizer for decades within the black community in
Memphis, Tennessee. 17
Howard became an influential attorney in Iowa, co-founding the National Bar
Association in 1925. He also wrote numerous articles as an Iowa Bystander columnist in the
1920s and 1930s. He later published the Iowa Observer newspaper in 1939. He was a close
friend to entertainer Paul Robeson and in 1948 and gave the keynote address at the Progressive
Party National Convention. 18
These three black officers were part of the 639 who had completed the rigorous
experimental prototype for black officer training program during World War I. Few of the
officers commissioned from this program were given opportunity to prove their mettle in combat
or service overseas. Houston was commissioned as a First Lieutenant, but never allowed to
serve overseas. He served only two years of active service at Fort Meade, Maryland, from 1917
to 1919 before being promptly released from the service. 19 Bitterly disappointed by his military
experience, Houston reflected, “The hate and scorn showered on us Negro officers by our fellow
Americans convinced me that there was no sense in my dying for a world ruled by them. I made
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up my mind that if I got through this war I would study law and use my time fighting for men
who could not strike back.” 20
Throughout the 1930s pervasive discrimination in the military caused a steady reduction
of blacks serving in the Army. This was most evident in the four black Regular Army units,
including the historic 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry regiments. Only about
one soldier in forty was black during the 1930s. Under the National Defense Act adopted in June
1920, the Regular Army numbered about 200,000. In January 1921 Congress directed a
reduction in enlisted strength to 175,000, and in June 1921 to 150,000. A year later Congress
limited the active Army to 12,000 commissioned officers and 125,000 enlisted men, not
including the 7,000 or so in the Philippine Scouts. Regular Army strength was remained at this
level until 1936. 21
Most of the black soldiers who still served on active duty in the 1930s were re-enlistees.
This limited openings for new recruits. Blacks within the active military during the 1930s faced
new limitations in the type of training they received. Most were relegated to support roles as
opposed to their designated combat type roles of their units. The regiments were also scattered
throughout the continental United States. 10th Cavalry units were scattered to West Point, New
York, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and Fort Myer, Virginia. 22
The 9th Cavalry was kept intact at Fort Riley, Kansas, but was not allowed to train as a
combat unit. Due to budgetary constraints, very few regiments trained for their respective
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missions during the 1930s. 23 The 24th Infantry Regiment stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia,
fared no better and was re-designated as a noncombat unit. Only the 25th Infantry Regiment
stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, was allowed to train for combat. 24
By 1940, as America’s entry into World War II became more likely, blacks comprised
only about 2 percent of the strength of the Regular Army and National Guard combined. 25 There
were only 4,179 black enlisted men and five black officers in the Regular Army. 26 Three of the
officers were chaplains.
This left only Davis Sr. and Davis Jr. as representatives of black line officers within the
Army. There were 353 black officers in the Army Reserve, which represented less than one-half
of one percent of the entire Officers Reserve Corps. 27 There were 5,279 black enlisted men and
three black line officers in the Regular Army in 1917 as the nation entered World War I. The
Army reduced its black strength by 1100 enlisted soldiers and one officer within two decades
since the end of World War I. 28 Although these seemed like minor numbers when compared to
the larger overall force, this reflected that the Army was regressing in its recruitment and
retention of blacks.
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In the interwar era, the nation’s military considered black officers as no more than
optional tokens. Those who were allowed to remain or enter the regular service such as the
Davises were used as a publicity feature to counter black claims against discrimination in the
armed forces. Many African Americans were qualified, willing, and able to serve, as evidenced
by the Des Moines Officer Camp experiment. Sergeant Henry Jones of the 349th Aviation
Squadron, based at Carlsbad, California, illustrated the dichotomy many blacks felt in their
desire to serve, but also conversely, the hope for a return on their investiture of service to the
nation. In a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, accompanied by 126 signatures from other black
servicemen, Jones wrote, “the men in this unit were loyal Americans, the fact that we want to do
our best for our country and to be valiant soldiers seems to mean nothing to the commanding
officer of our post.” 29 In his letter, Jones voiced an age-old American quandary imposed against
blacks as they battled conflicting dual themes of patriotism and second-class citizenship. Jones’s
chief complaint was about Jim Crow segregation practiced at their base in California.
To Jones and his fellow black comrades in uniform, it seemed odd that the military
enforced segregation on military bases in regions of the country where segregation was not
practiced. 30 To these men, the military was at least complicit, if not the purveyor of Jim Crow
policies outside of the South. Jones finished his letter with a simple, but familiar, appeal that
blacks in the service had echoed for decades, noting, “all we desire is to have equality.” 31
Key figures within the War Department in the 1930s such as Douglas MacArthur, (US
Army Chief of Staff, 21 Nov 1930 - 1 Oct 1935) and George C. Marshall, (US Army Chief of
Staff, 1 Sep 1939 - 18 Nov 1945) promoted the familiar racist narratives that cast black soldiers
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as limited and officers as unfit for command. Both Marshall and McArthur were influenced by
two case studies conducted by the Army and the Army War College on the use of black troops. 32
Based upon an examination of the all-black 92nd Division and its performance during World War
I, these studies were the main source that helped to shape Army policy in the use of black
soldiers and officers for three decades starting in the 1920s. The studies consisted of reports
gathered from white officers who had commanded black troops within one of two black divisions
(the 92nd and 93rd) used during World War I. Those conducting the inquiries chose not to
consider responses from black soldiers or black officers assigned to the 92nd Division nor those
assigned to the sister all-black 93rd Division. 33 The study, titled “The Organization and Training
of Negroes,” was comprised of a series of interviews and questionnaires given to former white
officers from the black divisions. It began in 1920 and concluded with a more formal
examination conducted by the War College in 1925. 34
These studies concluded that blacks were “physically unqualified for combat duty”
because blacks lacked the mental capacity of whites. The 1920 report offered that the average
black individual’s brain weighed ten ounces less than a white person. Scientific reasoning held
that less weight meant less intelligence, the report noted. It also offered that Negroes were
capable of memorizing drill regulations and theoretical principles, without understanding what
they meant. Instructors were warned to not be deceived by such apparent displays of learning.
The studies also concluded that blacks in general were “subservient by nature” and believed that
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they were inferior to whites. 35 From a military sense, Army officials gleaned that blacks were
more susceptible to the influence of crowd psychology, and unable to control themselves in the
face of danger. Most of the senior white officers, the committee noted, had agreed that having
black officers above the rank of lieutenant made commanding black troops more difficult. 36
Intermingling blacks with white soldiers could only result in chaos or at best, blacks naturally
having to follow the more adept white soldier in combat.
Both studies conveniently fit into racist tropes of general American society during this
era. They were largely antithetical to the proven service records of blacks in practically every
war that blacks had been allowed to participate in. This included the enviable performance
record of the 369th Harlem Hellfighters Regiment that had been detached to fight with the French
during World War I. When properly led, given proper equipment, and training, and allowed the
opportunity to fight, black soldiers had repeatedly performed in a manner that contradicted the
racist and biased studies. This simple point was completely ignored. 37
Colonel Charles C. Ballou, former commander of the 92nd Division during World War I,
countered the study with his own personal observations and assessment of black soldiers. He
noted how the 92nd Division had become a dumping ground for discarded soldiers and officers,
both black and white. He also pointed out that black officers were assigned to the division with
little or no training for the jobs that they were expected to execute in combat, especially in
artillery units. He also reflected in his response his racist views that black soldiers did not get
along with black officers because, he felt that they were so accustomed to white dominance that
they viewed black officers as someone pretending to be white or as a “stuck up nigger.” Ballou
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offered that the decision to train black officers was a poor decision, due largely because this was
done so more from a philanthropic stance than military practicality. No good could come from
imposing responsibilities upon blacks that they could not handle, he noted. He made positive
comments about the efficiency of the division’s Judge Advocate Corps and the way military
discipline and justice was handled within the division. Despite his well-intentioned response to
“set the record straight,”
Ballou’s testimony reinforced much of the negative characterization of black soldiers and
officers. 38 There were other challengers, mostly junior officers, both white and black, who
attempted to counter the damning narrative, but they were largely ignored, as their experiences
were viewed as limited compared to higher commanders at battalion, brigade, and division level.
The report and the testimonies of the white senior officers of the 92nd and 93rd divisions became
the basis of information that helped to shape army policy in the use of black soldiers and officers.
Collectively, this sounded the death knell for training more black combat arms officers. The
more convenient narrative of black inferiority permeated higher command within the military
and the White House.
Although America’s active military was required to reflexively expand to meet the
potential challenges of increasing international threats, the War Department’s discriminatory
policies against blacks exposed its regressive stance. Within the military, key figures who set
policy and led the nation through the coming world war proved to be tone deaf to black calls for
more inclusion. Important figures such as George Marshall, Douglas McArthur, George Patton,
Henry Stimson, who are appropriately credited for their bold leadership and navigating America
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through its most difficult years of World War II, were also adamant in their belief that most
blacks were not as capable as white airmen, soldiers and sailors.
This became all the more apparent as black advocates and leaders aggressively
challenged the government for more expanded roles for blacks in the military. Figures such as
Charles Houston, Roy Wilkins, Walter White, and Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York
pushed the War Department to curb its discriminatory posture towards blacks as the nation
prepared for potential involvement in World War II.
Fish, a white Republican from New York, had served with the 369th Infantry Regiment
during World War I. The NAACP had been brought into the fray as committee hearings on the
issue of black participation in the military were floated before Congress. In January 1939,
following suggestions from Walter White and the NAACP that softened black demands for an
all-black division, Fish introduced two somewhat moderate bills to Congress. 39 Within the new
bills, Fish requested that blacks be allowed in all branches of the Army, and that two black
cadets be allowed into West Point annually until there was an aggregate of eight. 40 Charles
Houston offered to testify at these proposed hearings. He also invited former Captain Eugene
L.C. Davidson, 367th Infantry, former Lieutenant and Professor of History at Atlanta University,
scholar Rayford Logan, and Emmett J. Scott, special assistant to the secretary of war during
World War I, as prospective witnesses for the congressional hearings concerning the proposed
bills. 41
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In spite of these modest proposals and offers of professional first-hand testimony, the
bills were not sent to Congress. Instead, they were immediately sent to a special sub-committee
on Military Affairs, where both proposed bills died. 42 The sub-committee refused to hold
hearings about the proposals or to publicize any discussion regarding them. 43
Exasperated, black leaders then shifted their focus of protest from military leaders to the
president himself. In late summer of 1939, the NAACP asked President Roosevelt to appoint an
interracial commission to investigate racial discrimination within the armed forces.
Walter White, in a letter to Roosevelt, argued that “despite the possibility of war,
democracy was still being denied to Negro Americans.” 44 While at the helm of the NAACP,
White noted to Congressional leaders and the president that he spoke on behalf of the nation’s
twelve million Negroes in an appeal for him to act favorably towards blacks in his capacity as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. White urged him “to use the utmost powers of your
high office to remove the barriers to full participation by qualified Negroes in every branch of
the defense forces of the government.” 45 All other ethnic minorities were allowed to integrate
within white military units. 46
In spite of strong black support in his second presidential run for office, Roosevelt largely
ignored the plight of the black communities throughout the decade. He had engineered
sweeping federal legislation under the National Recovery Act of 1932, and the Social Security
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Act of 1935 that impacted everyday Americans, but little of this reached African Americans,
particularly those in the South. 47 In an effort to maintain white southern Democratic support,
Roosevelt allowed states to arbitrate how federal aid was disseminated. 48 States instituted needsbased parameters for claiming aid that were heavily white-male centric. Linda Gordon notes that
the group most widely considered deserving of compensation for service was unemployed male
heads of families with children. 49 This policy either excluded or minimized priority for
domestics, agricultural workers, and single mothers from benefits available under either
program. 50
This excluded heavy pockets of minorities and women. Roosevelt was similarly
dismissive of pleas by the NAACP and Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters for better federal
protection against lynching and equal labor laws for blacks throughout the 1930s.
Harvard Sitkoff also notes the dilemma blacks faced in the 1930s. He contends that
although large numbers of black voters swung away from the Republican Party towards the
Democrats, largely because of Roosevelt, Roosevelt allowed race to trump his newfound base of
political support. Sitkoff emphasizes that in spite of this shift of significant political support
from black voters, Roosevelt and his administration continued a historical standardized practice
of largely ignoring blacks in general.
Dispirited by an insensitive government, a hostile legal system, and unsympathetic
intellectuals, Sitkoff argues that black activist such as Roy Wilkins, A.P. Randolph, Walter
White, and Mary McLeod Bethune, forced the administration to at least acknowledge and
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respond to some extent, to their concerns and needs by the end of the decade. 51 The promotion of
Davis was one example of this.
Ira Katznelson shares in this harsh assessment of the Roosevelt administration towards
blacks in the 1930s. He contends that the accomplishments of Roosevelt during the Great
Depression should not be viewed so favorably as many historians have painted. Katznelson
asserts that the Roosevelt administration operated habitually on fraught compromises.
Katznelson posits that Roosevelt frequently caved in to southern political pressure and mindfully
allowed the subjugation of blacks, including maintaining segregation within the military, because
so few blacks could vote in the south that their support was nominal. Roosevelt saw it more
advantageous to retain a larger base of loyal white Democrats than appealing to minority
concerns that could drive off his white southern support. 52
Faced with such open recalcitrance in the Roosevelt administration, Walter White tried a
different approach by enlisting the aid of the president’s wife, Eleanor Roosevelt. Black public
figures such as Bethune, Wilkins, and White, found her to be a more sympathetic towards blacks
than others in the White House during this era. Hoping that her counsel would help to sway her
husband in favor of such matters as federal antilynching legislation, she too failed.
Roosevelt refused to jeopardize his tenable hold on white Southern Democrats. The risk
of alienating his southern base of support factored into every decision and consideration made
about blacks. White, Roy Wilkins, and A. Philip Randolph sought to use the defense industry
and the military as fertile ground to advance equality for all blacks. As the need for soldiers,
sailors, and airmen from all races was sure to come, black leaders went again to Mrs. Roosevelt
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for support. Acutely aware of their harsh experiences in the two previous decades, she wrote to
her husband about how blacks attitudes on segregation in the military, noting, “there is a growing
feeling amongst the colored people [that] they should be allowed to participate in any training
that is going on in aviation, army, or navy.” 53 She reminded him that despite their support in
1932 and 1936, he had refused to endorse federal antilynching legislation. He was facing
reelection within weeks. Offering admonition that his neglect against this strong base of support
could be politically disastrous, Eleanor wrote, “this is going to be very bad politically, besides
being intrinsically wrong and I think you should ask that a meeting be held.” 54 Roosevelt
succumbed to his wife’s advice and called a meeting in September 1940 that included his
Assistant Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, Walter
White, T. Arnold Hill, former president of the National Urban League, and A. Philip Randolph.
Roosevelt seemed rather disengaged at the meeting but offered sympathetic gestures. He
assured his black audience that he intended to lessen racial discrimination in the military and
announced that black soldiers currently in reserve or active units would be granted access to all
branches within the Army. 55 This was a practice that had already been instituted on paper.
However, as evidenced by Charles Houston’s complaints, this was not occurring. He also noted
that the War Department would activate black officers within the Army Reserve at an
undetermined future date. 56 These revelations from the commander-in-chief of the military
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shocked his black audience, because it reflected how intransigent he, the military, and the white
leaders in government were in regard to dismantling segregation within the military. The two
measures that he spoke of were already in play or a step backwards in policy towards blacks in
the armed services.
The black entourage pressed the president on several points of their own. They sought
his approval to allow black professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and dentists, who were
inducted into the military, to be immediately commissioned as their white contemporaries were.
Roosevelt refused. He responded with several stated positions that were already in
practice within the military. He stated that black draftees were to be commanded by white
officers, and that black officers, once placed on active duty, would only be permitted to
command black units already under the command of black officers. 57 There were only two black
National Guard regiments. The three black men were stunned and silent as they took in the
president’s tone and words.
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, commented on the meeting in his diary making
clear his opposition to the proposals of “the Negro politicians” for “colored officers and various
other things.” He noted, “I saw the same thing happen twenty-three years ago when Woodrow
Wilson yielded to the same sort of demand and appointed colored officers to several of the
Divisions that went over to France, and the poor fellows made perfect fools of themselves and at
least one of the Divisions behaved very badly. The others were turned into labor battalions.” 58
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Following this meeting, the White House issued a press release that made clear the
government’s stance on race relations. It stated, “the policy of the War department is not to
intermingle colored or white enlisted personnel in the same regimental organizations. This policy
has proven satisfactory over a long period of years, and to make changes would produce
situations destructive to morale and detrimental to the preparation for national defense. For
similar reasons the department does not contemplate assigning colored reserve officers other than
those of the Medical Corps and chaplains to existing Negro combat units of the Regular
Army.” 59
Congress passed the Burke-Wadsworth Bill in September 1940. This was the first
peacetime draft law in American history. 60 This law required men between the ages of twenty
and thirty-five to register for the draft. In the new law there was to be no discrimination against
any person on account of their race or color. 61 However, the law changed nothing regarding
racial segregation once draftees were inducted into the service. 62
Although the White House’s press release appeared to contradict the conscription bill
regarding “equality” for all to serve, both policies were driven by the nation’s senior military
leadership. The War Department had submitted a recommendation to the administration that
“every effort should be made by the War Department to maintain in the Army the social and
racial conditions which exist in civil life in order that normal customs of white and colored
personnel now in the Army may not suddenly be disrupted. 63
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This tone-deaf approach by the War Department and Roosevelt diminished his popularity
within the black community. Civil Rights leaders and the black press jointly condemned
Roosevelt and the military for their recalcitrant support for Jim Crow. The Crisis began a series
of attacks on segregation within the military by running its covers with such provocative titling
as “For Whites Only,” and “White House Blesses Jim Crow” in its July and September 1940
issues. An editorial within the January 1940 issue, written by columnist George Padmore, stated
that “Democracy was not for the Colored Races.” 64 Another article chronicled segregation
within the US Navy, noting that enlistments had been stopped, assignments limited to steward,
and re-enlistment rates for Negroes stood at only one percent. 65
The article ended with the challenge to black readers that “the Navy department, and the
government will give you your equal rights, when, and only when, you have fought and
successfully demanded them. 66
The repercussions for Roosevelt’s callous handling of the black community came full
circle in his re-election campaign bid for an unprecedented third term in 1940. Roosevelt faced
this election against Republican Wendell Willkie, a corporate lawyer and private business energy
mogul who had initially supported Roosevelt and the New Deal. He parted ways with the
Roosevelt administration and the Democratic Party over what he considered the overbearing
intrusion of the Tennessee Valley Authority against small businesses. Willkie’s principal
campaign theme centered on offering an alternative to Roosevelt. He attacked Roosevelt for his
dormant stance on foreign policy and for seeking a third term in office. He also spoke strongly
in favor of civil rights. Vowing to roll back institutionalized racism in the federal government,
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Willkie told black reporters, “I say to you that under my administration, if elected, there will be
no discrimination because of race, creed or color in the appointments to federal
positions…Colored citizens [will be] appointed to any branch of government of the Civil Service
to which they are qualified.” 67
Willkie and the Republican Party courted the black vote by capitalizing on Roosevelt’s
stance on maintaining segregation in the military. In an address to more than five thousand New
Yorkers in Harlem, Willkie flatly condemned Roosevelt’s rigid stance on segregation. He also
denounced Roosevelt’s failure to support antilynching legislation. In essence, Willkie was
dredging up every issue that Eleanor had warned him about in regard to the black community.
Black leaders and public figures were emboldened by Willkie’s attacks on Roosevelt.
Roy Wilkins noted that “Mr. Roosevelt has failed to do many things he might have done
for Negroes. He could have passed the Anti-Lynching Bill. But this announcement of his
endorsement of Jim Crow [in the armed forces] is a greater blow than all of his failures.” 68
Heavyweight boxing champion Joe Louis offered his endorsement and support for Willkie before
a rally of thousands of blacks in St. Louis, telling the crowd, “he will do what the President has
failed to accomplish, and…I am for Willkie because I think he will help our people.” 69
In a column in The Crisis titled, “As the Crow Flies,” W.E.B. Du Bois expressed that
“Roosevelt has depended on the solid, lynching, reactionary South for reelection.” 70 The editor
for the Baltimore Afro-American noted, “After sixteen years of campaigning for Democratic and
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Progressive nominees, this newspaper today announces its support of Wendell Willkie, a
Republican, for the Presidency of the United States. 71
These public remonstrations finally drew a response from Roosevelt. In an attempt to
salvage the black vote, Roosevelt wrote letters to White, Randolph, and Hill, expressing that his
statements in their earlier meeting and the press release were misinterpreted in the press. 72 He
emphasized to each of them the final point that, “you may rest assured that further developments
of policy will be forthcoming to insure that Negroes are given fair treatment on a nondiscriminatory basis.” 73
Four renewed demands were given to Roosevelt through White House advisors Harry
Hopkins and Will Alexander. 74 They included: abolish segregation in all branches of the
military, promote Benjamin O. Davis Sr. to general officer, appoint a black assistant to the
selective service director, and appoint William Hastie, current dean of Howard University’s Law
School, as assistant secretary of war. 75
Colonel Davis had been in the forefront of discussion generated by the black press and
community. When the demand for an all-black division was still being circulated, black media
such as the Pittsburgh Courier promoted Davis as the best candidate for command of the unit.
Following Davis’s selection for a regimental command, elements of the black press and
community continued to closely follow Davis’s career in the Army. The Pittsburgh Courier led
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the charge through headlines and opinion pieces that promoted Davis and called for blacks to
have a larger role in the military.
In April 1940, Colonel Davis met with Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C.
Marshall, to personally discuss converting his regiment to an anti-aircraft unit. Marshall was
receptive and was convinced by Davis to allow this conversion to take place. 76 The impact of
this meeting was significant in that Davis left a positive impression on Marshall that portrayed
him as a senior officer who could handle his current grade of rank, as well as potential higher
responsibility. Marshall’s approval in allowing the conversion of a black infantry regiment into
a more complex branch such as anti-aircraft also signified a positive step towards allowing
blacks more roles within the Army. The news of this decision was quite well received by the
black press and community when it was announced officially later that year.
Unfortunately for Davis, his meeting with Marshall did not impact the results of the 1940
promotion board for brigadier general. In September 1940, when the Army released its initial
promotion list to general officer, of eighty-four officers selected for promotion, Davis was not
one of them. Davis denied that he was disappointed about not being chosen for promotion, or
that he planned to retire. Black media such as the New York Age immediately seized upon the
failure of the War Department to promote Davis, offering in its headline, “President Appoints 84
Generals, Ignores Col. Davis.” 77 Following numerous letters of protest about Davis’s nonselection for promotion, the War Department responded that Davis was too old to be promoted.
Its response noted, “only in exceptional cases were colonels nominated who were over the age of
fifty-eight. Colonel Davis is now over sixty-three years of age.” It argued that even if he had
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been selected for promotion, his age would have prevented him from serving for more than a
short period. Henry Stimson openly expressed his disapproval of Davis’s promotion with
Secretary of Navy Frank Knox at a cabinet meeting. 78 He also discussed the matter with George
Marshall, but Marshall left no public expression of his views about Davis’s selection to general
officer. Secretary of War Henry Stimson grimaced about the Hastie appointment and Davis’s
promotion, noting in his diary, “as soon as I reached the office this morning General Marshall
was ready for me with a list of new proposed General Officers, including the colored Brigadier
General whose proposed appointment by the President gave the occasion for the appointment of
others whose appointments from the standpoint of national defense were rather more
important.” 79
Following their meeting, the War Department released a revised list for promotion to
brigadier general, which included Colonel Davis. The White House offered an explanation to the
public noting that Davis’s name had been inadvertently left off the promotion list. 80 This had
now been corrected. While the media and the black community at large celebrated this measure
as a step forward for blacks in the military, there was debate and controversy surrounding this
mysterious revision of the promotion list. The first time that Davis had not been selected for
promotion was in 1937. Robert Moton had attempted to use his clout to push the War
Department to promote Davis. In a rather brisk letter, he noted the historical pattern of neglect
concerning Colonel Davis and admonished the War Department to correct its oversight by
immediately promoting him. This triggered a response from Colonel Edwin Watson, a military
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aide to President Roosevelt. Watson offered a conciliatory response to Moton, in which he
explained that no officer could be selected for such rank unless selected from an eligible list of
officers reviewed by a panel of current General officers. In a personal response back to Moton,
Watson stymied any further discussion about Davis’s promotion, offering, “confidentially, I
regret to inform you that Col. Davis is not on this list. This is no stigma on Col. Davis as there
are something like eight hundred Cols. and about thirty on the list. I am sure that you will agree
with me that the above ties the hands of the President in the matter of complying with your
request.” 81
Henry Stimson and George Marshall saw the promotion of Davis as a political
concession to appease blacks. Marshall later offered his views concerning race issues within the
military on December 1, 1941, stating, “that the settlement of vexing racial problems cannot be
permitted to complicate the tremendous task of the War Department.” 82
When Davis was promoted, he was pleasantly surprised but made no outlandish
expression about it. He simply noted in his diary that, “Associated Press called about noon
notifying me of my promotion.” 83 The black press and followers within the black community
were elated. Several black newspapers headlined their papers with the announcement of his
promotion. The Amsterdam News broadcast his promotion with one and one-half inch headlines
announcing, “Col. Davis Promoted.” 84 The Baltimore Afro-American displayed headings titled,
“Uncle Sam’s New Brigadier-General.” 85 Underneath its heading, a photograph of Davis
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flanked by his wife, Sadie, and daughter, Elnora, presented the iconic image of black middleclass success within American society.
The promotion of Davis and appointment of Hastie Days was clearly political fodder for
the black community. Before the November 1940 election, the White House had sent out a press
release announcing that it was granting three out of the four demands submitted to President
Roosevelt by the black advocacy group. First, Colonel Davis was to be promoted to the rank of
Brigadier General. Second, Major William Campbell Johnson was named as executive assistant
to the Director of Selective Service. Third, William H. Hastie was appointed as a civilian aide to
the secretary of war. 86 This ploy paid off, Roosevelt won reelection with an overwhelming 449
Electoral College votes to Willkie’s 82.
Earlier in June 1940, the key Allied nation of France had fallen to Nazi Germany. Great
Britain remained alone to face the might of Hitler’s military juggernaut. Winston Churchill
desperately pleaded for American help in the war against the Axis, hoping and suggesting that
America would have to get involved to stop German, and Italian aggression, sooner or later.
Roosevelt initially offered only tepid support in the form of lend-lease equipment, which at that
time amounted to only fifty old warships and destroyers. Meanwhile at home, Roosevelt and the
military remained silent and outwardly stubborn about maintaining segregation within the US
military. Blacks were ready to support an impending war, but only under better conditions for
blacks in government, the defense industry, and the military.
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One observer noted in Survey Graphic that Negroes were treated as the “stepchildren of
defense,” categorized with parolees, the medically deficient, and conscientious objectors. 87 With
three out of four demands met, most chose to settle for what had been achieved, while continuing
to push for the desegregation.
Despite the black community’s celebration, Davis’s promotion was tainted by
controversy. The manner in which Davis’s name had magically appeared on the second
promotion list drew notice. Historians have echoed these qualms. Gail Buckley notes that “most
black soldiers regarded him as an Army public relations figure: they knew that there was little
that he could do within the military structure to change conditions.” 88
Bernard Nalty barely mentions Davis’s promotion, instead emphasizing the importance
of William Hastie’s appointment. 89 Even Davis’s biographer, Marvin Fletcher, acknowledges
that the timing of Davis’s promotion “strongly suggested that political considerations were at
work.” 90
The New York Age, a pro-Willkie paper, highlighted his promotion with the less than
celebratory headline of, “Col. Davis Promoted To Brigadier General’s Rank: Appointment
Considered A Political Move To Halt Negro Voters Revolt.” 91 It stated the point that his
appointment was in line with the President’s policy of bestowing “empty honors on the
Negro.” 92 The columnist elaborated that since the President agreed with the Army’s view that it
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was unwise to mix white and Negro troops, Davis’s promotion was a political move and that
“instead of seeing active service in his new command, Gen. Davis will soon be retired.” 93
The dour predictions from the New York Age proved to be hollow as Davis was assigned
by the War Department to command the Fourth Brigade, Second Cavalry Division at Fort Riley,
Kansas. 94 After a number of parties and celebratory gatherings in his honor in New York, Davis
and Sadie departed for their new remote assignment out west in the spring of 1941.
Davis assumed command of a brigade that was a hodge-podge of old and new black units
thrown together. It included the famed 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments. Both units had been
ravaged by years of non-combat related duties and having subordinate units detached to serve in
various locations throughout the United States. The majority of the line officers within the
subordinate units were white. Davis was given the task of bringing the brigade back to active
duty standards of readiness. This would entail replacing leaders, restructuring units, and
undergoing extensive field training exercises culminating in external evaluations to validate unit
readiness at platoon, company, and battalion levels. This was a daunting challenge.
Complicating the issue was segregation at Fort Riley. Even Davis, as commander of a
brigade level unit, was restricted from attending white officers’ clubs and facilities. He and his
family were greeted at an officer’s call on post upon their arrival, which was standard military
practice for new incoming commanders, but social interaction ended with this “meet and greet”
exchange. 95 Social activities were restricted by segregation both on and off-post. Neither of the
Davises nor any black soldier could attend movies on post, or frequent the officers’ or non-
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commissioned officers’ clubs, or mix with their white counterparts during USO shows. Davis
found this to be non-sensical since Fort Riley was out of the Jim Crow South. He nevertheless
complied with Army policy. 96
Segregation aside, Davis dutifully set about his task to train his brigade for war. While at
Fort Riley, Davis took pride in being the first black officer to command a division for a
ceremonial viewing of the division by Lieutenant General Ben Lear, Commander of Second
Army. Davis stood in as acting commander while the actual commander, Major General Teddy
Allen, was away. Davis noted in a letter to Elnora, “Saturday I reviewed the Second Cavalry
Division, as a preparation for the visit of Lt. General Ben Lear, Cmdr. Of the Second Army.”
The following day at 7:30 am he reviewed the Second Cav. Division at Camp Funston. “I
commanded the Cavalry Divisions on these two occasions, those were two new “firsts” for
“Cullard Folk.” 97
Davis performed well within the short period that he commanded the Fourth Brigade. By
May, General Allen, Commander of the Second Division, reported to the War Department that
the Fourth Brigade was making good progress and “should finish fast in spite of a slow start.” 98
This was a compliment to Davis’s organizational skills and leadership.
Davis’s retirement loomed in the background. He told reporters, “I think I have done my
share but if the War Department desires me to continue to serve in the national emergency, I will
have an open mind.” 99 Notable figures such as Emmett Scott, former assistant to the Secretary
of War during World War I, and treasurer at Howard University in 1941, offered public support
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to keep Davis on active duty. Louis Lautier, a reporter and secretary of the Committee on
Participation of the Negro in National Defense, led a campaign to retain Davis on active duty.
Lautier recruited the aid of Scott in keeping this issue afloat. Scott wrote several legislators
warning them that if Davis were suddenly retired, this would confirm suspicions that his
appointment was no more than a political ruse for black votes. Senator Harry S. Truman and
Congressman Ulysses G. Guyer also joined the campaign to keep Davis on active duty with
combat troops.
They introduced bills to Congress calling for the retention of Davis on active duty during
the period of war. 100 Secretary Stimson opposed this measure based upon his belief that no
special legislation should be passed to aid individual officers. He ended any chance of the bill
reaching Congress. 101 It was never discussed by anyone outside of Truman’s and Guyer’s staffs.
In June 1941, as these initiatives were tossed about, George Marshall queried Davis about
serving within the office of the Inspector General. He described the role that he envisioned for
Davis “as an inspector and advisor on matters pertaining to the various colored units now in the
service.” 102 Despite the prestige associated with a brigade level command, Davis jumped at the
opportunity to continue service on active duty in any capacity. The proposal suited him
perfectly. He immediately accepted the post. On June 28, 1941, orders were issued retiring
Davis from active duty and immediately reappointing him to active duty to serve in the Inspector
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General’s office. 103 The New York Age grudgingly admitted surprise and satisfaction that Davis
had been retained on active duty. 104
Why did Davis settle for a lesser role as a staff officer? Had he stayed in command of his
brigade he stood a much better chance for advancement and promotion. Even for an officer of
his age in his early sixties, senior level command usually connoted promotion to the next level,
which in this usual trek, would have been a division command. Davis was torn between his
concern about his age and his desire to stay on active duty. He shared these concerns with
Elnora in a letter to her in early June 1941.
Davis wrote, “I expected to be relieved from duty here about the 15th and ordered home
to await retirement. I did state that should the Department feel the need of my services during
the period of emergency, I was available and desired active duty.” 105 Davis offered no regrets or
emotions about his removal from what many senior officers of his tenure would have considered
the pinnacle of a long career.
Neither Marshall nor any other senior officer in the War Department shared their
reasoning for taking Davis from a combat command but retaining him on active duty. His age
would have been an important factor, but so too was his lack of field command as the nation
faced war. Davis was in good physical condition for his age and could still ride quite well. He
had demonstrated this at Fort Riley when invited to attend a coyote hunt with the 9th Cavalry
Regiment. Although the 9th Cavalry was transitioning to motorized and armored transport,
horses were still prevalent in 1941. Davis boasted to Elnora that, “one must have a good horse
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and be able to stay up regardless of the nature of the terrain. I feel in perfect physical condition.
I was complimented on my riding. Generals don’t usually take part in the hunt. They usually
observe from some high point. I knew my horse, and I elected to take the part in the hunt and I
accompanied the Hunt Master whose post is up with the dogs. 106
Despite his demonstrated physical prowess, the question of his retention on active duty
remained in question. The black community saw Davis as an acceptable compromise with the
military. Davis seemed to relish his new-found notoriety. He noted in a letter to Elnora that,
“the Cullard Folk seems to be very much interested in me these days.” In the same letter he noted
that “the Pittsburgh Courier published a full-page editorial asking the Department to keep me.”
He concluded by stating again that “he had an open mind, and if the War Department wished him
to stay on, he would stay.”
His only proffered reservation was that “I just don’t want to bother with the
politicians.” 107 Most African Americans knew that the Army and Navy would not simply
integrate overnight, but Davis could be the symbolic lead figure that could help to move the
nation in that direction.
Davis concluded his assignment with the Fourth Cavalry Brigade in late June 1941 and
moved to Washington D.C. for his new assignment. It had been more than forty years since
Davis had lived in his city of birth. He purchased a home, took ten days of leave to get
established, and began his new duties as a staff officer for the Inspector General. His supervisor
was the Army’s Inspector General, Major General Virgil Peterson. Davis shared equal duty as
Assistant Inspector General with another Brigadier General, Howard McSnyder. Davis’s post
was termed the “Special Section.” The overall purpose of the Inspector General’s office was to
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monitor operations of the Army to ensure that army units were efficient and prepared for
potential combat roles.
This would be done through observation and reports about all aspects of unit readiness,
including training, morale, welfare, and individual soldier fitness. These reports were usually
rendered to unit commanders, to allow the local commanders the autonomy to make changes
within their own units. In other words, the IG was simply a tool of the higher command to
monitor subordinate units, divisions or lower, as they prepared for war. 108 The War
Department’s intent was to always allow unit commanders to be the masters of their own
organizations. Unit commanders could even ignore IG observations and reports, but most
understood the power of this agency and accorded its staff liaisons full access and respect.
Davis’s “special” purpose within the department of the IG was to be the Army’s first line
of response to race problems. Roosevelt and national leaders anticipated racial unrest and
strategically weighed and accepted the cost of maintaining the military’s current policies of
segregation. With the military expanding for war in a segregated Army and Navy, Roosevelt and
War Department leaders figured that racial tension was inevitable as black soldiers, airmen, and
sailors would be forced to train in regions where both black servicemen and local whites had not
been exposed to one another. They did not want to repeat such history as the racial violence that
had occurred between black soldiers and white civilians in Brownsville in 1904 or Houston in
1917. Racial incidents such as this would tarnish the image of the United States as it prepared to
fight in a world war in which Roosevelt espoused the rhetoric of freedom.
On January 6th, 1941, in a speech to White House correspondents, Roosevelt signaled to
the world that the United States would not allow despotism to endanger freedom throughout the
Divisions usually comprised three to five regiments, each regiment comprised three to five brigades, and each
brigade comprised three to five battalions. A division usually numbered from 10,000 to 16,000 men.
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world. He symbolically committed the US to the ideal of struggle against fear and tyranny in an
address known as the four freedoms speech. Roosevelt offered, “In the future days which we
seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential freedoms; freedom
of speech and expression, freedom to worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.” 109
Although black leaders and newspapers seized upon the opportunity to point out the glaring
contradictions and hypocrisy within the nation, Roosevelt was more concerned about how
international audiences perceived the US. He worried about how other democratic nations would
view the nation if racial problems dominated national and international headlines. Baring
disparities in American culture (after committing the nation to stopping despotism) was too
much to share with the world at this delicate moment in world history.
American leaders wanted to continue to portray the illusion of moral superiority over the
brutal examples shown by Axis forces around the world.
As new bases sprung up throughout the country preparing soldiers and sailors for war,
structural segregation followed on military bases around the country. Black servicemen who had
grown up away from the segregated South reacted sharply to this new experience. They clashed
often with military police, who were mostly white and were the enforcers of the military’s
version of Jim Crow segregation. Black servicemen were also continually challenged by local
whites who lived near military bases. White military commanders thought that they could
forestall this issue by restricting black servicemen to their bases.
Most reasoned that their units would be at stateside training facilities for only several
months before shipping overseas, therefore making restrictions on their black servicemen seem
practicable. This practice hardly resolved anything. Most military installations did not have
“Text of Roosevelt’s Speech before White House Correspondents,” The Washington Post, March 16, 1941;
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adequate recreational outlets for servicemen, and the facilities that were available were
segregated. Blatant bias against black servicemen created a ripe climate of racial tension that
often exploded into violence. Black servicemen nationwide complained and reacted forcefully
against what they perceived as racial oppression saddled with American hypocrisy. Altercations
between military police or white servicemen and blacks became commonplace. Some of the
confrontations exploded beyond military bases to the local white towns near the camps.
Between 1941 and 1943, there were open racial demonstrations, brawls, and riots at Camp
Stewart, Georgia; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Camp Lee, Virginia; and
Camp Polk, Louisiana.
Much of the trouble that black servicemen and women faced was no more than a carryover from years of segregation-driven de-humanization of blacks. White officers and
commanders quickly reminded their new black recruits about the parameters of the organization
into which they had entered, voluntarily or by draft.
Black newspapers noted this numerous times in opinion columns or headlines. The
Baltimore Afro-American reported that “segregation, discrimination, and injustice make the job
of soldiering a difficult one for the thousands of officers and enlisted men stationed at this army
post.” 110 The column further noted that “Jim Crow signs for everything could be seen at
Georgia’s Camp Stewart.”
At the radar school, there were stenciled signs in the lavatories inscribed, “these bowls
for white men only or these bowls for colored enlisted men only.” Latrine stools were marked
colored or white. Water fountains and guest houses were also marked for separate races. These
visual symbols of Jim Crow were only surface measures compared to the deeper core
“Army Race Riot Grows,” The Chicago Defender, June 14, 1943; “Jim-Crow Signs for Everything Seen at
Georgia's Camp Stewart,” Baltimore Afro-American, July 17, 1943.
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experiences that black servicemen and women faced upon their entry in military training
facilities across the country. A white captain at Camp Stewart, Captain Thyng, was reported to
have told his black soldiers of the 846th Engineer Battalion on hearing complaints, “this is
Georgia. The War Department regulations don’t mean a thing here. We make our own
regulations. We are the law.” 111
There were also familiar strands of white southern paternalism expressed in everyday
training such as drill and ceremonies or formational movements. Black soldiers noted that many
of their white non-commissioned and commissioned officers thought that colored soldiers were
“too thick” to understand English. 112 So, several of Camp Stewart’s officers invented a novel
method of instruction, which they called “swing and cadence.” 113 Instead of using standard
instructional commands in marching such as “left, right, left,” entertaining jingles were
incorporated. This would include such expressions as, “you had a good home, but you left,”
followed with the refrain from the soldiers back to their instructor, “your right.”
One white lieutenant even suggested that the men sing spirituals to help them keep time,
as was commonly practiced with black labor or penal worker chain-gangs in the south. 114
White leaders were also quite sensitive about allowing black veterans to have influence
over newly inducted black servicemen. This was especially true regarding soldiers such as those
from the famed 369th Harlem Hellfighters Regiment. Southern whites viewed them as
problematic for two reasons: they were from or associated with the North, and most had been
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overseas and were deprogrammed from American race conditioning. Most of these men were
combat veterans who had been treated with respect, dignity, and admiration by Europeans.
Many were proud of their service record and were unbroken by American racism. They had been
exposed to a realm of life possible beyond the steady cultural conditioning that cast blacks as
inferior. Chad Williams notes in his study of blacks in World War I how the imagery of blacks
changed as a result of the valorous service of the 369th. He noted a poem in The Messenger
titled, “When The Colored Troops Got Back,” articulated the transformative power of black
soldiers and veterans, while enlisting them in the cause of interracial social and economic
progress.
The final passage of the poem read:
In the look of those troops faces, Faces worn by sufferings encountered in the struggle, Faces beaming hiding the Marks of Slavery.
Beneath the Joys of Victory I felt the heavy gaze of a noble and heroic race Lighten
up.
And in the sunlight of that smile, the wrongs against Our Colored Brothers, will melt
into acts of kindness. 115
Key black figures who had served with the 369th Infantry Regiment were inspirational to
the black community and played major roles in furthering black growth and progress in the
1920s and beyond. Rayford Logan emerged as one of the nation’s preeminent African-American
historians. Harry Haywood was instrumental in shaping inclusive and egalitarian measures
within the Communist Party towards African Americans and other peoples of color. [He
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published classic works that chronicled African American contributions to American history
such as The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, What the Negro Wants, and
The Negro in American Life and Thought.] 116
Although Charles Hamilton Houston never served with the 369th overseas, his experience
with the regiment shaped his views towards the need for progressive reform. He made a pledge
during the war to help change legal and social treatment of African Americans and became one
of the most influential attorneys in African-American history. Houston helped to shape his
protege Thurgood Marshall. They jointly led the NAACPs legal attack on Jim Crow and the
legal validity of separate but equal.
A white officer speaking to recent black draftees in 1941 expressed open contempt for the
369th and blatantly attempted to discredit their legacy. 2nd Lieutenant Meckley of Battery G,
492nd Battalion at Camp Stewart, told his men, “don’t let those smart alecks from the 369th tell
you anything. They think that because they have been overseas and come from New York, they
know everything. They are a bunch of guardhouse lawyers and will make trouble for you.” 117
Davis was immediately put to task surveying and addressing such racial strife between
blacks and whites in hotspot locations such as Tuskegee, Alabama; Camp Lee, Virginia; Fort
Bragg, North Carolina; and Camp Livingston, Louisiana. He found himself continuously on the
road visiting military facilities around the nation. His principal audience was black soldiers. He
was not allowed to address white servicemen. Most black soldiers initially received Davis quite
enthusiastically and lined up in the hundreds to wait their turn to relate their grievance to him or
his staff. At first, Davis took his directives from the War Department as to where he visited.
Over time he developed his own schedule for post visitations. He either conducted arranged
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inspections of black units or investigated racial complaints that had been elevated to the War
Department.
Davis began his tour of duty at Tuskegee, where his son and other black cadets had begun
flight training. Several days after Davis’s appointment to the IG, there had been a near riot in
Montgomery, Alabama. A black military nurse stationed at Tuskegee was commuting from
Montgomery back to her duty station, when she was confronted violently about sitting in the rear
of the bus. She ignorantly refused to comply with the local custom and was beaten and thrown
off the bus by the white bus-driver. This was not an isolated incident.
As hundreds and eventually thousands of recently drafted or volunteering blacks who
were not familiar with Jim Crow policies crowded such remote southern locales, trouble ensued.
Most of the incidents involved young black men who were unfamiliar with the area and the
staunch rules of segregation in Alabama. Shocked that whites would treat women in uniform as
roughly as they did black male soldiers who “got out of line,” many angry black soldiers
stationed at Tuskegee reacted to this assault. An unreported number of men broke into the MP’s
station at Tuskegee, secured several weapons, and seized a military truck with the intent of going
into Montgomery to seek revenge. Fortunately for all involved, the assembled entourage of
black soldiers did not carry out their plan. Major Robert Pitts, an intelligence officer who was
stationed at Tuskegee, noted that “cooler heads prevailed and prevented the men from going into
Montgomery.” 118 He added, “the pot continued to boil and B.O. Davis, Sr., came to visit us.” 119
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Pitts framed this incident as being contained only because of the limited number of black
servicemen and women that knew about the altercation. In words that could be perceived as
either mild admonishment or pragmatic wisdom, Davis told them, “you are in the South, there
are certain laws and customs you must abide by. The army is not to take part in any incidents.
Those who get involved do so at their own risk and must suffer the consequences.” 120 Following
Davis’s speech, Pitts noted, “needless to say there was still much unrest.” 121
Davis did not address the racial incident. Instead he filed a general report about the
facility, including suggestions about how to deal best deal with racial issues. He suggested that
unit commanders at least recognize racial incidents as they occurred. He also proposed that
soldiers and officers be trained in ways to avoid difficulty between the races.
Davis did not attack the general point that the black airmen were segregated from white
fliers in training. Davis instead espoused a message of conciliation and camaraderie to black
servicemen. In a later visit to Camp Wolters, Texas, he offered, “I would counsel against
holding the entire group of Negroes responsible for the acts of one or two, there has been some
friction reported, but I don’t think it is anything unexpected or unusual. I fear over much
emphasis is being place on color in our Army.” 122 His messaging fell squarely in line with what
the War Department was looking for from its senior black military leader. Although not
coordinated or coached, Davis delivered the needed message of racial compliance as blacks in
ever-increasing numbers surged into the military.
As conflict between black servicemen and white authorities continued, Davis drew upon
many of his own past racial encounters within the military to offer advice to new black soldiers.
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By late 1941, Davis openly expressed several views that were contrary to Army policy. He
thought and expressed that there were two obstacles to racial progress within the military: poor
white officer leadership and “radical propaganda designed to make blacks dissatisfied under any
conditions.” 123 He believed that conditions had improved by the end of 1941. Davis ascribed
this positive turn to black servicemen discovering for themselves that much of the anti-military
propaganda was untrue. Davis also noted that morale increased when black officers were
assigned to black units.
The mere presence of a senior black commissioned officer as a representative figure of
the highest level of the military encouraged many black soldiers. To many black servicemen
Davis served as a symbolic figure that represented positive change within American culture. His
promotion and field presence also encouraged many that may have considered a career within the
Army.
Others were relieved to at least have someone of their own race hear their complaints.
They reserved judgement of him until they could see results from his interposition. Despite these
positive feelings among many black servicemen, many others were doubtful of his power or
influence.
William Hastie also toured military bases, and in the same manner as Davis, observed
and reported race problems within the Army and Navy. Hastie had served as a federally
appointed district judge in the Virgin Islands and the Dean of Howard University’s Law School
before reluctantly accepting the post of special assistant to Secretary of War, Howard Stimson.
Hastie had bought into the idea that his presence and influence would make a difference in race
relations in the military and war. During a visit to Camp Bragg, North Carolina, he had told a
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crowd of some 2,000 soldiers that “petty differences must be subjugated to the greater task of a
unified nation.” 124 In his first two years, he continued to speak in positive tones at numerous
venues throughout black communities across the nation. At Howard University in 1942 he told
an assembly of black servicemen from Howard that “when the story of this war is written, Negro
servicemen will have made a record for us in the life of America. 125 He also noted, “we’re doing
better today.” “The system of selecting men for officers training is better. Training of officers
takes place in schools for officers, not in schools for black men or schools for white men.” 126 He
noted how many more black officers were available in this period as compared to during World
War I. These new officers were produced courtesy of ROTC programs at Howard, Wilberforce,
and Tuskegee. Although the military was allowing more black officers, he failed to
acknowledge that none of the officers commissioned within these programs were allowed into
the regular army.
Unlike Davis, Hastie, upon his appointment, had almost immediately begun to note
discrepancies in how black service members were treated, despite the promises of more
progressive measures by the government and War Department. He painted segregation and
hostility against black servicemen and women as dysfunctional during the nation’s time of crisis.
From a practical view, Hastie believed that the US could ill afford to continue the wasteful
expenditures needed to maintain segregation between blacks and whites. Within two years of his
appointment, Hastie became openly critical of the military and the government. He even
indirectly criticized figures such as Davis, arguing that they were not helping the nation or
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military by going along with the status quo. In 1940 Hastie spoke before a delegation of mixed
race representatives from various youth organizations, noting that “divided opinion among
Negroes on the question of segregation in the Army makes for great difficulty in solving this
problem.” 127 He continued, “as long as people who are opposed to mixed units are able to point
to Negroes as also agreeing with this position our problem is extremely difficult.” 128
Within a year of the nation’s mobilization and draft, troubling narratives of black’s
inability to cope with segregation on their bases and racial violence against blacks plagued the
War Department. The War Department’s incalcitrant stance eventually forced black leaders such
as Davis, Hastie, Walter White, and A.P. Randolph to change their supportive stance towards the
government.
The government’s refusal to budge on segregation forced these figures to protest against
what they viewed as home-grown tyranny against blacks. Hastie thought that Jim Crow was
antithetical to the idea of a national unified front against despotism. When the War Department
approved a segregated flight school for black servicemen at Tuskegee, this was the final straw
for Hastie.
While most other African Americans touted this measure as a success story, Hastie
argued, “there is not now and never has been any good reason for segregated training of Negro
flyers at Tuskegee. The worst plan is to keep them (flight school cadets), apart until they are
forced together under the stress of circumstances in combat. Prejudice is based on ignorance.” 129
Hastie concluded that he was simply being used by the military and government as a race
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symbol, in which his suited role was for visual purposes only. When he found out that the War
Department had not taken any action on reports that he had submitted from the field, he tendered
his resignation.
Hastie continued to emphasize that the nation was wasting a valuable resource through
segregation. Following his resignation, Hastie publicly rebutted his former boss, Harold Stimson.
When Stimson asserted that the military’s current policies were serving the war effort to its best
advantage, Hastie decried this position as illusory in that “the continuance of policies of jimcrowism by the War Department had led to the non-use of Negro combat troops in large
numbers, exclusion of Negro WAC’s from overseas service, restrictions of the number of Negro
nurses and to numerous other grievances.”
These restrictions, he argued, limited the combat effectiveness of US military forces
worldwide. He noted that four major Negro organizations were in the process of launching a
nation-wide campaign against Jim Crow Army practices. 130
The War Department responded to Hastie’s critical but accurate depiction of the
disposition of black troops in the Army. The War Department put out an official communique to
black news organizations, that, “the dispersal of Negro personnel of the Army is in accordance
with War Department policy.” 131
Staff writers further noted that “it is the considered judgement of the War Department
that they will acquit themselves on the battlefields of this war with the same courage, distinction,
and valor that their forefathers displayed in all wars in which this country has engaged.” 132 This
retort to Hastie offered that there were more than 70,000 colored troops in the infantry, two
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colored infantry divisions, a recently activated cavalry division, and more than 25,000 Negro
soldiers on duty in the Pacific. 133 Amongst these numbers were 2,200 officers on duty that
ranged in rank from second lieutenant to brigadier general. 134 These numbers painted a rosy
picture of advancement for blacks in the military that went far beyond what any black person
would have imagined even ten years earlier. However, nothing had changed in regard to the fact
that these black servicemen remained segregated and led by white officers, as in the past. Davis
remained as the singular shining example of a general officer.
Examples of what Davis and Hastie were required to address included such unrest as seen
at Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Camp Stewart, Georgia. The first
incident investigated by Hastie involved three black soldiers, Privates William T. Monroe,
William R. Head, and Roland Woodfork, who went AWOL from the Fourth Brigade at Fort
Riley. This was Davis’s former command. The soldiers were volunteers who had come from
Michigan to join the Army and were assigned to serve in the cavalry at Fort Riley. They
eventually joined other black volunteers from Michigan and Illinois to form a 181-man weapons
company within the brigade. The men complained that they were forced to run away because
their white commanders ordered or endorsed violence against black soldiers within the unit. 135
They reported to Hastie that their trouble had begun in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The unit
had been ordered to conduct field maneuvers at various bases in several southern states. Their
unit had stopped to bivouac overnight in a fairground outside of the city. As the unit allowed its
soldiers rest and recovery, the complainants noted that five black soldiers had gone into Baton
Rouge to shop. They were stopped and questioned by a white captain and private. When they
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failed to address the white men as “sir” they were arrested and jailed for insubordination. 136
Their commander, Captain David V. Adamson, secured their release and returned the men to
their bivouac site. The AWOL soldiers then related that they were warned by friendly northern
whites that white southerners within a sister unit planned to attack the five black men that
evening.
Apparently, they felt compelled to exact revenge against these northern blacks for
challenging and slighting white authority. The attack never materialized, and the unit traveled on
to Hamburg, Arkansas, and established camp for training. 137
While encamped in Arkansas, two black privates, Lester Harris and Louis Benton, had
become inebriated and began to quarrel with one another to such an extent that their company
leader, First Sergeant Lang, became involved. He took the men to their company commander,
Captain Adamson, for punishment. In sworn affidavits from eye-witnesses at the scene, Captain
Adamson then reportedly ordered the men to fight using boxing gloves. 138 Harris refused to
fight Benton, stating that Benton was heavier and older. Captain Adamson then ordered Benton
to dig a trench for refuse. Benton complied until he complained that only he was being
punished. Adamson then allegedly threatened to turn Benton over to the military police.
By this point, the brigade commander, Colonel Richard White, had arrived to survey the
incident. He told Adamson and other soldiers present to “not transfer Benton to the MP’s, but
instead, to beat his goddamned brains out with a pick handle.” 139 The entire troop was assembled
as Benton was punished. Another black soldier, following orders, proceeded to beat Benton until
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he was bloodied and near death before soldiers within the formation broke ranks and intervened
to stop the punishment. 140
The three AWOL men noted how shocked they were by the sudden change in behavior of
their white officers as they had shifted from their mid-western locale of Kansas to Louisiana. 141
Each soldier expressed that they had seen both Adamson and White as “Ok” until they had
traveled south. 142
Hastie protected the whistle-blowers until a full investigation was conducted. Within his
examination Hastie found that although no black soldier had been beaten to death, as reported by
the AWOL men, there was ample evidence that supported their claims of injustice, abuse, and
wanton disregard for the rights of the black soldiers in the Fourth Brigade. 143 There was no
record of the final disposition of the three AWOL soldiers who had filed the complaint to Hastie.
Davis investigated similar incidents of racial violence between blacks and whites at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, in the late summer of 1941. Groups of black soldiers from Fort Bragg
had violently clashed with MPs at the Queens City Trailways Bus stop in Fayetteville, North
Carolina in early August 1941. Fayetteville was the town adjacent to Fort Bragg. What began as
an altercation between two black MPs and several black soldiers on the bus escalated to a violent
confrontation when white MPs intervened and began to beat the black bus riders with their night
sticks.
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One of the black soldiers who had not been initially involved in the brawl, Private FirstClass Ned C. Turman. He wrested control of the gun of a white MP, Sergeant Elwyn Hargrave,
and shot him in the heart, killing him instantly. He then fired wildly at the remaining white MPs
until he had expended all of the ammunition in the gun. Eyewitnesses reported that Turman then
attempted to escape through the rear door of the bus. He stumbled and fell to his knees as he
reached the doorway. Eyewitnesses stated that he was then shot by a white MP as he was in this
near prone position, on his hands and knees. 144 The remaining wounded, both black and white,
were reported to have been shot by white MPs outside of the bus as they fired haphazardly into
the crowded bus. At least six other men were wounded as a result of the gun fire. There were no
blacks with guns, with the exception of the one that Turman had seized. No black soldiers,
including MPs, were allowed to have firearms.
Following this incident, eyewitnesses reported that white MPs began to round up, beat,
and harass any black soldier within the immediate area in retaliation for the killing of Sergeant
Hargrave. This story was later retracted. 145 Black soldiers had been confined to the post for
forty-eight hours. The NAACP demanded that at least one investigating officer be black. 146
They were granted this request, as Davis was assigned to lead the investigation.
Davis spent nearly a month at Fort Bragg along with two white officers conducting a
thorough investigation. 147 They obtained sworn testimonies from ninety-one eye-witnesses and
personally visited the bus terminal scene where the deadly violence had occurred. They were
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also given assistance from the FBI in the form of a criminal investigation unit that used their
advanced technology to conduct tests on weapons and bullets used in the melee.
Despite the government’s best efforts, their investigation was inconclusive as to who was
responsible for starting the deadly incident. Davis expressed that he was as concerned about the
cause for the violence as much as the violence itself. He made several recommendations to the
War Department following his inquiry, including the dispatching of an experienced officer
trained in police work to be provost at the camp and to train a force of white and colored military
police; the establishment of a military police headquarters in the city of Fayetteville, separate and
distinct from the civilian police; more military officers to supervise the military police in the
city; and a unified force of military police established with white and Negro personnel, with the
men having equal equipment and authority. 148 Davis personally concluded that much of the
trouble stemmed from poor leadership by some of the unit commanders. However, he could not
deny that many of the problems that surfaced here also laid in basic army policies. The
unarming and dismissal of the black MPs who had initially began the interaction with black
soldiers at the bus station could not be ignored. It was Army policy nation-wide that black MPs
not be armed. It was also unwritten but inherently understood that black MPs had no authority.
Davis made his views known to the War Department. He noted in his diary, color “is
indeed a great problem for the white man. A little color affects him greatly.” 149 He submitted a
detailed report in which he noted that the first black soldiers entering the army during the
1940/41 expansion had been subjected to “radical propaganda designed to make them
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dissatisfied under any conditions.” 150 Within his report Davis also mildly challenged current
Army policy by criticizing the current policy requiring that white officers command black troops.
He argued in his report that the situation was made worse by the poor quality of officers
who had initially been assigned to command black units. Davis still believed that the nation was
on a positive trajectory towards better treatment of African Americans within the military.
Davis’s approach drew a grudging acceptance from the War Department. Hastie, on the
other hand, was cast as an outsider who did not understand the complexities of the military. He
was viewed as a trouble monger who focused too heavily on the problems within the military
instead of solutions. His proposals were flatly rejected. Davis’s more subtle method of working
within the system was accepted and promoted as an example of interracial partnership. Davis
took note of this. He wrote in his diary that this reinforced his belief that the “quiet approach”
was a more effective way to bring about change. 151 When the Army offered a conference to
leading black news editors to illustrate the progress that was being made with the incorporation
of blacks within the military, Davis was chosen as their key spokesman.
The conference was held on December 8th, 1941, the day after the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. Despite the disarray caused by the attack the conference was still held. Following
other Army spokesmen that spoke on how black servicemen were adapting to the military, Davis
spoke well and forcefully in positive tones about the military exchange with blacks. Davis told
his cynical audience of newsmen that wherever “the army is allowed to work out the situation in
its own way, morale was good and constantly improving.” 152 He concluded his briefing in a
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typical military vocabulary of toughness tinged with an optimistic outlook. In his summarizing
statement Davis told them that “we are alert and on our toes, and it is ‘Full Speed Ahead.’” 153
As the nation entered World War II and committed to defeating the Axis powers in both
Pacific and European theaters of war, millions of young American men and women were
mobilized. Included within these numbers were hundreds of thousands of African Americans.
Scores of other black men and women supported the war in the defense industry. Motives for
their supporting their nation in another world war ranged from individual self-interest exhibited
through jobs that were made available that previously hadn’t been, to, altruistic sacrifices made
by many to wake the country from its doldrums of racial oppression against blacks. With his
promotion to general officer, Davis could help to influence policies that would impact these men
and women. He started within the Army structure.
As a member of the Inspector General’s office, he witnessed firsthand how segregation
and discrimination impacted the lives of the masses of black men and women across the nation
and eventually overseas. He began to not only better understand the depth of the harm that
racism caused in the war effort, but also his larger and more important role in lessening its
impact upon the army.
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CHAPTER 5: Agent of Change (1942-1944)

In 1942 America entered the first year of a world war that had raged in the European
theater since 1939. Roosevelt, along with Admiral William D. Leahy appointed as the chief of
staff for the President and of Roosevelt’s strategic planning team including General Marshall,
Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Henry H.
Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces planned for a two-theater war against Axis
forces in Europe and the Japanese in the far east. Roosevelt, with coaching from British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, and his strategic planners chose to dedicate more than eighty
percent of US warpower against Germany before shifting resources against Japan. 1 American
military forces remained largely segregated as American forces fought key battles in North
Africa and in the Pacific. Domestically, African Americans in factories and other federally
controlled governmental facilities, benefitted from Executive Order 8802 signed by Roosevelt in
June 1941. This law prohibited ethnic or racial discrimination in federal jobs. No other segment
of American culture changed socially. America in the 1940s remained a racially divided nation.
Whether in the suburbs and Burroughs of northern cities or in the rural sleepy towns and cities of
the south, America held on to its premise that blacks and other minorities were an inferior
segment of the American body of people. African Americans, for their part, understand their
racial caste, but remained steadfastly determined to gain better status in yet another gamble of
“quid pro quo,” service to the country in its time of dire need. Victory at home as well as abroad,
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or the Double V slogan, rang throughout black communities in America throughout the war
years. 2
Davis remained active in his role as an assistant IG officer throughout 1942. He
continued to be showcased by the military in a variety of public-relations events. He participated
in a dedication of an Auxiliary Service Men’s Club at the Good Shepard Community House in
Chicago. He drove through Atlanta in a military motorcade, drawing the full attention of the
local black press, in January 1942. He was guest of honor in several holiday parades in 1941 and
1942. Davis felt as if he was making a positive impact for the military and nation. He
commented on several occasions in letters to Sadie and Elnora how he felt that he was being well
received by most black men and women in uniform. He wrote to Sadie in 1942 that “I think that
in spite of my age I have what is needed. It has been noted that where ever I go the men seem to
pick up.” 3
Davis by virtue of his rank, seniority in years in the Army, and his post on the Army IG
and the Advisory Committee, was in a powerful role as a potential emissary between the races
for positive change within the Army. Multitudes of blacks were entering the service by 1942.
Since his son had successfully completed West Point in 1936, blacks were being admitted again
to the premier Army officer academy.
The African American community generally supported the war with the caveat that the
nation would begin to treat them better as American citizens. The slogan calling for a “Double
V” campaign, for victory abroad and at home, was widely expressed and popular within the
black community as their sons and daughters went to war or into factories to support the war. 4
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One of the worst assignments that Inspector General liaison General Davis had to
contend with in his tour of military bases was Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Davis dreaded the
prospect of his visit there. In his diary he noted, “I do not look forward to this trip.” 5 Fort
Huachuca had become a hotbed for conflict as thousands of newly mobilized blacks encountered
Jim Crow segregation through military duty for the first time. Fort Huachuca was isolated,
commanded mostly by white officers, and lacked adequate recreational activities for the
thousands of black soldiers that passed through there. The two black combat divisions, the 92nd
and 93rd used in World War II assembled and trained at Fort Huachuca. This meant that at times
there were more than 10,000 black servicemen stationed at the segregated and isolated post.
With limited recreation available to the men, it was a breeding ground for trouble for the restless
young men. Davis had been told that morale was low and venereal disease high.
Davis traveled to Fort Huachuca in late July 1942. He met first with black officers, who
complained about Jim Crow policies on the post that restricted blacks from the few recreational
facilities on the base, the officers club, and the officer’s barbershop. They also expressed ire
about overcrowded quarters, and a shortage of practically everything from military supplies to
the lack of general civilian goods at the post exchange. 6 When he spoke with enlisted men the
following day, they echoed the sentiments of their officers. Davis concluded that there was little
evidence of discrimination. 7
He reported to his superior, Major General Peterson, that operations were running
smoothly, despite the complaints from the black soldiers. He ascribed their discontent to the
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harsh conditions at the base. 8 Davis also advised MG Peterson in a general report about overall
race relations. He advocated that the military should face the fact that there were racial problems
and that the first line of defense against such problems was subordinate line officers within units.
Davis felt that if junior officers and commanders were properly trained, many difficulties could
be avoided. He also shared within this report that black soldiers “deeply resented” the War
Department’s open policy of segregation. Davis believed that the military could be used as an
example to better race relations within American society. General Peterson omitted much of
Davis’s harsh assessment in his final report to the Chief of Staff. He did note Davis’s
suggestions for training junior leaders in race relations as well as his point that blacks should not
be sent to train in regions where they were unfamiliar with local customs and practices.
In 1942 Davis was also appointed to serve on an Advisory Committee on Negro Troop
Policies. This panel was largely a reactionary measure to counter overwhelming negative black
press against the War Department. Davis was quite direct with the committee. After more than
nine months of intensive debate and study, he offered, “the colored soldier has lost confidence in
the fairness of the Army to Negro troops. The War Department has to take decided action.
Colored people are fighting segregation. The Army is the best agency to solve the problem.” 9
In his own way Davis became a moderating voice between the black community and the
military. Most importantly, both sides were listening to him and did not doubt his credibility.
This responsibility and the constant schedule of inspections wore on Davis, causing him to have
to be hospitalized from fatigue for nearly two weeks. 10 In May 1942 he signed himself into
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Walter Reed Hospital in Washington D.C. for rest and medical monitoring. He recuperated
quickly as he adopted a slower paced schedule and less hectic lifestyle. By the end of June,
Davis resumed his normal schedule.
As Davis resumed his work on the Advisory Committee, Davis received orders for a
special assignment to Europe. As the first black Service of Supply, (SOS) units had begun to
arrive in England in 1942, the issues the nation had faced at home spread with these troops.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the European Theater Commander, desperately sought help to deal with
the racial tension mounting between American servicemen in England as blacks arrived in
increasing numbers. George Marshall suggested Davis might help Eisenhower to address some
of the immediate race issues in England.
MG Peterson thought that Davis would be taken from him and assigned to Europe. He
was openly opposed to this. He was quite pleased with Davis’s work so far and had
recommended him for the Legion of Merit award. After some bickering between Peterson, the
War Department, and Eisenhower, Davis was ordered to Europe for one month of temporary
duty. 11 His mission was to study and deconflict racial problems as best as possible within the
limited time that the IG Office agreed to detach him.
Davis traveled to Great Britain in September 1942 and met with senior US commanders
stationed in England, including Eisenhower. Davis sought guidance from Eisenhower on what
was expected of him in such a limited amount of time. Eisenhower told Davis to investigate the
racial climate in England and then make recommendations. Davis was then introduced to
Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee, the head of the Service of Supply units in Europe. The SOS
units contained the overwhelming majority of black servicemen. Davis accompanied Lee several
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times, visiting different sites where black soldiers served in service or supply units. Davis’s work
in Europe drew notice from the black press, as well as such figures as Eleanor Roosevelt. Mrs.
Roosevelt encountered Davis strictly by happenstance as she visited a variety of installations in
England. She later intimated to Walter White how impressed she was with him and his work. 12
While in England, Davis recommended that more blacks be allowed into Officer
Candidate School (OCS). As a result of his proposal, some fifteen black candidates were
considered and selected for commissioning by Lee. As Davis’s temporary duty drew to a close,
he continued his work of interviewing and dissecting racial conflicts in England. Both Lee and
Eisenhower took notice of his impact and deemed his work so helpful that Eisenhower requested
and received a two-week extension. Before departing, Davis left a list of recommendations that
were similar to suggestions that he had made in the states, such as fully integrating and
empowering all Military Police, desegregating public facilities on US bases in Europe, and
carefully selecting line unit commanders who would be placed in command over black troops. 13
Davis also suggested such general improvements as instituting educational programs on
race relations and African American history throughout the military services. 14 Based on his
experience within the IG and his general past in the military, Davis observed that much of the
trouble between the races stemmed from their ignorance of each other’s culture. This lack of
awareness, coupled with the different groups being thrust together, bred a volatile mixture.
Davis recommended that these sessions be made mandatory for all American soldiers entering
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Europe. This, he believed, was crucial for white commanders and soldiers. He also suggested
that black soldiers be taught about the value of American teamwork.
The common goal of defeating enemies of the United States, he emphasized, should be
pressed upon black servicemen. Lastly, he recommended that entertainment facilities such as
clubs be categorized by association (i.e., enlisted versus officer) or by service branch, and not be
segregated by race. 15
Although the Army issued press releases highlighting part of Davis’s proposals, most of
the black media thought that Davis was being used to minimally address the racial problems in
England. The Baltimore Afro-American charged that Davis had downplayed racism in England
as it blamed Eisenhower for his failure to control racist white troops. 16 Other papers such as The
Nation reported that Davis was used to conduct a cursory white-washing of the issue before
being sent back to the US. 17 Despite this inaccurate characterization of Davis’s work, the author
of this article, Joseph Julian, recommended similar educational programs to address the problems
between the races.
Unfortunately, the War Department chose not to fully share Davis’s report and all of his
recommendations with the media. Davis was unfairly painted by some in the black press as a
military stooge who ignored racism. His public statements that there was “too much emphasis
on color and the race issue” was used against him. 18
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Although Davis would not openly challenge the military or government on racial policy,
mainly because he felt it was not an officer’s place to do so, he believed that his work and views
were respected and at least considered by key leaders who could effect change. He had made
favorable impressions through contact with figures within government and the military such as
his immediate superior, Major General Peterson, Eleanor Roosevelt, Lieutenant General Lee, and
George C. Marshall. These men and women could affect the change that the black leaders
sought, and Davis had their ear. Davis noted this dilemma in his journal, writing that
“alleviation of the racial problems could only come from higher in the chain of command,” but,
“I think it is a case of ‘they just won’t see it.’” 19
Davis returned to the United States in November 1942. After a short leave he was put
back in the field investigating racial problems in Phoenix, Arizona. In this case, it was one group
of black soldiers fighting another. Davis wearily went about his business of interviewing
soldiers and leaders to determine the cause of conflict between the two.
As 1942 neared its end, Davis had evolved from an obscure senior black officer used by
both the military and black press to suit very separate narratives, to an important figure involved
in national policy concerning blacks and whites. He was one of only three black government
officials that helped to shape or direct national policy on race relations. The other two figures,
William Hastie and Truman Gibson, were not given the same voice or respect on racial matters
as Davis. By their pedigree of education and experience, both Hastie and Gibson were more
qualified than Davis to offer a broader perspective.
Yet, they were both skeptically viewed by military figures. Most military figures thought
of them as pundits who were a social and political concession allowed by President Roosevelt to
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appease the black community. Although outward appearances were made to show open
acceptance of them by military and government leaders, they were largely ignored. Hastie
related that one of his superiors, Assistant Secretary of War, Judge Robert Patterson, was said to
have been openly sympathetic with his general objectives, but, “there came a time when it was
difficult to see him, or place Negro soldier complaints on his desk.” 20
Davis regretted seeing Hastie leave. In spite of their ideological differences, Davis saw
Hastie as an ally in aiding blacks in the military. In a personal note he expressed sorrow about
Hastie’s leaving, offering to Hastie, “I know that you have been unable to accomplish many
things that you desired….I hope that you will not separate yourself from the interest of the
colored soldier.” 21 Hastie responded to Davis by sending him a copy of his letter of resignation,
in which he highlighted his key reasons for leaving: segregation, the lack of the opportunity for
blacks to serve in combat, and the possibility of segregation in officer training. 22 John McCloy,
the head of the Committee on Negro Affairs, also sent Davis a copy and offered that these topics
might be of further use by the committee.
Davis continued to work quietly within the system. Part of this behind-the-scenes work
was his continued service on the Advisory Committee. His insight and voice as a member of this
committee was invaluable and shaped several policy changes in 1943. Within time, during the
war, some concessions were made as a direct result of Davis’s recommendations or opposition to
set policies.
1943 was a bad year for the United States in terms of race relations. The government and
military leaders’ insistence on maintaining the status quo of segregation and blatant bias against
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all non-white races finally erupted into open protest and violence. There were Zoot Suit riots in
which white military personnel openly attacked Mexican American youth in California, white
mobs in Detroit, and blacks openly protesting segregation against white-owned businesses in
New York. 23 Young black men also openly challenged and fought white policemen, whom many
viewed as no better than the jackbooted soldiers of totalitarian states. In the United States and
abroad, racial disturbances within the military continued to surface. Black servicemen and
women grew tired and lost faith in fighting for a country that treated them with less regard than
many of their enemy, who happened to be European whites. William Hastie also announced his
resignation in 1943. He publicly declared his break as a direct response to and personal protest
against government policies against blacks.
Davis remained a lead figure within the IG’s office, helping to address racial problems
within the states. He also continued to serve as the lone black voice on the Advisory Committee
for Negro Affairs. Davis continued to exhort his superiors that segregation on the military bases
disturbed blacks. 24 In May 1943 there had been several incidents at Fort Clark, Texas, that
captured the attention of the War Department. At an opening ceremony for a service club on the
base two white commanders were booed and hissed by some 3,000 black enlisted men who were
required to attend the ceremony. Both had to cut their speeches short. At the same ceremony,
when a black chaplain delivered a prayer, he was cheered for several minutes by this raucous
crowd.
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During his investigation at Fort Clark, Davis noted how black officers were forced to sit
with black enlisted men in a segregated section of the post theater, while white officers were
allowed their own section designated only for officers. As he concluded his visit there, Davis
recommended that the post desegregate and that several white line officers be investigated and
disciplined for abuse of authority. These officers had been reported in surveys to habitually refer
to blacks in derogatory terms, including black women that worked around or on Fort Clark. 25
Davis also had to return to Fort Huachuca in July 1943. Racial unrest resurfaced as the all
black 92nd Division passed through for mobilization training. He and Truman Gibson were
dispatched there as the division arrived and began training for combat before it was deployed
overseas.
The 92nd Division was the third in line of all-Negro divisions created during the war.
Preceding it had been the 93rd Division that also trained at Fort Huachuca and Fort Polk,
Louisiana, and the 2nd Cavalry Division stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. Key figures within the
War Department viewed the creation of these units as a concession to appease the black
community. Aside from this point, the Army needed the soldiers. Prior to the war this had been a
specific request from black representatives who had met with President Roosevelt. The caveat to
this concession was the military’s normal practice of staffing the divisional leadership with white
senior commanders and officers. Major General Almond, the division commander, along with a
complement of white brigade and battalion commanders, were treated with open contempt by
their black subordinate officers and enlisted men. In public forums they were openly booed, and
some were even pelted with rocks when they attempted to address the men.
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During one such event for the dedication of a recently completed athletic field, Almond
was booed so loudly that the ceremony was abruptly ended. 26 This came as a complete shock to
Almond. Davis and Gibson interviewed black officers and soldiers about this borderline
mutinous behavior shown to superiors. Both officers and enlisted men reported that they were
not pleased with several things, including promotion policies, the lack of contact allowed
between black and white officers, and the poor quality of white subordinate leaders assigned
over black troops in line units. Davis and Gibson returned to Washington and reported their
findings. Davis recommended better promotion policies and ending segregation in officer
facilities.
Black press such as The New York Amsterdam News completed their own investigation at
Fort Huachuca and issued a searing indictment against the military, describing the base as “Hell
on Earth.” 27 Their report depicted inferior facilities for black soldiers, stories of beatings of black
servicemen by white military police, and open racial hostility between white officers and their
black soldiers. In this story they also inaccurately reported that Davis and Gibson had not found
anything wrong on the post. 28
Davis resumed his work with the Advisory Committee in early 1943. The work that
Davis would do on this committee was probably his most substantial and far-reaching
achievement as a senior officer and black advocate within the military. Before deploying to
England for his special assignment, Davis had urged the committee to publish its findings on
discrimination and openly share with the black community, and press in particular, the steps that
it was taking to address changes that were being sought to improve race relations. While he was
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in England, the committee decided to hold off on announcing these measures because they
believed that race relations were improving.
Instead of addressing racial friction, the committee chose instead to explore how to best
utilize the Army General Classification Test (AGST), as it related to blacks. A classification
test, its purpose was designed to group soldiers into categories based on how they were assessed
in their abilities to pick up soldiering skills. Each inductee was evaluated by testing their
potential to learn facts, skills, and techniques necessary for carrying out Army duties. In three of
the elements whose effects were measured, Negroes as a whole entered the Army with grave
deficiencies.
School facilities for Negro inductees had been measured and found to be inadequate by
general standards. This directly impacted testing. Test administrators also considered other social
back ground influencers or common media including newspapers, radios, and motion pictures.
In many communities with large Negro populations one or several of these influences upon
learning was missing from the backgrounds of most Negro inductees. The socioeconomic status
of Negroes was generally lower than that of the rest of the population, and the general cultural
background of Negroes was lower still. The Army was not interested in these shortfalls in black
culture. Their main interest was in how to best utilize black inductees in needed military
occupations.
On the AGCT, the most rapid learners-those making scores of 130 or above-were ranked
at the top in Grade I and the slowest learners-those making scores of 69 or below-were placed in
Grade V. With 100 as the average, the AGCT was designed to obtain scores that would reflect a
normal distribution curve, as follows: Grade I, 7 percent; Grade II, 24 percent; Grade 111, 38
percent; Grade IV, 24 percent; and Grade V, 7 percent.
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These grades had broad and general usefulness to classification and assignment. Grades I,
II, and III were expected to produce leadership for the Army, with officer candidates coming
wholly from Grades I and II-from men with scores of 110 and over. Grades I, II, and III were
also expected to furnish the Army's enlisted specialists and technicians.
The lower grades could be expected to produce only semiskilled soldiers and laborers.
Soldiers who ranked as low as four or five were considered barely trainable. Many who had
scored in the five range had still been accepted and placed in the all-black combat divisions. The
committee considered removing most of these soldiers from combat units and transferring the
majority of them to service units or discharging them altogether. Davis opposed this plan and
argued that the test was racially biased. He argued that the negative impact on morale and within
the black community would negate any positive efficiency measure gained. 29 Despite his
misgivings, Davis was forced to go along with the plan to screen the category-5 soldiers out.
Black media attacked the action and questioned the validity of the test, just as Davis predicted. 30
Davis also raised the issue of putting black troops in combat to the Advisory Committee.
He noted that all three black infantry regiments, and two black artillery battalions, had been in
training for too long and were becoming impatient. Davis noted that the word being spread
throughout black communities was that black soldiers would not be allowed to serve in direct
combat. He suggested that they attempt to counter this narrative by putting black soldiers in
combat theaters immediately, even if it meant sending piecemeal units. McCloy asked Davis for
a recommendation on which unit was ready for such a task. He also asked for a report on the
status of the first all-black division, the 93rd Division. Although Davis replied within a week, his
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recommendation was tabled and placed in a pending file for the Secretary of War to review.
Disappointed, Davis patiently waited for Marshall’s review.
The issue of deploying black troops into combat theaters had resurfaced as a particularly
sore topic within the black community in April 1943. Based on what African Americans had
seen in World War I, they had good reason to be skeptical. Davis reiterated his position and
pressed the committee to allow black units to be deployed into combat as soon as feasible. The
committee put off any further debate on this matter and waited until this recommendation was
submitted to the War Department later that year. As Davis had surmised, racial incidents
continued, even increasing in number and severity in 1943. Black soldiers languished on their
bases as they awaited deployment orders or assignments to permanent stateside assignments.
Most of the black leaders, political and military, as well as the lay veterans from World War I,
believed that stateside duty equated to nothing more than labor in service units. They had no
faith in the notion that this war would be different from the last.
Colonel Joseph Leonard, secretary of the Advisory Committee, carefully captured
observations from each committee member and compiled a synopsis that highlighted actionable
issues that they deemed as crucial to bettering race relations throughout the military. In a
compiled report, he included the most egregious issues that black soldiers had raised, including,
discrimination in transportation, conflicts with local police, use of racial epithets by white
superiors, continued racial segregation in recreational facilities on post, and slow promotions of
black officers. Leonard sent this compilation to each member and asked for solutions to address
these problems “as far as possible.” 31 Once a consensus opinion had been reached by the
committee, Davis was selected to draft an observations and findings letter on behalf of the
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committee, fine tuning the key insights from each member. This would then be sent to George
C. Marshall with recommendations on how to best address each point raised by the committee.
Davis was given a subcommittee to aid him in the preparation of this recommendation letter.
Truman Gibson offered Davis his observations. Gibson noted that black soldiers had
become dissatisfied with the military because most felt that despite their best efforts, they were
still overlooked, and were not accepted within military organizations on equal par as whites and
other ethnic minorities. Gibson suggested that an all-out effort should be made to treat the black
soldier as an equal, and to protect them as long as they were in uniform. 32 This, he believed,
would be reciprocated by faithful and unquestioning service rendered by black soldiers.
Colonel Leonard had contrasting opinions from Davis or Gibson. He noted that there
should be “no discrimination in favor of negro troops in the way of compromising disciplinary
standards.” He also stressed that although blacks were scientifically shown by testing to be “of
lower average intelligence” than whites, they could still be made into good soldiers. 33 He
suggested that black junior officers eventually be allowed to replace white officers, but that black
units and soldiers remain under white officer leadership until this transition took place. The
overall tenor of the committee’s findings made race relations appear to be better than the black
public perceived it to be.
The McCloy Committee report offered to General Marshall was dominated by Colonel
Leonard’s language and views. The letter sent to Marshall appropriately noted that
dissatisfaction was widespread, and a serious problem existed between the races within the
military. But it then shifted in tone, offering conciliatory language that deflected from the basic
issues associated with open segregation and discrimination condoned by senior leaders.
32
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The language used in the report bordered on being dismissive. It noted that contributing
causes to unrest “real or fancified” were incidents of discrimination and segregation. Blame was
directed at local commanders. The report ascribed most racial conflict to “the failure on the part
of commanders in lower echelons to appreciate the seriousness of the problems and their inherent
responsibilities.” 34 The letter then stated that while discrimination should not be permitted
against blacks, there should be no preference given to blacks. Discipline was paramount to all
other concerns. The committee recommended that the seriousness of the situation be
communicated to commanders at all levels, and that all soldiers should understand that all people
were to be treated equally. The report also suggested that equal facilities should be made
available to the servicemen and women. It specifically highlighted the suggestion that supreme
efforts be made to reduce friction with civilians.
Marshall accepted the report and issued a directive on July 14, 1943, highlighting the
findings and suggestions to each key component commander in the Army Air Forces, Army
Ground Forces, and Army Services Forces. 35 In essence, he only made them aware of the fact
that a formal study had determined that racial discrimination was a problem within the services.
He ignored the committee’s specific suggestions on how units and commanders could best
address race problems and thus prevent further altercations between blacks and whites in
uniform. The military’s response was a general acknowledgement that racial discrimination
existed, but in regards as how to lessen or eliminate it, there was no further plan offered.
The McCloy Committee spent the remainder of the year continuing to push for direct
actions to protect black soldiers. It drafted a proposal making attacks against blacks in uniform a
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federal crime. This recommendation stalled in a Judiciary Committee after failing to gain
traction within the military or Congress. Davis pushed for an informational pamphlet concerning
the attitudes of black soldiers, which was published as “Command of Negro Troops.” Davis was
also instrumental in getting the War Department to assign the all-black 99th Fighter Squadron to
combat duty in the Mediterranean Theater. His son, now Colonel Benjamin O. Davis Jr., also
played a role in convincing a congressional committee to allow these men an opportunity to
prove their efficiency in combat as airmen.
Davis delivered a scathing critique of his own committee members to Senator McCloy.
The Army had bungled addressing any real race issues to this point. He noted, “I believe the
problem is large enough and serious enough to warrant the establishment of a bureau with
General Staff representation to devote full time to study the conditions surrounding the colored
soldier.” 36 Davis had grown frustrated with the window dressing that had been covering the
dominant and continued race problem within the military. He wrote to McCloy that he believed
“that it was utterly impossible for any white man to appreciate what the colored officers and
soldiers experienced in trying to develop a high morale under present conditions.” 37 This
prompted McCloy to re-evaluate Davis’s proposals and task Colonel Leonard with resetting the
committee’s agenda at their next meeting scheduled in early 1944.
In mid-1943 Davis was also assigned several additional duties aside from the Advisory
Committee by the Army. He served as a military aide to both the outgoing president Edward
Barclay and President-elect William V.S. Tubman of Liberia during a state visit by both officials
to America in June 1943.
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Davis escorted presidents Barclay and Tubman to several functions held on their behalf
in Washington, including state dinners presented by the White House. During one of the state
dinners Davis met and mingled with President Roosevelt. He then accompanied the Liberian
VIPs as they toured Wilberforce University in Ohio; Buffalo, New York; and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Davis so impressed his entourage that he was awarded a Liberian title of honor,
“Commander of the Order of the Star of Africa. 38
Davis was also tasked that summer as an Army liaison to the black press. Many senior
military officials believed that much of the racial unrest in the military stemmed from poor
relations with the black press. The Bureau of Public Relations sought to correct this negative
relationship by assigning Davis to escort, communicate, and clear up any misconceptions about
military actions taken with black soldiers. Davis invited several black newspapers to escort him
as he observed field maneuvers of the 93rd Division as it trained at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Several
key publications such as the New York Amsterdam Star News, the Washington Afro American,
Chicago Defender, and Crisis magazine covered the training in positive tones, highlighting
Davis as a key figure for the military and black community. The Washington Afro American
headlined its May 15, 1943 edition with “General Davis Lauds Efficiency.” 39 Military leaders
were very pleased with Davis’s ease and reputation among the black press.
Davis resumed his efforts to influence the Advisory Committee to confront racial
discrimination more directly. He questioned Senator McCloy and other committee members
about segregation on military bases. Why had the federal government allowed southern states to
dictate their Jim Crow policies upon federal installations as bases were built in the south? Could
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the War Department protect black soldiers against white southern law-enforcement agencies that
openly boasted about shooting Negroes?
He stated, “It is impossible, to cultivate in the colored soldier cheerful, willing obedience,
and a desire to make, if necessary the supreme sacrifice for a cause that does not guarantee to
him the same privileges accorded to other men wearing the uniform issued to him.” 40 Lastly,
Davis made comments to McCloy about the issue of segregating blood plasma. Davis told
McCloy that “this was most offensive and insulting to the colored people.” 41
Along with Davis, representatives from twenty-five civil rights groups met and proposed
key demands for change within the Army. These proposals were presented to Roosevelt and
competing presidential candidates in 1944. 42 This group sought: full integration (this was later
adjusted to a call to integrate only volunteer units); abolition of racial quotas; abolition of
segregation in recreational and other Army facilities; abolition of blood plasma segregation;
development of educational programs in race relations in the Army; greater black participation in
combat forces; and the progressive removal of black troops from areas where they were subject
to harsh racism, abuse, and violence from local whites. 43 Although Davis did not agree with or
fight for each of these issues, he continued his general messaging to end segregation of forces in
training, of blood plasma, and the push for education between the races about the other.
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McCloy and white members of the Advisory Committee were shaken by Davis’s harsh
observation and critiques. Each of his points was discussed and debated in committee meetings
in early 1944. During Davis’s two-year tenure with the committee, Davis had evolved from a
dutiful obedient martinet, who enjoyed the privileges associated with being in a rare minority
class as a black active duty officer, to become an outspoken advocate for blacks in the military.
It had taken time, seniority, and the vantage point of national power to affect this transition. He
had advocated for more fair treatment of blacks, ending segregation on military bases, ending
segregation of blood plasma, and allowing black soldiers and units to serve in combat. Yet, by
the time he left in 1944 for duty in Europe, the only policy measure that the military acted upon
was allowing more blacks into combat.
Eventually two black infantry divisions as well as a number of separate tank, tank
destroyer, and artillery battalions and combat support units saw action. At the same time the
highly publicized "Tuskegee Airmen," and other black air units were trained and deployed in the
war against the Germans. Most black soldiers, however, continued to be employed in service
units around the world, performing important duties but ones that tended to reinforce old
stereotypes about blacks as soldiers. The 99th Pursuit Squadron or Tuskegee Airmen was
deployed to the Mediterranean Theater and served in Italy in May 1943. It was reorganized and
redesignated as the 332nd Fighter Pursuit Squadron and would be redeployed to the
Mediterranean in 1944. It would finish the war stationed in France as an essential fighter unit
that protected bombers in the final air campaigns over Germany. The 93rd Division was
deployed to the Pacific Theater in January 1944, and served in New Guinea, the Northern
Solomon Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago. The 92nd Infantry Division was deployed to
Italy in September 1944.
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The 2nd Cavalry Division was deployed to the Mediterranean Theater in March 1944 but
was almost immediately disbanded having its soldiers sent to support units in Europe, Italy, and
North Africa by May 1944. 44
Before Davis entered the European Theater of Operations, he was assigned one final
public relations duty. In November 1943, he was recruited to promote an educational film about
black soldiers, titled “The Negro Soldier.” The original film had been made in 1942 by Marc
Connelly, a white writer, and Carlton Moss, an up-and-coming black author. The film was
narrated by a black minister to an audience of black worshippers, representing lower to middle
class blacks who believed in the American Dream. Davis viewed the film in late 1943 and
suggested edits that more accurately portrayed the military as he knew it. The film had
inaccurately depicted black officers commanding black soldiers. It also gave the viewer the
impression that most black soldiers who had served in the first world war had served in combat.
Davis convinced the producers to modify the film by removing the scenes where black officers
commanded black soldiers and replaced them with black dock-workers from World War I. The
film was released in February 1944 as an orientation film for all incoming white troops. In April
1944 it was released to general audiences throughout the nation. Davis went on a promotional
tour with the film as it was sent to Hollywood. With much fanfare and deliberation at its premier
in Hollywood, Davis opened the film with a short introduction. Davis told audiences that the
film accurately portrayed the history and legacy of blacks in the military and finished each public
presentation with a patriotic but sober message of the Negro’s desire for inclusion within
America’s enterprise of liberty and freedom.
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He noted, “all we ask of you is security—freedom from fear; no more, no less than you
have guaranteed to us, and that in the enjoyment of being citizens of this great country.” 45
While in Hollywood, Davis enjoyed fanfare and celebrity status with the likes of Lena
Horne and Hattie McDaniel. Due to the length of the 44-minute film, only a small number of
theaters decided to show it following its grand opening. 46 This prompted Truman Gibson and
Carl Moss to edit it down to 40, 42, 46-minute versions. 47 This greatly improved theaters’
acceptance and viewership. It was shown extensively on the west coast and in the northeast.
Over 300 theaters in New York showed the shortened version of the film. Davis went back to
California to promote the popular documentary.
It was so successful that a sequel was ordered by the War Department. Famed movie
director Frank Capra was recruited and tasked with directing the new film. Writers Carl Moss
and Marc Connelly were kept on as writers and directed to focus the sequel on black soldiers
overseas in combat and support roles contributing to the war effort. Moss agreed but insisted
that Davis accompany him to maintain his crucial presence and role in the film. Senator John
McCloy also suggested sending Davis to maintain his affiliation with the film. McCloy feared
that the black community might draw the wrong impression about Davis if he was linked directly
to the film.
He offered, “I think it would be advisable if General Davis be sent over concurrently with
the director and writer team, but that his official mission be stated as one of routine inspection of
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Negro units in the theater.” 48 As a result of this artistic prodding, in July 1944, Davis was again
ordered to Europe on ninety-day temporary duty orders. Davis would not return to the states for
nearly two years as he embarked upon his journey once again to the war in Europe.

48
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Chapter 6: Integration in The European Theater of War (1944-1970)

In the final years of World War II Davis served in the European Theater of Operations.
German military forces had been pushed closer and closer to the homeland as Germany fought to
the bitter end. Overwhelming Soviet forces pressured Germany from the east as western Allied
forces landed in occupied France and proceeded to kill or capture most of the German forces that
stood in their way. Americans, various allies, and British Commonwealth forces seized every
major city in France by the end of 1944 and entered Belgium and parts of Germany. Germany’s
defeat was inevitable. At home in America, the American public looked optimistically to the
European war’s end. Japan, also strategically blunted and stopped in their ability to conduct the
offensive, also hung on fighting desperately. The last two years of the war in both theaters
would yield the highest casualty figures Americans would see for the entire war. The African
American community held on to its commitment to support the war while advocating for better
treatment in return for their loyalty.
As Davis traveled back to Europe it was kept quiet by the media. Military officials had
hopes of using his minor celebrity and fame in the black community to dramatize for maximum
effect his arrival in France. By 1944, most of the fighting was occurring there. Davis, along with
the director and film crew, were sent to England initially in July 1944. They spent
approximately two months in England before visiting black soldiers in Normandy, France.
The film crew captured numerous images of black soldiers in service support roles in rear
areas and even got close enough to the front lines to witness the processing of German prisoners
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of war. Davis excitedly wrote to Sadie, “I have seen some prisoners and wounded brought in, I
have been forward of our artillery positions and heard projectiles going over.” 1

Figure 4: African American soldiers in various training locations and Europe.

Following their work in France, the crew departed for the Mediterranean Theater. Davis
was photographed and filmed awarding several black airmen from the 332nd Fighter Pursuit
Squadron various awards. Within this group was his son, Benjamin Jr., who was awarded the
Distinguished Flying Cross.

1
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Figure 5: Davis awarding his son and other Tuskegee Airmen with various awards

This ceremonial patriotic event was captured by both black and mainstream media.
Davis commented to reporters that it was his “happy privilege and good luck to be here for this
grand occasion.” 2 Davis had fought doggedly to allow the black flyers combat roles following
their training at Tuskegee. He felt vindicated about his tough stance with the McCloy Advisory
Committee as these men excelled in combat as fighter pilots. 3 In a letter to Sadie, he gloated on
this point, merrily noting, “as Pa used to say, ‘nothing succeeds like success.’” 4
Davis’s efforts to promote equal opportunities for black airmen opened the door for his
son to excel as a combat aviator. Benjamin Jr.’s service and leadership during the war earned
him notoriety and fame. As commander of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and 332nd Fighter Group,
Davis’s airmen shot down 111 enemy planes and destroyed or damaged 273 on the ground.
It was also during his tenure of command over the 332nd Fighter Group in which they
boasted that an American bomber was never shot down while they flew escort to them. Yet,
Davis Jr. found himself having to defend the fighting record of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and
therefore by proxy, the entire experiment of allowing blacks to be pilots. This was necessitated

Press Release, Aug. 10, 1944, file 291.2-1 negroes, Public Relations Bureau, SHAEF records; Evening Star, Aug.
10, 1944.
3
Davis Letter to Sadie, April 8, 1945; Davis Letter to Sadie, September 11, 1944. Davis Archives. Diary entries,
Aug. 30, and September 18, 1944, Davis Archives.
4
Ibid.
2

233

following a report from their group commander Colonel William W. Momyer alleging that the
99th Squadron was ineffective in combat because "(in) my opinion... they have failed to display
the aggressiveness and desire for combat that are necessary to a first-class fighting
organization.” 5
Todd Moye in his study of the Tuskegee Airmen, Freedom Flyers, argues that the 99th
was set up to fail. He points out that Momyer assigned the fighter group duty over Sicily, after
hostile Italian and German forces had been cleared. White squadrons were given patrol duty over
Italy, which was still heavily defended by German forces. This resulted in a lop-sided combat
record that heavily favored white squadrons. Truman Gibson helped to arrange a press briefing
with Benjamin Jr. on September 10, 1944. 6 Davis vigorously defended the record and men of
the 99th to the press. In his testimony he emphasized the tremendous pressure and “duty” he and
his men felt to insure that the “experiment” of black flyers be successful. 7 This briefing was
followed with subsequent testimony to the McCloy Committee on October 16, 1944.
Davis expressed to the committee that he had blindsided about the whole matter of his
squadron’s “poor” performance record while in theater. He offered that he was unaware of the
inadequacy of his squadron until he received the report from higher command recommending
removing the unit from combat. Following his testimony and a more objective inquiry into the
combat record of the squadron, the matter was later dropped. A formal inquiry held that the
99th's performance was comparable to those of other air units in the Mediterranean theater. 8
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Benjamin Davis Jr. had also earned individual distinction as a leader of numerous combat
missions. He received the Silver Star for a strafing run into Austria and the Distinguished Flying
Cross for a bomber-escort mission to Munich. His leadership of America's black combat
aviators of World War II helped speed the integration of the Air Force, through their exemplary
performance and example. The Tuskegee Airmen’s fighting record was used as an example of
successful combat performance by black servicemen as the Fahy Committee studied reasons to
maintain integration following the war.
Like his father in establishing precedence, Benjamin Davis Jr. was promoted as the first
African American general officer in the Air Force in 1954. Benjamin Davis Jr.’s acclaim as an
American hero and trail-blazer continued to grow even after he retired from the Air Force in
1970. This was evident through his post-retirement promotion to the rank of a four-star general
by President William Clinton in 1998. This occurred twenty-eight years
after he left active duty and indicates the historical legacy he had acquired through his service in
the Air Force, but especially through his leadership of the Tuskegee Airmen. In contrast, Davis
Sr. reached the public eye only with occasional stories about his life in retirement.
Davis and Gibson were escorted to several historic cities and sites while filming black
soldiers there. They visited Rome, Naples, and Pompeii. Carlton Moss later described Davis as
an accommodationist with no underlying hatred for whites. But, he also noted that “Davis
carried a hurt that comes with the accommodationist idea, where he was doing everything right,
but was still not rewarded.” 9 Moss also noted that people came to him and asked him to get
Davis to do things, implying that he was an Uncle Tom. 10 Moss responded that he did not try to
put Davis on the spot, but provided situations where he could express opinions, positively. Moss
9
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also spoke about Davis’s appearance. He noted that Davis was almost an “ishi,” meaning in
expression of that period, “is he white or is he colored.” Moss observed, “he had light skin and
naturally straight hair, but that he did not stand out because of his color, but because of his
‘ramrod’ appearance. He looked like the commandant.” 11
Following the work in Italy, Davis was released from his film duties and allowed to
return to his role as an IG officer. LTG Lee convinced General Eisenhower to allow Davis to
remain in Europe to perform this function. He was placed on LTG Lee’s staff as a special staff
or compliance officer who would inspect units to ensure that all soldiers were treated equally.
Davis was perfectly content to remain in the European Theater of Operations. He was quite glad
that LTG Lee saw him as a valuable asset in maintaining discipline within his mostly black
command. He had written to Sadie that, “your ole man seems to be desired by some others
besides you.” 12
Racial friction had continued to simmer and occasionally erupt as the Americans entered
their third year in the war. Davis visited, lectured, and investigated racial complaints in England
and France as the war intensified in the fall and winter of 1944. He visited black Red Cross
workers in Bristol, England, after concluding that little had been done to allow black workers
equal access following his 1942 visit. In a speech before the black workers, he denounced the
emphasis on color and encouraged the British people to stand firm in their treatment of Negro
troops and workers. He argued that blacks should be treated in accordance with the ideals of
democracy and freedom. Davis also re-emphasized that certain language used to describe blacks
such as “negro” offended most of them. He suggested that the term “colored” was a more
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respectful use of language towards blacks in general. 13 This reflected his world view of race
imprinted on him through parents who had enjoyed some of the most positive aspects of
American culture. Both Louis and Henrietta Davis experienced career opportunities that had not
been commonly offered to most blacks of their era. Education, good incomes, and the
opportunity for advancement in employment, especially for Louis, shaped a more positive vision
of what American society could offer to African Americans.
Although LTG Lee was happy to have Davis serving on his staff to respond as a racial
front man, Davis served more or less at this point as a black figurehead. Eisenhower and major
unit commanders ignored Davis’s work of addressing racial issues within the service units
because they were pre-occupied with fighting the war.
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Davis and his son were popularized in fictitious style as a “real-life” comic book heroes
battling the enemy and serving their nation together as a father-son joint patriot team. 14

Figure 6: Davis and son highlighted in government published comic book.

The themes of service, sacrifice, and duty to the nation were meant to inspire other blacks
to follow the stellar example shown by both men. The fictionalized depiction of the Davises
highlighted their commitment to serve within the military and their nation despite flaws within
American culture. The book illustrated various key points in each officer’s life and career where
race and the military intersected. Their choices of devotion to the service and nation against
odds imposed by racism sold a positive message that overshadowed the harsh discrimination that
each officer had faced during their tenure in the Army.
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Davis’s most significant effort to desegregate the military occurred following the German
Ardennes Offensive that began in December 1944. This final German Offensive set the stage for
crisis that would force the US Army to reconsider segregation. In December 1944, Adolf Hitler
attempted to split the Allied armies in northwest Europe using armored and mechanized infantry
forces that would thrust through the Ardennes to Antwerp. Allied leaders miscalculated and
underestimated German forces and their capability at this stage in the war, leaving the Ardennes
sector lightly defended by only two inexperienced and two battered American divisions. On
December 16, 1944, three German armies (more than a quarter-million troops) launched a deadly
attack that largely struck American forces in the Ardennes. During the months of this
engagement, Americans experienced some of the heaviest casualties in the war. Entire divisions
such as the inexperienced U.S. 106th Division was nearly annihilated. American losses for the
month of December alone was 77,700 killed, wounded, or captured, and 56,700 nonbattle
casualties. 15 American units initially caught off guard fought desperately to stem the German
advance at St.-Vith, Elsenborn Ridge, Houffalize and Bastogne. As the Germans drove deeper
into the Ardennes to secure their objectives, the vital bridgeheads, the Allied line took on the
appearance of a large bulge, giving rise to the common name for this battle, the Battle of the
Bulge. Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke’s brilliant defense of St.-Vith combined with
Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s counterattack with Third Army, helped stall the German
offensive.
Patton performed a remarkable tactical feat of turning the Third Army ninety degrees
from Lorraine to relieve the besieged town of Bastogne. The 101st Airborne Division’s stubborn
defense of Bastogne, in anticipation of relief from 3rd Army, also played a major role in stopping
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the German momentum. A crucial German shortage of fuel was a final factor in the failure of this
offensive.
LTG Lee had shared a conceptual proposal with Davis about allowing black service
support soldiers to volunteer for combat to help fill combat replacement shortages. 16 Lee’s
selling point for this dramatic change in policy was that such replacements would be able to get
to the front lines much quicker because they were already in Europe. Davis immediately bought
into this proposal and developed a plan in which he sought to use qualified black individual
replacements that could be plugged into white combat units. These soldiers were to be given
basic combat training and shipped immediately to the front from either England or supply depots
in France. Davis referred to this plan in a letter to Sadie. He could not reveal the details but
offered the general idea to her as he referred to it, “I secured a decision from the High Command
which I think it is the greatest since the enactment of the Constitutional amendments following
emancipation.” 17
Lee allowed Davis to present this proposal to the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in late December 1944. Lee wanted a black advocate to present
the proposal. SHAEF’s or General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, MG Walter Bedell Smith, balked
at the idea and immediately tried to convince LTG Lee to withdraw this plan. Lee refused, and
the plan was forwarded to General Eisenhower for review and approval. Eisenhower saw the
usefulness of having a ready supply of manpower that could be converted into combat soldiers as
opposed to waiting for replacements from the states. In the worst periods of combat during the
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Ardennes Offensive of 1944 and 1945, all soldiers in combat zones, from cooks to clerks, had
been forced to fight as infantryman, so this conversion was not so far-fetched. 18 He reconfigured
the plan to use black replacements grouped together into thirty plus man platoons that would be
incorporated into white companies. The call was limited to privates who had some infantry
training and placed in at least the upper four categories of the Army General Classification
Test. 19 Noncommissioned Officers who wished to apply would have to accept a reduction in
rank. Although this was a slight adjustment from Lee and Davis’s plan, Davis was elated that
Eisenhower had bought into the idea of mixing companies and battalions. He believed that this
would be the first substantial step in integrating the Army. Two thousand two hundred and
twenty-one black soldiers volunteered for combat duty in December 1944. 20
Davis closely followed the training of these black volunteers and visited with many of
them. He spoke to groups of them telling them that the high command was very interested in their
progress and performance. 21 He noted, “I urged the colored soldiers to make friends with the white
soldiers and I have reminded the southern white that he has a responsibility to make the colored
man a good comrade to repay him for the devotion of their ancestors to his ancestors.” 22 Davis
even raised past dark themes held by whites about blacks left unrestrained, such as rape of
vulnerable white women as white men abandoned them during the Civil War. Davis remarked, “I
remind them of the period when their ancestors left their women folks and children in the care of
the ancestors and there is no record, or have I ever heard that any of these women being violated.” 23
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He continued to monitor the black replacements as much as possible during the crucial
months of combat during the Battle of the Bulge. By April 1945 the German offensive had been
defeated. Germany’s war machine under Adolf Hitler was in total collapse due to constant
military pressure by Russians in the east and Allied forces from the west. With the war nearly
over, Davis believed that the integration experiment was working and should be allowed to
continue beyond hostilities. More than 2,000 black soldiers remained with the white combat
units through the end of the war. He followed their progress in letters to Sadie, telling her, “I
seem to see more mixed groups of soldiers on the streets nowadays. I think we are making
progress in the right direction.” 24
Davis had been very pleased with reports about the black replacements’ performance in
combat. He reported to Senator McCloy about such positive findings near the end of March 1945:
“reports to date about the conduct of these units in battle have been encouraging.” 25
Concerned over the potential for racial strife with the transfers, Eisenhower created a new
section to deal specifically with race problems in theater. As a result of this action Davis was
removed from the IG section and placed over a new agency known as the Colored Troops Affairs
Division. Davis’s immediate superior was now Major General Charles Bonesteel. This section
only dealt with complaints concerning the morale of individual soldiers. Violent crimes and
more serious racial offenses were left to the IG. A chief complaint among black soldiers that had
been integrated into white combat units was that black non-commissioned officers who
transferred often had to sacrifice rank to transfer. These soldiers were concerned about losing
their seniority and pay, as it was unclear if the transfer would be permanent. Yet most were
grateful that they had been given the opportunity to serve in combat.
24
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There had also been rare cases of black soldiers being accused of raping white European
women. 26 True or not, Davis was completely intolerant of such behavior because he feared that
any act or accusation, no matter how small, would smear his efforts thus far at integration.
He also worried that such abhorrent behavior by a few blacks would fit perfectly
into racist tropes about black men as lust-crazed animals when exposed to white women. Many
whites still held to racial stereotyping from the previous century that presented blacks as simplistic
brutes that could perform limited tasks, but only under strong white supervision. Davis launched
a campaign against rape using pamphlets and through personal talks with black troops. He targeted
black soldiers only. In his talks he espoused the responsibilities that black servicemen faced while
deployed overseas, hoping to instill within them a commitment to uphold the good name of the
Army and more importantly, their race. 27
In spite of a few minor roadblocks and negative incidents, Davis felt that the replacement
program was a qualified success and had moved the nation towards a more equal footing for all
blacks. Davis was rewarded for his work with a very positive evaluation and another award.
Bonesteel noted his sacrifice for the War Department and nation in his evaluation narrative.
Although he did not rate him as a superlative officer, his rating and language cast him as a good
officer, worthy of potential for promotion. 28 Davis was honored in early 1945 with the
Distinguished Service Cross. This high-level award is usually associated with general officers or
senior non-commissioned officers for lengthy service and accomplishment. His inscribed
citation stated the award was “for exceptionally meritorious service to the Government from
June 1941 to November 1945.” 29
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This was a cursory acknowledgement of Davis’s overall contribution to the war effort in
regard to race relations. Davis was more interested in a second star than an award. 30 He was also
awarded the French Croix de Guerre with Palms by the French government for his exceptional
work regarding race relations during the war. 31 Davis hoped that this high-level recognition for
his achievements would result in a promotion. 32 Advancement to the grade of Major General
would have helped to ease his controversial selection to general officer. He strongly desired this
honor before retirement. Davis also hoped that he would be allowed to continue to help shape
national policy in future decisions about black soldiers. He shared these thoughts with Truman
Gibson, hoping that he could help sway officials towards such an appointment. 33
But the war was ending, Davis’s Colored Troops Affairs section was disbanded, and
Davis was ordered back to the United States. There was a brief hope that he might be sent to the
Pacific theater, but this was dashed quickly when the war ended there in August 1945. Davis
briefly returned to Europe and was transferred back to LTG Lee’s command. Davis hoped this
would lead to an opportunity for promotion because he felt that Lee understood him better and
was more sympathetic in general towards blacks. This positive relationship, he hoped, made him
appear to be a more valuable asset than Bonesteel realized. Davis believed that he could help to
avoid a repeat of the racial tension the nation had experienced in 1919. This was a huge task,
given the massive demobilization of military personnel from all branches of service.
By 1947 the Army had 59,795 black soldiers stationed overseas. This was 10.77 percent
of the total number of overseas troops, divided principally between the two major overseas
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commands. By 1 March 1948, following a general reduction of forces, black strength overseas
was reduced to 23,387 men, but black percentages in Europe and the Far East remained
practically unchanged. 34
Davis, in alliance with Truman Gibson, recommended that the Army continue its policy
of integration. Davis’s patient and enduring relationship with the military had effected change
during the war years. Now the question that remained to be seen was if this would last.
The Army held a hearing on this proposal on 1 October 1945. 35 Witnesses called to
testify before this committee included Davis, his son, (now Colonel Benjamin Davis Jr.), Truman
Gibson, and numerous other military leaders and civilians involved in decisions affecting race
policy within the armed services. Davis testified before the committee, offering several
observations based upon his first-hand experience during the war. He concluded with an
underlying theme that he had expressed since he was allowed to voice his opinion. He noted,
“segregation fosters intolerance, suspicion, and friction.” 36 Despite the testimonies of these key
figures who had dealt with racial strife throughout the war, the committee concluded that full
integration was impracticable at that time. 37
It was necessary, the board declared, to avoid past experience in which black soldiers
both individually and collectively, were squandered in larger units such as the 92nd and 93rd
Divisions during World War II. Board members offered that advance planning was needed to
develop a broader base of trained men among black troops to provide cadres and leaders to meet
national emergencies more efficiently. Morris Macgregor in his comprehensive study on
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integration offered that the Army was expected to adopt a racial policy that provided for the
progressive and flexible use of black manpower ''within proportions corresponding to those in
the civilian population." 38 Army leaders were also encouraged to take advantage of the advances
blacks had made in education, industry, and government service since the World War II period.
Most of the language in the board’s recommendations was too vague. There was no timeline
given as to when policies or programs of integration were to occur. The findings of the
committee were issued to the public in 1946. This assessment, known as the Gillem Report,
concluded that the Army’s goal should be to eliminate, as quickly as possible, any special
consideration based on race.” 39 Despite this seemingly positive verbiage, there was nothing
mentioned about how or when this would happen.
Davis briefly went to Europe before returning to Washington in November 1945. With
the war in both theaters over, the need for Davis waned. As 1946 approached, he remained on
active duty in Washington D.C., but he knew his days in active service were numbered. His
brief acclaim as an important voice in military policy faded. Yet, Benjamin Jr.’s star rose.
Davis continued to serve in the Inspector General’s office. No longer fettered by career
goals, he spoke out publicly about ending segregation within the military. He spoke about this at
the national convention of the Frontiers Club in 1946, and again in 1947, at the convention of the
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America. 40 Despite his open critique, the War Department
largely ignored Davis and other black voices that encouraged integration of the military. He
fulfilled duties as a representative ambassador to Liberia during its centennial celebration, but
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this was nothing more than symbolic. He refused consideration for a permanent ambassador post
due to the failing health of his mother, Henrietta. 41 Davis officially retired on July 13, 1948, on
the fiftieth anniversary of his service in the Army. 42 President Harry Truman presented Davis
with a scroll signed by himself, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and Chief of Staff
Omar Bradley. 43 Davis received congratulatory praise and acknowledgements from key figures
within the War Department, including George C. Marshall, Omar Bradley, his former supervisor
LTG Lee, most of the black press, and many other public figures that were interested in him.
Six days after Davis retired, Truman issued Executive Order 9981 initiating the
desegregation of the armed forces. Davis played no role in the issuance of this order, but his
work during the war set the stage for this massive step forward in the armed forces. Although
this order did not immediately desegregate American military forces, it set the path for complete
integration within a decade. The order was issued without fanfare.
The wording used in the order was so vague that it confused both those for and against
integration of the armed forces. A Washington Post reporter wrote “Truman did not call
specifically for an end to segregation among American troops. It clearly authorized the
committee to make recommendations for the ending of such segregation.” 44 The order was so
confusing that even a member of government expressed to the New York Times that as he read it,
“integration was not the order’s aim. 45 A.P. Randolph and much of the black press decried the
order as “business as usual” in a segregated military force. The new Chief of Staff of the Army,
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General Omar Bradley, even spoke against the order, stating that, “the Army should follow the
American people on rejecting segregation, not lead it.” 46 He also stated emphatically that “the
Army will put men of different races in different companies. It will change that policy when the
nation as a whole changes it.” 47 Following criticism from Truman, he later retracted and
apologized for his statement. All three branches of service dragged their feet in enforcing the
order.
Truman attempted to clarify the intent and execution of the order by creating a
committee, the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, whose sole purpose was to expedite integration. The committee was led by
the former solicitor general Paul Fahy. It also included the editor of the Chicago Defender, John
Sengstacke, and National Urban League executive secretary Lester Granger. The Fahy committee
held further hearings and forced each branch of service to closely study the impact of limited
integration. In general, the Air Force and Navy complied with a two-year study and concluded
that integration did not negatively impact morale or readiness. The Army continued to lag behind,
with testimony from Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall and General Omar Bradley
justifying their recalcitrance. Royall repeated an old defense used by Army officials for decades,
noting, “the Army was not an instrument for social evolution.” He also revived age-old stereotypes
that cast blacks in the worst possible light, noting, “black soldiers had proven ill-suited for combat
and were in fact ‘peculiarly qualified’ for manual labor.” 48 Bradley argued a more subtle
justification, offering that, “if we try to force integration on the Army before the country is ready
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to accept these customs, we may have difficulty attaining high morale along the lines I have
mentioned.” 49
Reality within the Army contradicted both men. Thousands of Army positions were left
vacant because white soldiers had either not been trained to fill them or were in such limited
numbers that unfilled spaces in white units became the norm. Meanwhile, within black units,
scores of potentially qualified black soldiers were confined to labor and service battalions. 50 This
glaring disparity prompted Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to issue a directive on April 6,
1949, instructing all services to accept and assign personnel only “on the basis of individual
merit and ability.” Johnson’s directive left no room for interpretation; it necessitated integration.
The Fahy Committee issued a similar recommendation in its
report to Congress and President Truman in May 1950. 51 There were four key recommendations
included within the final report:
A. Open all Army jobs to qualified personnel without regard to race or color.
B. Open all Army Schools without regard to race or color.
C. Rescind restrictions on assignments of black troops.
D. Abolish the racial quota.
As a result of the clarification of Truman’s order to desegregate, the Army quietly
desegregated its entire force. In southern states where Jim Crow laws and customs remained a
way of life for African Americans, the Army integrated not only combat units, but the its entire
force in general. On base schools, restaurants, and recreational facilities were quietly opened to
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black service members and dependents. Rawn James notes that military bases and posts became
beacons of peaceful integration. 52 The Air Force and Navy followed suit and demonstrated to
America that they too were in step with progress in the nations’ military.
Davis was surprisingly quiet and disengaged from the process. He spent much of the
1950s involved with the American Battle Monuments Commission (AMBC). He kept himself
quite active, making trips around the country and to Europe commemorating veterans and
dedicating sites to honor the memory of fallen servicemen from World War II. He was
instrumental in the construction and dedication of six cemeteries throughout Europe. He and
members of the committee visited Cambridge, England; Normandy, Brittany, Epinal, and the
Rhone Valley in France; and the Sicily-Rome Memorial. 53
As key civil rights events such as the Brown v. Board ruling, the Montgomery Bus
Boycott, and the Emmett Till murder trial unfolded in the mid-1950s, Davis remained out of the
public eye. In 1961, Davis, at 84, was respectfully asked by staff from the Kennedy
administration to resign from the AMBC. 54 While no explanation was offered, Davis’s age would
have weighed heavily in such a request. Davis complied quietly without disturbance. This marked
the end of any further public service activity for Davis. He did not participate or publicly comment
on any of the emerging civil rights events that developed in the 1950s and early 1960s. The 1950s
also witnessed the quiet and distinctive integration of all branches of the military services.
Although all three branches of service balked and dragged their feet about the recommendations
from the Fahy Committee, they eventually complied and quietly integrated as a result of the Korean
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War. Bernard Nalty notes, reforms did not occur through the logic presented by the Fahy
Committee, but through the practical need for manpower as a result of the new war in Asia. 55
Local commanders faced an impractical dilemma as they attempted to train and prepare
thousands of new recruits for combat in a segregated force. The commanding officer at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, lacking the resources and facilities to separate and train black and white
inductees, was the first to order integration. Other local commanders followed suit. This occurred
without incident. By 1953 when the Korean War ended, Assistant Secretary of Defense John
Hannah announced that 95 percent of African-American soldiers were serving in integrated units.
The remaining 5 percent were integrated within six months. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps followed suit and integrated by the mid-1950s.
By the 1960s both Davis’s and Sadie’s health deteriorated to the point where he could no
longer drive or take walks in his neighborhood in Washington D.C. In 1966 Sadie died after
suffering a second heart attack. 56 Davis had been married to his second wife for forty-seven
years. With the death of his close companion, Elnora convinced her father to sell the
Washington home and move to Chicago to live with her.
Elnora did her best to keep him active and healthy, but Davis succumbed to acute
leukemia in 1970. He died on Thanksgiving Day on November 26, 1970. 57 He was buried with
full military honors in Arlington Cemetery. 58 Most of his immediate family, a handful of senior
black officers, and the Secretary of Transportation, John Volpe, attended the funeral. Most
notable black newspapers covered his death with a synopsis about his life, distinction in the
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military, and the notoriety associated with being the first black general, as well as the father of
the more famous Benjamin Davis Jr.
Although the honors rendered to Davis for his funeral were commensurate for his station
as a military officer, his funeral was hardly noticed by the wider public. Once the remains of
Davis’s mentor, Charles Young, were brought to the United States, he had been honored with a
state funeral that was widely publicized and publicly attended by thousands. The relatively quiet
passing and small ceremony for Davis symbolized the private, complex space that Davis
occupied within the sphere of black consciousness. In most cases he was compelled to enter
public life as a reluctant figure attempting to navigate and deconstruct military and public
structures, merely because of his status as a black military officer.
In 1989 biographer Marvin Fletcher offered a vigorous defense of the life and legacy of
Benjamin Oliver Davis Sr, and deserves full credit for attempting such an enterprise. He studied
Davis for years, personally interviewing him, direct family members, and close friends and
associates. Fletcher offered a well-rounded evaluation of Davis’s life and legacy, as he noted
contrasting views about him that ranged from personal admiration by his son and daughter, to the
negative branding of him as an accommodationist by such contacts as Carlton Moss. Other
critiques of Davis labeled him as an individual opportunist who was merely passing time and
“enjoying the ride” of privilege associated with being an officer on active duty. There were
numerous editorials that were written about his life and impact as the first African American
general officer within the military. Several appropriately noted the noteworthy succession from
the lowest rank within the military, private, to the attainment of a one-star general officer.
Others fairly point out that Davis’s promotion did not spur advances among other black officers.
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In fact, it would be twenty-eight years before another black officer was selected for general
officer in the Army. 59
Fletcher correctly notes that many of Davis’s critics were outsiders looking into a closed
society that operated in its own way. Some of the everyday men who served with Davis during
his long tenure in the Armed Services offered mixed reviews. Major Arthur Hayes had written a
personal letter to Walter White reporting that while Davis had been in Europe, he had openly
denied his affiliation with blacks by stating, “I am neither your kind or color.” 60 Hondon
Hargrove, a Second Lieutenant, who had been commissioned from Wilberforce University in
1938, noted that Davis had been his instructor in military tactics. Hargrove went on to offer that
“it is interesting that at that time he was thought of with a great deal of respect because of his
high rank and dignified appearance. Maybe he should have stayed at Wilberforce.” 61 Sergeant
E.J. Wells, of the 365th Infantry Regiment, had met Davis while stationed at Fort Huachuca,
Arizona, as Davis visited to address racial problems. He was struck by how nicely Davis was
treated in public, as opposed to comments made by whites after he had left the base. One of the
white officers in his unit had remarked, “that nigger didn’t look so big even with that star on his
shoulder.” 62
Such verbal banter was openly made by white officers in front of black enlisted soldiers.
(In interviews conducted by Fletcher in the late 1960s Davis was mentioned only in secondary or
passing terms by most of the black officers and enlisted men who had served in the black
regiments). Subsequent black Generals Roscoe Robinson, Colin Powell, Julius Becton, did not
mention Davis Sr. in any of their biographies.
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Fletcher aptly noted the distinction of Davis as a black officer, referring to his status as a
“minority within a minority.” 63 The pressure of serving in an organization that was universally
white cannot be minimized. Fletcher argues that not only was Davis cut off from a black middle
class network that could have offered support and validation, but also isolated by the mere fact
that as an officer he could not socialize with fellow black soldiers because they were enlisted.
Benjamin Jr. also mentioned this distinction in the prologue to Fletcher’s biography of his father.
Davis Jr. highlighted how his father was set apart from most of the officers of his period because
he came from an urban middle-class background and that his motivation for entering the officer
corps was based upon his hopes for the future, as opposed to those who followed a heritage of
military service. 64 These differences made Davis a non-traditional officer aside from his race.
Fletcher argues that in spite of the rigid system of segregation and limited opportunity,
figures such as Davis, Charles Young, and John Green still inspired young black men through
their status and enduring service as officers. I differ slightly here with Fletcher. While the mere
presence of each officer on active duty stood out, I would argue that the individual commitment
that each officer demonstrated in service with their fellow black brothers in arms defined each
individual officer’s credibility to the thousands of black servicemen with whom they came into
contact. Charles Young stood out as a race advocate as well as a stellar example of military
success not only to his men, but to the black community as well. Davis was largely overlooked
in this regard because of his failure to identify with and protect his men from the white power
structure. He often chose to shield himself behind patriotic and military tropes sold by the
military over racial identity or specific demands for fairness or equality for his men. A fair
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defense of Davis against this point would be that he held a more macro view of how to help his
race and blacks within the military. While Young’s hands-on and more individualistic approach
of attacking racism was more popular, Davis’s methodology was more impactful.
Marvin Fletcher concluded that Davis was most effective within his military career as a
general officer during the war years. I concur with Fletcher’s analysis that Davis’s most
significant contribution to society and the military was when he served in his capacity as a senior
officer between 1941 and 1945. However, I maintain that his most impactful work came while
he served on the McCloy Advisory Committee.
His work within the Inspector General’s office between 1941 and 1945 was significant as
well, but as a member of the Advisory Committee Davis helped to shape policy for future
generations to come, as he strongly voiced his objections against segregation and advocated for
the fair treatment of black soldiers. As a military insider, his voice was heard and needed.
Davis, as a general officer, was in his element, while other key black voices of this era “William
Hastie, Walter White, Truman Gibson, and even A.P. Randolph” were largely ignored by the
War Department.
Fletcher argues that Davis helped to lay the foundation for the desegregation of military
forces, largely as an insider who bided his time, and “spoke when asked, or spoken to.” I differ
slightly here, because Davis helped to sell the template of successful integration within platoons
and companies of combat soldiers during the Battle of the Bulge and beyond. Although the
military reverted to its former practices of segregation and balked at continuing a successful
“experiment,” the model had been set.
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It was hard to refute the evidence of the successful merging of black soldiers into combat
units during a crucial battle in the war. Although General Bradley attempted to settle for
continuing segregation, ensuing conflict in the post-World War II era prohibited this practice.
Fletcher assigns Davis credit for consistency in his stance against segregation in the
military after the war had ended. However, by this point the War Department had written Davis
off as a retiree who was no longer needed. He had been silenced. White allies such as LTG Lee
and Senator McCloy had retired. Fletcher also positively notes his work honoring the war dead
while serving on the American Battle Monuments Commission and his last interactions as a
potential ambassador to Liberia.
This work was quite limited and largely ignored by most of American society in the
1950s. Fletcher in his final summation offers that Davis, even in isolated circles, did more than
serve in a military career of fifty years culminating with the rank of a flag officer. He argues that
he served his country, the black community, and improved the Army through his service.
This is a fair assessment. However, I offer that this sounds like an almost purposeful
optimistic evaluation. This narrative is similar to arguments about how black progress has
followed an ever-rising arc towards positive change. Yet, the Army and military still struggles
with the ghosts of its past practices. Black officers, particularly those in combat arms branches,
remain in small numbers and are rare. There have been several observations and studies about
this military dilemma since the mid-1990s. One of the first post-civil rights era assessments of
the military that countered the “ever upward” narrative was Remo Butler’s 1996 study that
attempted to identify causes and trends for consistently low percentages of black officers.
Butler’s study, Why Black Officers Fail, was controversial for its argument that past
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discriminatory biases against black officers were the primary reason for sub-performance. 65
Butler found that blacks comprised a significant portion of the Army at 29.1 percent in 1990,
while the overall black population stood at only 12 percent of the American population. 66 By the
time his study was published in 1998, the overall black
numbers had dropped to 26.6 percent while black officer strength remained at 11 percent. 67
A distinct point within his study was the observation that black officers were promoted in
like percentages as other racial groups to the rank of major. Beyond this rank black officer
advancement decreased by half, reducing this select group of field and general grade officers to
only five to six percent of officers in the Army. Although the percentage of black officer
promotions had improved by 2007, black officers still lagged behind significantly in comparison
with white officer promotion rates and especially in selections for commands. There were similar
studies and evaluations that broached this topic in 2008, 2011, and 2014.
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Table 1: Table showing trends of promotion disparity between white and black officers by rank from 1994-2007.

Oddly, Department of Defense studies and remedies to this ongoing problem were not so
dissimilar from the McCloy or Fahy Committee reports. Davis’s impact was a first
layer of change. As an insider, he championed programs within the military that were out of reach
to other African American social and political leaders, but his influence was limited to serve within
the larger interest of the white military structure. In many ways Davis served only as a racial gobetween as the nation struggled through its crisis of merging and utilizing its second-tier black
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citizenry through World War II. Military leaders and the government did not genuinely consider
Davis’s arguments for ending segregation as a long-term “fix” for the military. It would take
continued political and social pressure, outside of the military, to effect this change.
In a true vein of selective historical memory, West Point named its newest barracks in
honor of Benjamin Davis Jr. in 2017.68 Articles written about this commemoration celebrated
Davis Jr.’s ordeal of being ostracized as he navigated through the academy for four years,
enduring the silent treatment and other abuses due to racism. Renaming the barracks in his
honor was viewed by many as the military’s expiation for its ugly past against black servicemen.
The West Point naming committee chair and chair of the academy’s history department, Colonel
Ty Seidule, had noted that Benjamin Davis Jr. had described himself to many as an “invisible
man” while at West Point. 69 Benjamin O. Davis Sr. was mentioned only once in the article. He
was noted as the father of the heroic West Point graduate and as one of two black officers on
active duty at the time of Davis Jr.’s commissioning.
This is Davis Sr.’s historical legacy and placement: the real invisible man. He was a
behind the scenes historical figure that indirectly helped to push the military and greater society
towards the ideal of its founding. Yet, he was exploited by the military and national leadership
during the war. Davis was aware of this position. He knew he was needed during
the war to address the nation’s shortcomings in its treatment of blacks. Once the war ended and
the troops returned to their regular lives, he was forcefully retired. Many of the changes within
the Army that Davis suggested were accepted as only temporary. Once the war ended, and with
Davis taken off active duty, most of the changes implemented during his tenure were rescinded.
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Permanent changes were not made until 1948 under President Truman. This unpalatable fact
leaves his legacy in question.
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